





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BACKGROUNDS FOR SOCIAL WORKERS

EDWARD J. MENGE





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BY

EDWARD J. MENGE, M.A., PH.D., M.Sc.

Author of "The Beginnings of Science"




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
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TO
MY FATHER AND MOTHER

IN TOKEN OF SINCEREST APPRECIATION FOR THE
SACRIFICES THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WILLING
TO MAKE IN ORDER THAT THEIR CHILDREN MIGHT
OBTAIN THOSE ADVANTAGES WHICH THEY THEM-
SELVES HAD TO FORGO

PREFACE

The desire to give to the public this little volume had its origin in the reading of the many articles written on such subjects as Marriage, Divorce, and Immorality, which appeared some years ago when the Royal Divorce Commission of England was sitting, and which desire then resulted in an article by the author, appearing in the *Westminster Review* of August, 1913.

In 1916 the Dallas School of Civics and Philanthropy, founded by Mr. Elmer Scott and placed under the superintendence of Miss Flora Saylor, asked the author to deliver a series of three lectures on "The Family" from the historical viewpoint, which three lectures form three chapters of this book. Two other chapters have already appeared, one each in the University of Dallas Quarterly and the University of Dallas Bulletin.

Especial thanks are due the Reverend Peter P. Finney, C.M., Ph.D., professor of philosophy in the University of Dallas, for reading the entire manuscript and offering many valuable suggestions.

As the book is written with a purpose, I have not hesitated to borrow anywhere and everywhere, and to quote profusely if it seemed valuable that this should be done. Credit has been given wherever another's work has been used and, quite naturally, thanks are extended to all these, and to the Dallas School of Civics and Philanthropy which revived so much of the author's interest in the things of which this book treats.

EDWARD J. MENGE.

University of Dallas, January 18, 1918.

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BACKGROUNDS FOR SOCIAL WORKERS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THIS little volume attempts to present a historic background on which social workers may build. It aims to assist making possible a passing of judgment on the many theories and methods proposed for the betterment of the human race, by presenting something definite—some standard—by which to gauge that which one wishes to judge.

To be thrown in the midst of much reading on any given subject without such gauge would be like finding oneself in the midst of battle without a distinguishing mark by which friend and foe might be differentiated. To distinguish such friend and foe among writers on social subjects we must know one thing thoroughly, and that is the history of the past. This knowledge of the past is the garb that identifies our friends and the lack of it our enemies; but, more than this, the firm facts of history at our command build an impregnable fortress surrounding us and our friends that makes it possible to meet the enemy one at a time and vanquish them as they seek entrance to our mind's citadel.

We are not advancing any new theories of how to improve the race; we are only showing what must be remembered

when any one wishes to advance such theories. We are not here producing a text-book of history, of philosophy, of sociology, or of any of the special sciences, but we are attempting, within the smallest possible space, to give to those who are interested in, and whose work is associated with, Social Service an idea of the past, plus the stressed points that have made the differences among the many and various peoples and nations, as well as a foundation of depth, rooted in all past time, that will not permit the one who takes this information to heart to be swayed by every passing idea of world-betterment regardless of whether there be any ground upon which such theory rests.

We are attempting to show that progress, solely and completely independent of this foundation, would not and could not be progress; that for each individual to begin as soon as he arrives at that age where reasoning is possible, to work out all things for himself, even though he continue to the ripest of old ages, would mean that such individual had progressed no further than did his father, for, if each began at the age of reason to think certain thoughts, and did this independently, each generation's knowledge would die out with that generation, and men would have to begin anew; not from where the parent left off thinking, but at the very beginning that such parent began, and consequently each would end at practically the same point, depending only on his thinking ability and his length of life. But this would be only individual progress—there would be no Race progress in such case. But here we note that it is now a scientific dictum that acquired characteristics are not transmitted to offspring; that is, that any quality that a parent may develop during his lifetime will not be inherited by his child. For example, if one develop the arm muscles to the fullest possible extent, the child of such parent will not

inherit this development, but will in all probability be born with an arm very much akin to the way the parent's arm was at the time of *his* birth. Should, then, the child desire a development of the same arm muscles, he would have to go through the same process of exercises in order to obtain such development. However, we do inherit that which often seems least likely of transmission, namely, the standards, educational, moral, etc., of past times, or, what we usually call Social Inheritance, which means that through the stories we hear from parents and others, called tradition, and the writings of men who have long since passed from the living stage, we are able to profit by what has already been done, and to start where those of the past have left off. This alone can make for any Progress worthy the name.

This being true, it quite naturally follows that he who does not know anything of this past is bound by virtue of that very fact to make any quantity of unpardonable errors, and to waste his life and his thoughts on things that no individual could ever accomplish alone.

One must not, however, pick out of that past only those things which one admires and object to all else; one must not assume that the same act performed by two different persons necessarily has the same motive behind it. The same act and the same result may very often be the outcome of many varying causes. One must not, for example, fail to distinguish between those results and factors which were the common heritage of a given century, and which had nothing whatever to do with that century's beliefs and philosophy, and the rules and promulgations of that institution which men of the middle ages accepted as their supreme court—the Church. We must appreciate the idea thoroughly, that just as the supreme court of our own land does not make any laws, nor propose them, but merely

gives a ruling as to whether they are valid or not—that is, upon their constitutionality, so also the Church gave validity to the laws made in Christian countries by Christian rulers. It had nothing to do with, nor was it responsible for, the making of laws or their enforcement by Christian Emperors and Princes throughout the world. It had no control over these. But because men did believe the Church divinely instituted to validate a given law, being the chosen instrument to guard the Divine Constitution, whenever a law had such validation no man questioned it. He may have questioned its value; he may have questioned its expediency, but he never questioned its validity.

It is most essential that this point be not lost sight of; that it was only as a supreme court of MORAL VALUES that the Church stood for. All else, no matter how much it may have been stressed by certain individual churchmen, was secondary.

And this constitution of the Church was not arbitrary. It was based on the very principles on which all laws are based—that man owed all he had to his Creator, and that it was therefore necessary for man, not being in direct communication with his Creator to have an institution that could, by having its most learned men unite, work out those principles which reason and observation presented, and which the great mass of men being unable to do for themselves, were then bound to accept. And it was this that the Church meant, both to Jew and Christian, and, we may add, even to Pagans—a supreme court of moral values.

It is, however, easy to understand that, such being the case, many Emperors and Princes made laws for their own aggrandizement and therefore often these laws were directly opposed to all that was moral, causing an almost constant opposition by this great Spiritual Court. We must not

blame the Church for that which was done in spite of her powerful antagonism.

It was the fault of those individuals who desired to force their own wills on the peoples of all Europe and Asia and parts of Africa that caused the abuses to be brought in, and it was the Church that stood out predominantly as the defender of the human family—it stood as the only single institution that was above all nations and races and constitutions of men—and which had for its validity the supreme sanction of that Creator from whom Emperors and Princes and all men alike held their power, and to whom all owed allegiance.

It does not matter in the least whether we are very fond of this viewpoint; it does not matter in the least whether we believe it, for neither fondness for a given thing nor belief changes a truth. We must accept the facts that confront us, and, unless we do, the sooner we cease forming opinions and passing judgment on anything and everything, the better will the rest of mankind be.

It was in those days of long ago that men laid greater stress on one's idea of the universe than on any other single factor. Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton has well summed up the differences between our own times and the middle ages in these words:¹ Now "a man's opinion on tram-cars matters; his opinion on Boticelli matters; his opinion on all things does not matter. He may turn over and explore a million objects, but he must not find that strange object, the universe; for if he does he will have a religion, and be lost. Everything matters—except everything."

"Examples are scarcely needed of this total levity on the subject of cosmic philosophy. Examples are scarcely needed to show that whatever else we think of as affecting practical affairs, we do not think it matters whether a man is a pes-

simist or an optimist, a Cartesian or a Hegelian, a materialist or a spiritualist. Let me, however, take a random instance. At any innocent tea-table we may easily hear a man say, 'Life is not worth living.' We regard it as we regard the statement that it is a fine day, nobody thinks that it can possibly have any serious effect on the man or on the world. And yet if that utterance were really believed, the world would stand on its head. Murderers would be given medals for saving men from life; firemen would be denounced for keeping men from death; poisons would be used as medicines; doctors would be called in when people are well; the Royal Humane Society would be rooted out like a horde of assassins. Yet we never speculate as to whether the conversational pessimist will strengthen or disorganise society; for we are convinced that theories do not matter."

But President Hibben of Princeton University has well said ² that "the doctrines of the schools become at last the maxims of the crowd," which means only that the theories advanced by men who aim to teach others their particular viewpoint of life, at last are acted upon by men at large, and are in all reality the complete cause of their action. That, just as the doctrines of the French philosophers were the cause of the horrors of the French Revolution, so theories of life, or philosophies of life are the most potent of all ideas given to man. At present we have an excellent example of such carrying out of a theory on the part of the Bolsheviki of Russia. Trotzky was welcomed to our shores and permitted to advance any and all theories regardless of whether valid or not, and then when our land is at war, and the unification of Russia means much to us as an ally, he is permitted to depart and do untold damage to our cause. But to men at large theories do not matter!

"In the fifteenth century men cross-examined and tor-

mented a man because he preached some immoral attitude; in the nineteenth century we feted and flattered Oscar Wilde because he preached such an attitude, and then broke his heart in penal servitude because he carried it out. It may be a question of which of the two methods was the more cruel; there can be no question which was the more ludicrous. The age of the Inquisition has not at least the disgrace of having produced a society which made an idol of the very same man for preaching the very same things which it made him a convict for practicing."

"Our modern educationists are trying to bring about a religious liberty without attempting to settle what is religion or what is liberty. If the old priests forced a statement on mankind, at least they previously took the trouble to make it lucid. It has been left for the modern mobs of Anglicans and Nonconformists to persecute for a doctrine without even stating it."

An author of a pamphlet making the assertion that a picture of a drunkard's liver would be more efficacious in the matter of teaching temperance than any prayer or praise, called forth this from Mr. Chesterton: "In that picturesque expression, it seems to me, is perfectly embodied the incurable morbidity of modern ethics. In that temple the lights are low, the crowds kneel, the solemn anthems are uplifted. But that upon the altar to which men kneel is no longer the perfect flesh, the body and substance of the perfect man; it is still flesh, but it is diseased. It is the drunkard's liver of the New Testament that is marred for us, which we take in remembrance of him.

"Now it is this great gap in modern ethics, the absence of vivid pictures of purity and spiritual triumph, which lies at the back of the real objection felt by so many sane men to the realistic literature of the nineteenth century."

What disgusts the ordinary man in the subjects chosen by Ibsen, Maupassant and Zola, is not these author's plain language, for that is precisely the language that great quantities of men constantly use, but that these writers show a complete absence of any "clear idealism." "Strong and genuine religious sentiment has never had any objection to realism, on the contrary, religion was the realistic thing, the brutal thing, the thing that called names. This is the great difference between some recent developments of Nonconformity and the great Puritanism of the seventeenth century. It was the whole point of the Puritans that they cared nothing for decency. Modern Nonconformist newspapers distinguish themselves by suppressing precisely those nouns and adjectives which the founders of Nonconformity distinguished themselves by flinging at kings and queens. But if it was the chief claim of religion that it spoke plainly about evil, it was the chief claim of all that it spoke plainly about good. *The thing which is resented, and, as I think, rightly resented, in that great modern literature of which Ibsen is typical, is that while the eye that can perceive what are the wrong things increases in an uncanny and devouring clarity, the eye that sees what things are right is growing mistier and mistier every moment, till it almost goes blind with doubt.*"⁸

"Every one of the popular phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is good. We are fond of talking about 'liberty'; that, as we talk of it, is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about 'progress'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about 'education'; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. The modern man says, 'Let us leave all these arbitrary standards and embrace liberty.' This is logically rendered, 'Let us not decide

what is good, but let it be good not to decide it.' He says, 'Away with your old moral formulæ; I am for progress.' This, logically stated, means, 'Let us not settle what is good, but let us settle whether we are getting more of it.' He says, 'Neither in religion nor morality, my friend, lie the hopes of the race, but in education.' This, clearly expressed, means, 'We cannot decide what is good, but let us give it to our children.'"

Mr. H. G. Wells, in his *Mankind in the Making* "dismissed the ideals of art, religion, abstract morality, and the rest, and says that he is going to consider men in their chief function, the function of parenthood. He is going to discuss life as a 'tissue of births.' He is not going to ask what will produce satisfactory saints and heroes, but what will produce satisfactory father and mothers. The whole is set forward so sensibly that it is a few moments at least before the reader realizes that it is another example of unconscious shirking. What is the good of begetting a man until we have settled what is the good of being a man? You are merely handing on to him a problem you dare not settle for yourself. It is as if a man were asked, 'What is the use of a hammer?' and answered, 'To make other hammers,' and when asked, 'And those hammers, what is the use?' answered, 'To make hammers again.' Just as such a man would be perpetually putting off the question of the ultimate use of carpentry, so Mr. Wells and all the rest of us are by these phrases successfully putting off the question of the ultimate value of human life."

We have quoted Mr. Chesterton at some length, for he has so well summed up not only the foibles and frailties of modern reformers, but has also done that which is far more rare—has shown *what it is that we of this age lack and why*.

This little book is then for men and women who know there is much to be done; who know that unless they take it upon themselves to assist in the doing of those things they probably will not be done, and to make them familiar with the conditions of the past—with the successes and the failures of ages long since gone—with the desires unfulfilled of those who have taught generations now no more.

It has been written for those who desire *to be right* before going ahead; who want to profit by the greatest thoughts of all the world's greatest thinkers; who want to accomplish something that is enduring—something built upon the solid rock of a firm philosophical foundation—that the blasts of emotionalism and irresponsible theorizing may not root from its ground-work.

It is written for those who are seeking something and know what it is they are seeking.

It is written for those who want a *WHY* satisfactorily answered when human betterment is discussed.

Mr. A. G. Gardiner, of the London *Daily News*, well sums up the yearnings of the average man and woman seeking for a betterment of all things without having first settled what is good, in his characterization of the Reverend R. J. Campbell,⁴ where he says, "It is not uncommon to hear him dismissed as a rather crude mind rushing in where wiser men fear to tread, and fighting out his doubts in the public eye. There is a certain truth in the criticism. He is the ordinary man thinking furiously aloud. He is the preacher wrestling with the plain man's doubts in the pulpit. He is not so much fighting for the souls of his hearers as for his own soul, and in that intense drama the man from the counting house and the shop sees mirrored his own disquiet and his own hunger. Perhaps he, too, out of this conflict, may catch a vision of the promised land."

Perhaps! That is exactly what most of us unfamiliar with historic backgrounds, without sympathy for those men who stressed the end for which man was created as the all-important thing ever to hold before one as the guiding star, have for our reward.

This is what we meant when discussing each individual's attempt at working out his own salvation on all things without beginning where others have left off—without the historic background. It means that such a man, at the end of his own career, is no further along than was his great-grandfather at the same period of life. If progress is to come at all, it can come only to the race when all that has gone before is taken into consideration.

As Mr. Gardiner further says of him whom he is discussing, "He invites them out into the open in pursuit of the rainbow. But to the soul adrift from the churches, yet consumed with the hunger for some revelation that the world cannot provide, the pursuit of the rainbow offers an emotion and a vision that stimulate if they do not satisfy."

"He has another defect. It is a certain feverishness of the spirit. There is about him the sense of the hot, uneasy pillow. The raw edges of life chafe him. He cannot escape from the hair-shirt of this mortal vestment, and he cannot endure it. Whatever is, is *wrong*."

"His head is grey in his youth, his eyes eloquent with some nameless hunger, his face thin and pallid, his physique frail as that of an ascetic of the desert, he stands before us a figure of singular fascination and disquiet, a symbol of the world's passionate yearning after the dimly apprehended ideal, of its unquenchable revolt against the agonies of men."

It is for men and women of this type, earnest, conscientious, firm in their desire to do good, without knowing what

good is; it is for men and women drawn out into the open instead of being surrounded by the walls of philosophical truth that this book has been written.

And lastly, it was written for those who, when one discusses the past and suggests the return of anything good then existing, immediately think only of all the unpleasant things likewise then existing, such as bad housing, bad sanitation and the lack of all the many comforts entirely brought into our life in recent times, and who assume that were one to restore a single ancient ideal, all that was bad at the time of such ideal's existence must likewise be restored. These minds, incapable of holding more than a single thought at a given time, are, however, often confused with those who are inclined to concentrate on one subject and therefore discuss nothing else and think of nothing else. This is entirely erroneous, for they should be classified with those children suffering with Dementia Precox because, as in that disease, it is not astonishing that the individual knows so much about one thing, but so astonishing that he knows so little about everything else.

Let us just note that because the old Puritans destroyed the stained glass windows in Oxford University, and because a later generation of more sensible people restored them, it does not follow that the living conditions prior to such destruction either had to be brought back again or were brought back again with their restoration. Because the extremists at the time of the Reformation destroyed so much that we now fain would have, it does not follow that we must, should we restore the good things then taken from us, have to take with them all that was bad.

And so we have arranged our work into a discussion of *what* OUGHT to be done; *when* it OUGHT to be done; several chapters on applying this *WHEN* and this *WHAT* to problems

daily confronting us, and lastly, we have devoted a chapter each to a short and concise statement of historic backgrounds of the Primitive, Mediæval, and Renaissance and Reformation Families, ending with a chapter summarizing all we have said, thereby aiding memory in its epitomizing.

NOTES

1. *Heretics*, by Gilbert K. Chesterton, John Lane Co., 1912, pp. 11-37.

2. *The Problems of Philosophy*, by John Grier Hibben, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898, p. 9.

3. Italics are ours.

4. *Prophets, Priests and Kings*, by A. G. Gardiner, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1914, pp. 240-243.

CHAPTER II

TRAINING

What It Means and When to Get It

IF there be any one thing of greater importance in our business intercourse with our neighbors than another, it is to be able to tell whether the one with whom we are dealing knows his subject—is an expert.

In the ordinary walks of life, there are thousands of things that come to us in which we must seek expert advice. We cannot all know the law, or medicine, or pharmacy, or soils, or poisons, or what food is best suited for ourselves, or what causes success in one and failure in another. We cannot understand why it is that one man has a "streak of luck" and another nothing but one dismal failure after another. We cannot understand why it is that one man, though the brightest in his class, should prove to be nothing but a chronic bore and worthless scamp later on, and another whom one of his teachers may have classified as below normal should have made a great name for himself. We cannot understand why some twins may be so totally unlike, and then again others so much alike in everything. We cannot understand why a man of less training and education is more successful in a large undertaking than another who has had much better opportunities afforded him. We cannot understand why it is that great writers, for example, of the past have often lived in garrets. We cannot understand why some fathers and mothers are constant chums to

their sons and daughters, while in other cases they are not. We cannot understand why sickness and misfortune seem to follow in the wake of one family and not in another. We cannot understand why some children are born healthy and continue so, while others are born weak and sickly and never seem to change. We cannot understand why those who seem to take most medicine are constantly ill and those who take little are in much better health; how some big robust man who has never had a sick day in his life will suddenly be taken with an illness, and die in a short space of time, while a little woman who one would not suppose could live another month, will live for a quarter of a century and eventually become well. The man who loses his job every time he gets one is nonplussed as to the reason, as is the business man who sees a competitor daily take more and more of his customers away. The man who finds when the day's work is done his only consolation in drowning his troubles has difficulty in understanding how another can, under the same circumstances, play golf, read a book or take to the sloping paths beside the river's edge. The man who cannot read a printed page longer than ten minutes before getting nervous, cannot understand how another will, when sorrows weigh greatest upon him, calmly take a volume of some of the heaviest and to him most un-understandable reading, and bring back that poise so necessary to a happy life. The man who spends his time at cards, pool or other games of similar nature cannot understand how another may seek solace in religious pursuits. And the man whose ambition it is to see his children in comfortable circumstances financially, cannot understand how his neighbor will spend every dollar he has to give *his* children a schooling, instead of investing it where these dollars will bring in others *immediately*.

The man who has himself started from the ranks cannot understand why his son should not do likewise. The man of one religious belief finds difficulty in understanding the peculiar traits in his neighbor's mind that permit such a different viewpoint. The man who later on in life finds his children having little interest in his parents, complains about them and cannot understand, while the woman who has slaved and toiled for husband and offspring wonders why it is that those for whom she has worked are not appreciative. The father cannot understand why his sons care for other things than *he thinks he cared for* when a boy, and so with the mother and daughters. And, parents cannot understand why it is that their children are shiftless, when father and mother have always done everything for them, furnishing their incomes, condoning their foibles, permitting every one else to assist them, but not forcing them to help themselves.

And yet all of the things here mentioned have just come to mind during the fifteen minutes we have been writing, without attempting to find any extraordinary cases whatever. If these come all unbidden, how many more thousands of instances might be cited did one make an actual attempt to find these seeming un-understandabilities in the human family?

We have said Expert Advice is one of the most important things in life, and by expert advice we mean all those things—every bit of useful information that is given, which experience proves to be correct, whether it be the best way to build a house or to feed the baby; and, everyone who can give this advice, *not from what he thinks he has discovered by experience*, because that is just the reverse of expert, but, who can give this enlightenment from experience, plus an explanation of why it is true, is an expert in that particular matter.

Observe here that we have said *nothing about sincerity nor intention. What we want is a truthful statement of the case under consideration, plus the ability on the part of the adviser to give a valid reason for his suggestion.* And the person who can do this is an expert in so far as that one particular point is concerned.

Every one of the difficulties mentioned could have been explained and overcome had there been expert advice in each case. The sum and substance of all education is simply and solely to cause one to be able to tell when expert advice is being given and when it is not. Remember, one may be getting *sincere advice that is worth nothing—the intention of the person may be the best in the world and yet everything he says be untrue and dangerous to follow.* This is the stumbling ground of the ordinary man; he cannot tell the difference between sincerity and truth. *He confuses results with the intent the adviser had in bringing about results.* He passes judgment on the number of copies of a book an author sells, for example, instead of whether the author was able to drive home to his readers what he wished to drive home. A man might become the most successful banker in the country, and yet consider himself an utter failure, because all his life his aim and ambition had been to become a great musician.

In order to construct a foundation on which to build, let us just glance at the main organ of thought and call attention to some of the laws that are most evident.

We find that the average weight of the male human brain is as follows:

New-born child.	381 grammes, or about 12	ounces
Child at 1 year	945 grammes, or about 29½	ounces
Child at 5 years	1263 grammes, or about 39½	ounces

Child at 10 years	1408 grammes, or about 44	ounces
Child at 15 years	1490 grammes, or about 46 $\frac{1}{2}$	ounces
Youth at 20 years	1445 grammes, or about 45	ounces
Man at 25 years	1431 grammes, or about 44 2-3	ounces

It is interesting to note that the greatest weight in the male is attained at about 15 years of age. The female brain reaches its maximum weight slightly earlier than this, namely, between ten and fourteen.

Professor Halleck,¹ from whom we quote, well says that

It is probable that in most favored classes in the community, and especially in the case of those who keep the brain properly exercised, the brain weight may keep on increasing until the age of twenty, and possibly to a later period. Venn measured the heads of Cambridge students at various times and found that the head increased in size during the entire course. This has not been shown to be true except in the cases of those who give their brains regular exercise in a judicious way. It is highly probable that such exercise tends to prolong the period of nerve plasticity. The brains furnishing the weight given above did not come from the most favored classes, but they probably afford good average data.

The brain certainly begins to decrease in weight in the latter part of middle life and before old age can be fairly said to have begun. No definite time can be set for the beginning of this decrease; indeed, it probably begins at different times with different people. The brain weights of eminent men who died late in life tend to show that in their case loss of weight is deferred to a late period. Their brains were probably at birth of a superior kind, but the right exercise, judiciously continued into old age, may have been a factor in postponing the decline. Examinations of the convolution immediately in front of the fissure of Rolando have shown the fibres of association increase in number until the age of thirty-three, when a decrease probably begins.

Few if any tracts thus far examined indicate increase after thirty-three, although decrease does not begin in some convolutions until considerably later. As these fibres are required to explain the physical side of thinking, and the association and correlation of activity in various parts of the brain, we should naturally suppose that they would not begin to decrease in number until late in life. The fact that they do not increase after thirty-three agrees with the conclusions of those who believe that no one gets an absolutely new idea into his head after that time.

Early exercise of any kind seems to change the nerve matter in surprising ways, so that its entire subsequent reactions toward certain objects may be afterwards changed. Darwin gives some striking instances of this: "An animal when once accustomed to an unnatural diet, which can generally be affected only during youth, dislikes its proper food, as Spallanzini found to be the case with a pigeon which had been long fed on meat. The caterpillars of the *Bombyx hesperus* feed in a state of nature on leaves of the *Cafe diable*, but after having been reared on the *Ailanthus*, they would not touch the *Cafe diable*, and actually died of hunger."

Human beings afford instances almost as striking as these. If a child is brought up on highly seasoned foods and artificial drinks, he can hardly endure a change later, although the former diet may be ruining his health.

Early training inexorably determines one's attitude toward the world, and even the comfort one takes in this or that sphere.²

Even inanimate things can acquire the habit of making wonderful reaction to stimuli. It is well known that the wood of a Cremona violin, which had been used by the hands of none but masters, gradually acquired a molecular tendency to harmonious resonance. When the instrument was afterwards used by an ordinary player, he was astonished to find that it had a tendency to play well of itself and to refuse to respond to his mistakes by introducing the amount of discord to which he was accustomed. The sooner the idea is exploded that a child should not be taught until

he can see the why and wherefore of things, the better it will be for the world.

To show how dangerous it is to leave an individual's training until he is old enough to think out the reason for it, we quote from the foremost living psychologist, Professor Wm. Wundt, who says, "The old metaphysical prejudice that man 'always thinks' has not yet entirely disappeared. I myself am inclined to hold that man really thinks very little and very seldom. Many an action which looks like a manifestation of intelligence most surely originates in association."

Continuing Professor Halleck's statements:

Acquired tastes are frequently the source of many of the pleasures of life. There are many things in which we have taken no interest originally, things which are positively distasteful at the start, but from these we often grow to receive much enjoyment. From repeated exercise, the nervous system acquires new storage facilities, and new pleasures are the result of using this stored energy.

The entrance to most studies is attended with painful labor; but after awhile they become sources of positive pleasure. It has been well said that acquired tastes are so many acquired ways of getting pleasure from things which are distasteful. Raw oysters, tomatoes, and pickled olives are physical instances. Many studies furnish mental illustrations.

It may be hard to teach an old dog new tricks, but it is still harder work to get him to *enjoy* them.

Lack of fitting exercise at the time when the nervous system is ripe for response is dwarfing in the case of human beings.

It is true that some vocations are subject to less routine than others, and some are for that reason more enjoyable. The student in many lines does not keep repeating the same facts, but he proceeds from new truth to new truth, fre-

And this is the Utilitarian doctrine in a nutshell.

As we have said at the beginning of this chapter, it is necessary to accept one or the other of these theories if we are to have any valid causes assigned as to WHY a given thing is right or wrong, and it is absolutely essential that we do have some validity for our ideas if we wish to place ourselves on any higher level than the rest of the animal world; for, whereas, we all admit that the anatomical or physical structure of some animals and men is very much alike, we all likewise admit that the one great distinguishing feature between men and the lower forms of animals consists in man's ability to rise to greater heights in the mental realm—in the thought world.

There are some animal psychologists who believe they have evidence that animals do considerable thinking also, but this is largely because these men do not give their words³ the same meaning as those who take the opposite view; but, just now we are not arguing this particular point. What we are insisting upon is this: that just in so far as a man does think—that is, just in so far as he obtains a valid reason for his acts and theories, is he removed from the lower forms of animal existence. We all admit this; the abler a man is, the more intellect do we credit him with, and the higher do we place him among other human beings. So in continuing, let us always keep in mind that *this ability to find valid reasons for his acts is the gauge by which we can judge an individual's relative standing among men, and it is also the gauge that separates him from the brute creation.*

Animals work by instinct—that is, they do what they do because they are so constituted that they cannot help themselves—there is no responsibility to be placed upon them mentally, and consequently there can never be any question of morals or ethics among them. But, though man also does

probably most of his acts by instinct, *he does not do them ALL that way*; he is responsible—he has some choice—no matter how limited that may be. It is upon this fact that he has some choice, we pass judgment—that we can justly seek for the intention of the accused whenever a crime has been committed. *It does not matter whether we are able to find the intent or not, it does not matter how difficult it may be to tell whether the person accused committed the act willfully or accidentally*, this factor must be taken into consideration, and we rightly look down with pity on the mental status of those savage tribes who are so low in the scale of intelligence that they insist on the life of a member of the tribe or family of him who has accidentally killed one of their own members, being unable to make any distinction between intentional and accidental killing; who can only see that a *death has occurred, and some one must pay the penalty.*

Just in so far as a person is able to make fine distinctions is he trained in his particular line. To make the matter clearer: Supposing a person were asked the relative values of various pieces of silk, he who could not distinguish but three different types when twelve were present would not be as able to pass judgment as he who could distinguish the twelve. We are not trying to contend that he who merely tries to juggle with words is he who can distinguish most in the intellectual world, but we do insist that a man tell what his words mean, so that there will be no misunderstanding. And we do not mean that one who can find most words that will add more darkness than light to a given question is the more eminent, but we do mean that **ONLY WHEN THERE ARE VARIOUS DIFFERENCES**, he who can distinguish them is the abler man in that particular field, though it be the only one in which he may be.

This being true, it must follow that just in so far as one

can give a valid reason WHY his acts and thoughts and words are correct, does he distinguish himself from the lower animals. To again make this matter clear, we may say that in view of the fact that the great mass of acts performed by animals as well as men are instinctive, still, though, they may be performed by instinct, or may originate through instinctive processes, it requires intelligence if reasons are to be assigned and explanations given,—and reasons and explanations are demanded of man alone. An act that is purely instinctive is done without any regard to Right and Wrong—it is performed simply because the organism performing it is built to perform it and cannot do otherwise. An act of this kind cannot be right or wrong, because *when one cannot help himself, there is no responsibility, and, there being no responsibility, there can be no such thing as Right or Wrong*. Let us take a dog, or a cow, doing an act because it feels like it—because there is an instinctive process or nervous impulse that makes it want to do this. We do not consider the matter of responsibility in passing judgment, consequently we neither praise nor blame. So, too, if a person act simply because he feels like it—because he wants to act—without any further reason—because he instinctively feels he must act, without *thinking* of what the act is, what it means, and why he does it, as well as the result that may follow, he certainly cannot be classified any higher in the intellectual world than the dog or cow. It is only in so far as he can assign a reason for the faith that is in him, for the act he is to perform, that he deserves consideration from a human viewpoint—from an intellectual viewpoint. It is for this reason that an emotional individual, no matter how sincere, no matter how able he may be to carry forth his doctrines, will do so much harm; because, following in the footsteps of the irrational animal

instead of the rational, he does not reckon the results that flow from his act. *No man is justified in doing merely what he wishes; merely what he desires; merely what he feels like doing; unless he can assign a reason for it, and, unless he can, he ceases to carry the right of having his ideas being considered worthy of human notice.* These men are on the mental level of the lower animals, for it is only by the reasoning faculty that one can distinguish even the highest forms of animal from the human.

Having defined the two great systems of explaining why Right and Wrong are right and wrong, and shown that only on accepting one of them can any one's opinions be deemed worthy of notice, let us take up the evidences for each in a very brief manner.

First, if there is a God, absolute, eternal, good, there can be no doubt as to the Transcendentalists standing on the safest ground.

Second, if that God created the human race as well as everything else that exists, there can be no doubt of an obligation existing between Creator and the rational creature.

Third, if a man is a rational animal—that is, if he is only distinguishable from the lower animals by his power of reasoning (even though he may not use his distinguishing power very often), it must follow that the laws of conduct as well as the laws of everything else, must be apprehended through this ability at reasoning, and these laws must be so arranged as to be understandable and have a meaning to the collective reason of intelligent human beings—that is, one must find one's first principles, and then logically build up one's ideas so they have a meaning.

Fourth, that if man is a reasoning animal, *all men have this ability of reasoning in common, though some may have*

much more of it than others; and,

Fifth, if all men have the faculty, the use of which distinguishes them from the lower forms of animals, it is only in so far as this faculty is used that men may consider themselves above other forms of living creatures. This has been summed up poetically by some one in these words: Life sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal and comes to full blossom in the human family.

Now, as Herbert Spencer himself has said:

“Judging whether another proves his position is a widely different thing from proving your own. To establish a general law requires an extensive knowledge of the phenomena to be generalized, but to decide whether an alleged general law is established by the evidence assigned merely requires an adequate reasoning faculty. Especially is such the case when the premises do not warrant the conclusion.”

There are many men with wonderfully acute minds; minds that can see the greatest number of possible applications to a law; minds that can, it seems, intuitively see the many ramifications into which a given act may and does lead; and, because of this scintillating brilliance—because of the immense number of rays from their intellect lighting up so many paths—we are oftentimes blinded to the fact that it is only a great area they cover, but, that penetration is not theirs. They are acute, but not profound. As Lord Macaulay somewhere says, we must not confuse the poisonous effect of the venom on the arrow's point with the strength with which the bow was drawn. But the very breadth of such minds startles and confuses. Few men are analytic, and on that account it is the acute mind that leads most men astray. It is this type of mind that spreads over so much territory, that it sees nothing deeply; which throws aside fundamental principles, for fundamentals require depth, and

where there is no depth there can be no principles. Brilliancy, and sparkling intellectual effervescence have usurped the place of profundity.

We can readily understand this, however, when we remember what has been said on the necessity of training in fundamentals—in principles—during the plastic period of youth. These acutely minded men have not had this training, or it has been applied in a most narrow field, and this narrow field, spreading out as the years went on, became the only vision their eyes could behold—all else was out of focus. And, just as everything outside the focus of the camera is blurred, so, too, with the camera of the intellect—just as the brilliancy of that which is in focus outshines all the blurred parts, these men having concentrated so long on the picture, forget that because a thing is blurred and cannot be minutely examined, and does not clearly show, does not mean that it doesn't exist. In fact, it means just the reverse—that the blurred part does exist—but that he who looks is burdened by a limited sight.

Our chapter of "The Ideal" ⁴ has covered the first and second statements. The third, fourth and fifth will be accepted as they stand.

But as the minds of those who hold the Utilitarian viewpoint have not received the proper training during the plastic period, or at least but a portion of what should have been given, the argument has largely descended to this:

If, as the Transcendentalists hold, the whole code of morality is obtained through our interpretation of the natural and the supernatural law, it follows that there can be no morality without Religion, because Religion means the relation of man to his Maker, and if there be no Maker, there can be no supernatural law, and, therefore, any code of

morals that is acceptable must come from what reason alone tells us, or what reason alone can interpret from the actual experience of everyday life.

There are many very able men who hold that morality had no relation whatever to Religion in the days gone by.

There are those who hold that if it is necessary for one to have a God by all means have one, but that it shows a better and higher form of moral fibre if He isn't needed.

How are we going to adjust these seemingly conflicting ideas? Are these men fools who object to the very principles on which their opponents insist? By no means. Many of them are more brilliant than those who are defending a sounder doctrine, but brilliancy has nothing to do with TRUTH. A thing remains just as true if every man on the side of Right should prove to be foolish, and a thing remains an untruth, even though every able thinker in the world object to it. What does it matter as to the truth or untruth *of the fact*, if only an idiot see a man's body disappear in a mass of quicklime, and all the keepers at the institution where this idiot is confined insist that it be not so? Let us get away from the absurd notion that because a learned man says a thing, that makes it true. Spencer's statement quoted above is perfectly correct—that all it takes to disprove a man's theory is to show it is not logical, and, by the very reasons that make reason worth anything must it fall by its own absurdity.

These men whose brilliancy of intellect exceeds their depth, whose lack of fundamental principles puts everything out of focus, may speak with the utmost authority on that which lies within their focus, but on nothing else. They cease to be brilliant or great or authoritative on anything except their field. Do not misunderstand this. Some men are versatile, and have more than one line of work in focus,

but not very many of them have.

And when these men say religion had nothing to do with morality they are right in what they mean, but wrong in what they say. For *they have mistaken some particular form of religion for Religion.* They have not taken the time to find out what their opponents actually mean, and jump into the fray to fight but a windmill which they have quixotically transformed into a giant. It is perfectly true that morality is independent of any one particular form of religion. The particular sect or form of faith one may acknowledge merely interprets what it considers morality means. *But one must have something to interpret before interpretation is possible.* Morality was always existent, regardless of any changing interpretation different forms of religions may have placed upon it.

If there be no religion—that is, if there be no relation of man to his Maker—there can be no obligation of any kind, for it can validly be asked by what *right* any one man or set of men can ask obedience of another man or set of men. There is no right in such a case—only the force of superior strength.

But, it is objected, are not men moral without religion? Is not Professor Huxley's contention true, "I do not for one moment admit that morality is not strong enough to hold its own"? Did he not show by his own life of extreme fairness in his discussions to both friend and enemy, that he was better and much more moral, at least in this respect, than were many of the so-called Transcendentalists?

Mr. W. S. Lilly has well said in answer, that "the vital question is not what this accomplished physicist will admit, but what, as a matter of fact, does happen, and from the nature of the case must happen. No doubt Professor Huxley, emancipated from belief in angel or spirit, still guides

himself by the same ethical rules as before. I do not myself know anything of the early training of this illustrious man. But I suppose that, like the rest of us, he was brought up upon the Catechism. At all events, I am quite sure that he is the product of many generations of Christian progenitors. What M. Renan happily calls the moral sap of the old belief—*'la seve morale de la vielle croyance'*—still courses through his spiritual being. His materialism takes credit for virtues springing from quite another source.

"He knows, far better than I do, the influence of heredity and of environment upon character. He is well aware how deeply rooted in the past are those ethical principles whereby human life is still largely governed, even among materialists. The question is, can you uproot those principles and expect them to flourish upon quite different soil? Morality, in Professor Huxley, I can well believe, is strong enough to hold its own. But will it be strong enough in Professor Huxley's great-grandchildren? 'It takes several generations of Christian morality to get into the blood,' the missionaries in Samoa told Baron von Hübner. It will doubtless take several generations for Christian morality to get out of the blood. And then? Not, indeed, that I am now pleading for Christianity. Still less am I pleading for any special form of it. There is little in Christian morality that is exclusively Christian. And I am not prepared to assert that many of the most precious of the ethical elements of our civilization might not survive a general decay of specifically Christian doctrines. I am at present merely pointing to the fact that as the metaphysical dogmas, enumerated in a previous page, have lost their hold upon the popular mind, the ethical conceptions for which they served as a basis have fallen into discredit."

Here lies the crux of the whole matter, for without a

reasonable motive for doing right, one cannot validly claim credit for rightness. Observe the difference between the moral and the intellectual realm, so often confused. Morals have to do with guilt or innocence of a responsible human being, when being judged for the committal of an act that is unlawful in the moral order, and which was deliberately done. Here INTENT and SINCERITY are paramount, but the intellectual question with which we would be concerned in this case is, "Have I the mental ability to give a valid reason as to *why* this particular act is wrong or right, as the case may be?" In other words, in the moral realm it is a question of guilt or innocence; in the intellectual, of mental ability at reasoning. The one is, "Did I or did I not obey the law?" The other is, "Why should the law be what it is?"

It is not the result of an act so much that counts in the moral realm; it is the intent of the actor. That a man may have been killed is only right or wrong in so far as the intent which brought the killing about was right or wrong. Were it an accident there certainly could be no question of morality. Yes, even in case of war, let us suppose a man is caught and convicted of a most heinous offense, and from all appearances and all the evidence, the same thing would continuously occur, were he set at liberty. There are no prisons in camp. It may be right on the principle of self-defense, to even insist on his being killed.

A man must follow the dictates of his conscience and here he must be sincere or he is to be condemned, but he must have a *certain* conscience; that is, he must have taken all steps necessary to obtain proof that he is correct in his judgment. In other words, a man must sincerely follow out the dictates of the still, small voice, but he must just as

surely obtain all that knowledge and information which it is essential every person as a member of human society must have. We may even allow his instincts and emotions to furnish the power that drives him on, in whatever acts he perform, but, unless the intellect guide the driving force, and he remain within the speed limit, he is bound, sooner or later, to run amuck. We mean by this that his instincts, with which he was born as well as those later acquired, which have largely resulted in his likes and dislikes, are valid sources of power to cause action, but his thought capacity is the engineer that should be the guide, and the moral law is in this case used to exemplify the speed limit.

If all this be borne in mind, it can readily be seen that without some valid reason for living a moral life—that is, without Religion (not some particular sect, or some particular form of religion)—there can be nothing moral or immoral. No matter how good a life a person may lead, if he do so simply because he *feels* that way, there is neither moral nor intellectual fibre present—it is all a matter of pure emotionalism, and that person is just as much to be condemned as is the person who lives an evil life for the same reason—namely, that he *feels* like it. *It is the intention of the actor* that must be taken into consideration. All our laws admit this, but simply because it is often very difficult to find this intention, and sometimes impossible, there are those who forget that we, nevertheless, have to look for it if we are to pass judgment with any degree of validity. And whether a person perform an act, either good or bad, if it be done without moral intent, and without the ability to know why it is being done, the intellectual level of that person falls to the lowest possible human ebb, and sometimes below even the human. To do a thing willfully because one knows it to be right is good, and to do a thing because one

knows it to be evil is bad. It is the intention, and not the act, that must be discussed whenever we have for our subject-matter MORAL RIGHT and WRONG.

As we have shown, no man or set of men can claim allegiance to their doctrine unless they accept a Superior Being to whom they owe an obligation, and from whose works they are able, by their reasoning faculties, to discover a law. Just in so far as this Supreme Being's discovered laws are then cast aside, does there exist any Wrong, and, this being so, any theories adduced to substantiate a form of belief not resting on an obligation to a Creator, in any moral code must be based on the principle of force—of the majority or the strongest insisting on the minority or the weaker in doing what it considers should be done. In fact, it is but the deification of brute force.

We must not forget that majorities have nothing whatever to do with Right or Wrong, or with Truth. It cannot matter what a majority might say about mosquitoes infecting human beings with malaria. If mosquitoes produce malaria in the human being, they will go on doing so regardless of whether every man, woman and child in the country votes that they do not. Truth is not and cannot be subject to vote. And, as far as Right and Wrong are concerned, if there is a Supreme Being we owe Him allegiance, for if He is the first and ultimate cause of our being, we have an obligation existing, that, no matter if the entire universe unite in rejecting, is still there.

In the Utilitarian viewpoint, as Bentham expressed it, Crime is really a miscalculation, an error in arithmetic. And Mr. John Morley says, "Moral principles, when they are true, are at bottom only registered generalizations from experience," and, "human society is not an organism, but a machine—just as the individual men of whom it is composed

are machines, a kind of company, as some one has happily expressed it, which insures against risks by applying the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, the taxes being the premium" (p. 43).

In this field one sees very fully the doctrine "that the end justifies the means," which is so often attributed to the Jesuits, but which no one has yet been able to show any Jesuit, or, for that matter, any intelligent individual who believed in an absolute standard of morals, ever did approve.

Mr. Lecky has aptly observed that the only charge Utilitarians can bring against vice is imprudence, and when, as in our own day, this doctrine has been taught in the schools, is it any wonder that so many consider that crime consists only in being found out, not in its committal?

"Certain to me is the reasonableness of the universe. It is cosmos, not chaos. Be its final cause immeasurably distant from our knowledge, yet every part of the process through which it moves is found, when examined, to be intelligible. 'Nothing is that errs from law.' There are mysteries, indeed, and locked doors everywhere. As Hegel saw, every convex is concave, and every concave convex. But this is not contradiction nor unreason. Certain also to me is the supremacy of duty. Whatever is doubtful, of this I am ineffably sure, that right I must do, whatever the result; that on the side of right I must be whether it triumph or not" (p. 59).

And it is on the basis of reason that our ideas of Right and Wrong must rest. Again quoting Mr. Lilly, who is speaking of Utilitarians, "No sort of compromise, no kind of *modus vivendi*, appears to me possible between the two schools of Transcendentalism and Materialism. I admit, indeed, that we may learn much from many teachers whose

theories I judge false. Let us gladly accept these facts. Let us narrowly scrutinize their arguments. The writers whom I have in view, however admirable in other respects, are assuredly great corrupters of words. Too often they exhibit the smallest power of distinguishing between a nude hypothesis and a proved conclusion. They omit necessary links in their reasoning, as when, for example, they pass at a bound over the unbridged gulf between automatic consciousness and deliberate volition. They tell us, perhaps not quite accurately, that the brain is the organ of thought, and they proceed to argue as though they had demonstrated that it is the *cause* of thought, and that intellect is a mere 'cerebral phenomenon.' They talk glibly of causation, as if they knew all about it, overlooking their entire inability to analyze the causal nexus" (p. 61).

We might say, as some chemist has well said, regarding the formation of things chemically, we have the same idea of the process itself that a man would have about Hamlet were he to enter the theater just as the curtain rose when that drama was to be performed, then leave immediately and re-enter just as it fell. We know nothing about the process itself. We see our own acts and then we see the results, but the how and why of the process we do not know.

There is no doubt that all theories after Spencer's time will have to take the facts he so industriously collected into consideration, as well as his speculations into which he fitted them, but this is entirely different from assuming that his particular form of evolution on which all his theory rests will be accepted.

Let us then sum up. Utilitarianism is based simply and solely on the pleasure-pain concept. Simply on *How one feels*. It is, therefore, purely emotional, and not deserving intellectual consideration. Bentham says, "Pleasure and

Pain govern the world. It is for these two sovereign masters alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."

But, as Mr. Lilly answers, "Well, but surely the pleasure and pain which come home to the individual are his individual pleasure and pain. The idea of duty differs by the whole diameter of existence from the idea of delectation. But they tell us, 'Our sole experimental and scientific criterion of human action—the greatest happiness of the greatest number—does carry with it an obligation. The precept really is: Work for the general advantage, for you will find your own advantage in doing so.' To this I reply first: Where is the obligation, the binding tie? In place of it you present me with nothing but a mere motive. And in the second place I observe that the proposition on which the motive is based is untenable. It is by no means universally true that by working for the general advantage I shall find my own. On the contrary, upon many occasions, the general advantage points one way and my private advantage another. Nay, is it too much to say that my own private and personal advantage will seldom be identical with the general advantage in a world where the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest are the primary laws?" (pp. 49-50).

And again: "As Mr. Lecky has said, the only 'charge Utilitarians can bring against vice is imprudence.' But even supposing that the charge could be sustained, prudence is one thing, duty another. Prudence rests upon the calculations of self-love. Duty means abnegation of self and obedience to the unconditioned command of Right. The first note of the moral law, as of all law, is obligation. To sacrifice my private gratification to the general welfare may be an admirable rule if it comes to me in the name of Right. Not

so if it appeals to me in the name of Utility. I ask what is useful for myself, for my own delectation. Why should I not, if man is merely a pleasurable animal? Do not mistake me. I grant pleasure is a mighty spring of individual life. I admit that it is a good at which the human will legitimately aim. But I deny that it is the source of ethics. The only morality you can derive from it is the morality of money, for which pleasures, physical and intellectual, of all kinds may be purchased" (pp. 48-49).

The moral law is the very *raison d'être* of government. "Man as man, has no claim upon my obedience. Only to the law of Right, speaking through human ministers, is my obedience due. And here is to be found the underlying principle which makes criminal justice just. The moral law apprehended, *not made*, by our practical reason, implies that right is rewarded and wrong punished. That, as we have seen, is involved in the very conception of law. Penal jurisprudence is simply a moral judgment exhibited in visible form. Thus Aquinas, with his usual clearness and precision: 'The law of nature'—the law arising by Divine Reason, which is the nature of things—'proclaims that he who offends should be punished. But to define that this or that punishment should be inflicted upon him is a determination drawn from the law of nature by human law'" (p. 129).

"A man has not a right to do what he likes with his own. He only has a right to do what he ought with his own; which, after all, is his own in a very qualified sense. The only things which a man can in strictness call his own—and even here he is under the law of conscience—are his spiritual, intellectual and physical faculties. The material object on which he exercises these faculties is subject to a higher ownership than his; to the indefeasible title of the human race, represented to him by the com-

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probably most of his acts by instinct, *he does not do them ALL that way; he is responsible—he has some choice—no matter how limited that may be.* It is upon this fact that he has some choice, we pass judgment—that we can justly seek for the intention of the accused whenever a crime has been committed. *It does not matter whether we are able to find the intent or not, it does not matter how difficult it may be to tell whether the person accused committed the act willfully or accidentally,* this factor must be taken into consideration, and we rightly look down with pity on the mental status of those savage tribes who are so low in the scale of intelligence that they insist on the life of a member of the tribe or family of him who has accidentally killed one of their own members, being unable to make any distinction between intentional and accidental killing; who can only see that a *death has occurred, and some one must pay the penalty.*

Just in so far as a person is able to make fine distinctions is he trained in his particular line. To make the matter clearer: Supposing a person were asked the relative values of various pieces of silk, he who could not distinguish but three different types when twelve were present would not be as able to pass judgment as he who could distinguish the twelve. We are not trying to contend that he who merely tries to juggle with words is he who can distinguish most in the intellectual world, but we do insist that a man tell what his words mean, so that there will be no misunderstanding. And we do not mean that one who can find most words that will add more darkness than light to a given question is the more eminent, but we do mean that *ONLY WHEN THERE ARE VARIOUS DIFFERENCES*, he who can distinguish them is the abler man in that particular field, though it be the only one in which he may be.

This being true, it must follow that just in so far as one

can give a valid reason WHY his acts and thoughts and words are correct, does he distinguish himself from the lower animals. To again make this matter clear, we may say that in view of the fact that the great mass of acts performed by animals as well as men are instinctive, still, though, they may be performed by instinct, or may originate through instinctive processes, it requires intelligence if reasons are to be assigned and explanations given,—and reasons and explanations are demanded of man alone. An act that is purely instinctive is done without any regard to Right and Wrong—it is performed simply because the organism performing it is built to perform it and cannot do otherwise. An act of this kind cannot be right or wrong, because *when one cannot help himself, there is no responsibility, and, there being no responsibility, there can be no such thing as Right or Wrong.* Let us take a dog, or a cow, doing an act because it feels like it—because there is an instinctive process or nervous impulse that makes it want to do this. We do not consider the matter of responsibility in passing judgment, consequently we neither praise nor blame. So, too, if a person act simply because he feels like it—because he wants to act—without any further reason—because he instinctively feels he must act, without *thinking* of what the act is, what it means, and why he does it, as well as the result that may follow, he certainly cannot be classified any higher in the intellectual world than the dog or cow. It is only in so far as he can assign a reason for the faith that is in him, for the act he is to perform, that he deserves consideration from a human viewpoint—from an intellectual viewpoint. It is for this reason that an emotional individual, no matter how sincere, no matter how able he may be to carry forth his doctrines, will do so much harm; because, following in the footsteps of the irrational animal

instead of the rational, he does not reckon the results that flow from his act. *No man is justified in doing merely what he wishes; merely what he desires; merely what he feels like doing; unless he can assign a reason for it, and, unless he can, he ceases to carry the right of having his ideas being considered worthy of human notice.* These men are on the mental level of the lower animals, for it is only by the reasoning faculty that one can distinguish even the highest forms of animal from the human.

Having defined the two great systems of explaining why Right and Wrong are right and wrong, and shown that only on accepting one of them can any one's opinions be deemed worthy of notice, let us take up the evidences for each in a very brief manner.

First, if there is a God, absolute, eternal, good, there can be no doubt as to the Transcendentalists standing on the safest ground.

Second, if that God created the human race as well as everything else that exists, there can be no doubt of an obligation existing between Creator and the rational creature.

Third, if a man is a rational animal—that is, if he is only distinguishable from the lower animals by his power of reasoning (even though he may not use his distinguishing power very often), it must follow that the laws of conduct as well as the laws of everything else, must be apprehended through this ability at reasoning, and these laws must be so arranged as to be understandable and have a meaning to the collective reason of intelligent human beings—that is, one must find one's first principles, and then logically build up one's ideas so they have a meaning.

Fourth, that if man is a reasoning animal, *all men have this ability of reasoning in common, though some may have*

much more of it than others; and,

Fifth, if all men have the faculty, the use of which distinguishes them from the lower forms of animals, it is only in so far as this faculty is used that men may consider themselves above other forms of living creatures. This has been summed up poetically by some one in these words: Life sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal and comes to full blossom in the human family.

Now, as Herbert Spencer himself has said:

“Judging whether another proves his position is a widely different thing from proving your own. To establish a general law requires an extensive knowledge of the phenomena to be generalized, but to decide whether an alleged general law is established by the evidence assigned merely requires an adequate reasoning faculty. Especially is such the case when the premises do not warrant the conclusion.”

There are many men with wonderfully acute minds; minds that can see the greatest number of possible applications to a law; minds that can, it seems, intuitively see the many ramifications into which a given act may and does lead; and, because of this scintillating brilliance—because of the immense number of rays from their intellect lighting up so many paths—we are oftentimes blinded to the fact that it is only a great area they cover, but, that penetration is not theirs. They are acute, but not profound. As Lord Macaulay somewhere says, we must not confuse the poisonous effect of the venom on the arrow's point with the strength with which the bow was drawn. But the very breadth of such minds startles and confuses. Few men are analytic, and on that account it is the acute mind that leads most men astray. It is this type of mind that spreads over so much territory, that it sees nothing deeply; which throws aside fundamental principles, for fundamentals require depth, and

where there is no depth there can be no principles. Brilliancy, and sparkling intellectual effervescence have usurped the place of profundity.

We can readily understand this, however, when we remember what has been said on the necessity of training in fundamentals—in principles—during the plastic period of youth. These acutely minded men have not had this training, or it has been applied in a most narrow field, and this narrow field, spreading out as the years went on, became the only vision their eyes could behold—all else was out of focus. And, just as everything outside the focus of the camera is blurred, so, too, with the camera of the intellect—just as the brilliancy of that which is in focus outshines all the blurred parts, these men having concentrated so long on the picture, forget that because a thing is blurred and cannot be minutely examined, and does not clearly show, does not mean that it doesn't exist. In fact, it means just the reverse—that the blurred part does exist—but that he who looks is burdened by a limited sight.

Our chapter of "The Ideal" ⁴ has covered the first and second statements. The third, fourth and fifth will be accepted as they stand.

But as the minds of those who hold the Utilitarian viewpoint have not received the proper training during the plastic period, or at least but a portion of what should have been given, the argument has largely descended to this:

If, as the Transcendentalists hold, the whole code of morality is obtained through our interpretation of the natural and the supernatural law, it follows that there can be no morality without Religion, because Religion means the relation of man to his Maker, and if there be no Maker, there can be no supernatural law, and, therefore, any code of

morals that is acceptable must come from what reason alone tells us, or what reason alone can interpret from the actual experience of everyday life.

There are many very able men who hold that morality had no relation whatever to Religion in the days gone by.

There are those who hold that if it is necessary for one to have a God by all means have one, but that it shows a better and higher form of moral fibre if He isn't needed.

How are we going to adjust these seemingly conflicting ideas? Are these men fools who object to the very principles on which their opponents insist? By no means. Many of them are more brilliant than those who are defending a sounder doctrine, but brilliancy has nothing to do with TRUTH. A thing remains just as true if every man on the side of Right should prove to be foolish, and a thing remains an untruth, even though every able thinker in the world object to it. What does it matter as to the truth or untruth *of the fact*, if only an idiot see a man's body disappear in a mass of quicklime, and all the keepers at the institution where this idiot is confined insist that it be not so? Let us get away from the absurd notion that because a learned man says a thing, that makes it true. Spencer's statement quoted above is perfectly correct—that all it takes to disprove a man's theory is to show it is not logical, and, by the very reasons that make reason worth anything must it fall by its own absurdity.

These men whose brilliancy of intellect exceeds their depth, whose lack of fundamental principles puts everything out of focus, may speak with the utmost authority on that which lies within their focus, but on nothing else. They cease to be brilliant or great or authoritative on anything except their field. Do not misunderstand this. Some men are versatile, and have more than one line of work in focus,

but not very many of them have.

And when these men say religion had nothing to do with morality they are right in what they mean, but wrong in what they say. For *they have mistaken some particular form of religion for Religion.* They have not taken the time to find out what their opponents actually mean, and jump into the fray to fight but a windmill which they have quixotically transformed into a giant. It is perfectly true that morality is independent of any one particular form of religion. The particular sect or form of faith one may acknowledge merely interprets what it considers morality means. *But one must have something to interpret before interpretation is possible.* Morality was always existent, regardless of any changing interpretation different forms of religions may have placed upon it.

If there be no religion—that is, if there be no relation of man to his Maker—there can be no obligation of any kind, for it can validly be asked by what *right* any one man or set of men can ask obedience of another man or set of men. There is no right in such a case—only the force of superior strength.

But, it is objected, are not men moral without religion? Is not Professor Huxley's contention true, "I do not for one moment admit that morality is not strong enough to hold its own"? Did he not show by his own life of extreme fairness in his discussions to both friend and enemy, that he was better and much more moral, at least in this respect, than were many of the so-called Transcendentalists?

Mr. W. S. Lilly has well said in answer, that "the vital question is not what this accomplished physicist will admit, but what, as a matter of fact, does happen, and from the nature of the case must happen. No doubt Professor Huxley, emancipated from belief in angel or spirit, still guides

himself by the same ethical rules as before. I do not myself know anything of the early training of this illustrious man. But I suppose that, like the rest of us, he was brought up upon the Catechism. At all events, I am quite sure that he is the product of many generations of Christian progenitors. What M. Renan happily calls the moral sap of the old belief—*‘la sève morale de la vieille croyance’*—still courses through his spiritual being. His materialism takes credit for virtues springing from quite another source.

“He knows, far better than I do, the influence of heredity and of environment upon character. He is well aware how deeply rooted in the past are those ethical principles whereby human life is still largely governed, even among materialists. The question is, can you uproot those principles and expect them to flourish upon quite different soil? Morality, in Professor Huxley, I can well believe, is strong enough to hold its own. But will it be strong enough in Professor Huxley’s great-grandchildren? ‘It takes several generations of Christian morality to get into the blood,’ the missionaries in Samoa told Baron von Hübner. It will doubtless take several generations for Christian morality to get out of the blood. And then? Not, indeed, that I am now pleading for Christianity. Still less am I pleading for any special form of it. There is little in Christian morality that is exclusively Christian. And I am not prepared to assert that many of the most precious of the ethical elements of our civilization might not survive a general decay of specifically Christian doctrines. I am at present merely pointing to the fact that as the metaphysical dogmas, enumerated in a previous page, have lost their hold upon the popular mind, the ethical conceptions for which they served as a basis have fallen into discredit.”

Here lies the crux of the whole matter, for without a

reasonable motive for doing right, one cannot validly claim credit for rightness. Observe the difference between the moral and the intellectual realm, so often confused. Morals have to do with guilt or innocence of a responsible human being, when being judged for the committal of an act that is unlawful in the moral order, and which was deliberately done. Here INTENT and SINCERITY are paramount, but the intellectual question with which we would be concerned in this case is, "Have I the mental ability to give a valid reason as to *why* this particular act is wrong or right, as the case may be?" In other words, in the moral realm it is a question of guilt or innocence; in the intellectual, of mental ability at reasoning. The one is, "Did I or did I not obey the law?" The other is, "Why should the law be what it is?"

It is not the result of an act so much that counts in the moral realm; it is the intent of the actor. That a man may have been killed is only right or wrong in so far as the intent which brought the killing about was right or wrong. Were it an accident there certainly could be no question of morality. Yes, even in case of war, let us suppose a man is caught and convicted of a most heinous offense, and from all appearances and all the evidence, the same thing would continuously occur, were he set at liberty. There are no prisons in camp. It may be right on the principle of self-defense, to even insist on his being killed.

A man must follow the dictates of his conscience and here he must be sincere or he is to be condemned, but he must have a *certain* conscience; that is, he must have taken all steps necessary to obtain proof that he is correct in his judgment. In other words, a man must sincerely follow out the dictates of the still, small voice, but he must just as

surely obtain all that knowledge and information which it is essential every person as a member of human society must have. We may even allow his instincts and emotions to furnish the power that drives him on, in whatever acts he perform, but, unless the intellect guide the driving force, and he remain within the speed limit, he is bound, sooner or later, to run amuck. We mean by this that his instincts, with which he was born as well as those later acquired, which have largely resulted in his likes and dislikes, are valid sources of power to cause action, but his thought capacity is the engineer that should be the guide, and the moral law is in this case used to exemplify the speed limit.

If all this be borne in mind, it can readily be seen that without some valid reason for living a moral life—that is, without Religion (not some particular sect, or some particular form of religion)—there can be nothing moral or immoral. No matter how good a life a person may lead, if he do so simply because he *feels* that way, there is neither moral nor intellectual fibre present—it is all a matter of pure emotionalism, and that person is just as much to be condemned as is the person who lives an evil life for the same reason—namely, that he *feels* like it. *It is the intention of the actor* that must be taken into consideration. All our laws admit this, but simply because it is often very difficult to find this intention, and sometimes impossible, there are those who forget that we, nevertheless, have to look for it if we are to pass judgment with any degree of validity. And whether a person perform an act, either good or bad, if it be done without moral intent, and without the ability to know why it is being done, the intellectual level of that person falls to the lowest possible human ebb, and sometimes below even the human. To do a thing willfully because one knows it to be right is good, and to do a thing because one

knows it to be evil is bad. It is the intention, and not the act, that must be discussed whenever we have for our subject-matter MORAL RIGHT and WRONG.

As we have shown, no man or set of men can claim allegiance to their doctrine unless they accept a Superior Being to whom they owe an obligation, and from whose works they are able, by their reasoning faculties, to discover a law. Just in so far as this Supreme Being's discovered laws are then cast aside, does there exist any Wrong, and, this being so, any theories adduced to substantiate a form of belief not resting on an obligation to a Creator, in any moral code must be based on the principle of force—of the majority or the strongest insisting on the minority or the weaker in doing what it considers should be done. In fact, it is but the deification of brute force.

We must not forget that majorities have nothing whatever to do with Right or Wrong, or with Truth. It cannot matter what a majority might say about mosquitoes infecting human beings with malaria. If mosquitoes produce malaria in the human being, they will go on doing so regardless of whether every man, woman and child in the country votes that they do not. Truth is not and cannot be subject to vote. And, as far as Right and Wrong are concerned, if there is a Supreme Being we owe Him allegiance, for if He is the first and ultimate cause of our being, we have an obligation existing, that, no matter if the entire universe unite in rejecting, is still there.

In the Utilitarian viewpoint, as Bentham expressed it, Crime is really a miscalculation, an error in arithmetic. And Mr. John Morley says, "Moral principles, when they are true, are at bottom only registered generalizations from experience," and, "human society is not an organism, but a machine—just as the individual men of whom it is composed

are machines, a kind of company, as some one has happily expressed it, which insures against risks by applying the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, the taxes being the premium" (p. 43).

In this field one sees very fully the doctrine "that the end justifies the means," which is so often attributed to the Jesuits, but which no one has yet been able to show any Jesuit, or, for that matter, any intelligent individual who believed in an absolute standard of morals, ever did approve.

Mr. Lecky has aptly observed that the only charge Utilitarians can bring against vice is imprudence, and when, as in our own day, this doctrine has been taught in the schools, is it any wonder that so many consider that crime consists only in being found out, not in its committal?

"Certain to me is the reasonableness of the universe. It is cosmos, not chaos. Be its final cause immeasurably distant from our knowledge, yet every part of the process through which it moves is found, when examined, to be intelligible. 'Nothing is that errs from law.' There are mysteries, indeed, and locked doors everywhere. As Hegel saw, every convex is concave, and every concave convex. But this is not contradiction nor unreason. Certain also to me is the supremacy of duty. Whatever is doubtful, of this I am ineffably sure, that right I must do, whatever the result; that on the side of right I must be whether it triumph or not" (p. 59).

And it is on the basis of reason that our ideas of Right and Wrong must rest. Again quoting Mr. Lilly, who is speaking of Utilitarians, "No sort of compromise, no kind of *modus vivendi*, appears to me possible between the two schools of Transcendentalism and Materialism. I admit, indeed, that we may learn much from many teachers whose

theories I judge false. Let us gladly accept these facts. Let us narrowly scrutinize their arguments. The writers whom I have in view, however admirable in other respects, are assuredly great corrupters of words. Too often they exhibit the smallest power of distinguishing between a nude hypothesis and a proved conclusion. They omit necessary links in their reasoning, as when, for example, they pass at a bound over the unbridged gulf between automatic consciousness and deliberate volition. They tell us, perhaps not quite accurately, that the brain is the organ of thought, and they proceed to argue as though they had demonstrated that it is the *cause* of thought, and that intellect is a mere 'cerebral phenomenon.' They talk glibly of causation, as if they knew all about it, overlooking their entire inability to analyze the causal nexus" (p. 61).

We might say, as some chemist has well said, regarding the formation of things chemically, we have the same idea of the process itself that a man would have about Hamlet were he to enter the theater just as the curtain rose when that drama was to be performed, then leave immediately and re-enter just as it fell. We know nothing about the process itself. We see our own acts and then we see the results, but the how and why of the process we do not know.

There is no doubt that all theories after Spencer's time will have to take the facts he so industriously collected into consideration, as well as his speculations into which he fitted them, but this is entirely different from assuming that his particular form of evolution on which all his theory rests will be accepted.

Let us then sum up. Utilitarianism is based simply and solely on the pleasure-pain concept. Simply on How one *feels*. It is, therefore, purely emotional, and not deserving intellectual consideration. Bentham says, "Pleasure and

Pain govern the world. It is for these two sovereign masters alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."

But, as Mr. Lilly answers, "Well, but surely the pleasure and pain which come home to the individual are his individual pleasure and pain. The idea of duty differs by the whole diameter of existence from the idea of delectation. But they tell us, 'Our sole experimental and scientific criterion of human action—the greatest happiness of the greatest number—does carry with it an obligation. The precept really is: Work for the general advantage, for you will find your own advantage in doing so.' To this I reply first: Where is the obligation, the binding tie? In place of it you present me with nothing but a mere motive. And in the second place I observe that the proposition on which the motive is based is untenable. It is by no means universally true that by working for the general advantage I shall find my own. On the contrary, upon many occasions, the general advantage points one way and my private advantage another. Nay, is it too much to say that my own private and personal advantage will seldom be identical with the general advantage in a world where the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest are the primary laws?" (pp. 49-50).

And again: "As Mr. Lecky has said, the only 'charge Utilitarians can bring against vice is imprudence.' But even supposing that the charge could be sustained, prudence is one thing, duty another. Prudence rests upon the calculations of self-love. Duty means abnegation of self and obedience to the unconditioned command of Right. The first note of the moral law, as of all law, is obligation. To sacrifice my private gratification to the general welfare may be an admirable rule if it comes to me in the name of Right. Not

so if it appeals to me in the name of Utility. I ask what is useful for myself, for my own delectation. Why should I not, if man is merely a pleasurable animal? Do not mistake me. I grant pleasure is a mighty spring of individual life. I admit that it is a good at which the human will legitimately aim. But I deny that it is the source of ethics. The only morality you can derive from it is the morality of money, for which pleasures, physical and intellectual, of all kinds may be purchased" (pp. 48-49).

The moral law is the very *raison d'être* of government. "Man as man, has no claim upon my obedience. Only to the law of Right, speaking through human ministers, is my obedience due. And here is to be found the underlying principle which makes criminal justice just. The moral law apprehended, *not made*, by our practical reason, implies that right is rewarded and wrong punished. That, as we have seen, is involved in the very conception of law. Penal jurisprudence is simply a moral judgment exhibited in visible form. Thus Aquinas, with his usual clearness and precision: 'The law of nature'—the law arising by Divine Reason, which is the nature of things—'proclaims that he who offends should be punished. But to define that this or that punishment should be inflicted upon him is a determination drawn from the law of nature by human law' " (p. 129).

"A man has not a right to do what he likes with his own. He only has a right to do what he ought with his own; which, after all, is his own in a very qualified sense. The only things which a man can in strictness call his own—and even here he is under the law of conscience—are his spiritual, intellectual and physical faculties. The material object on which he exercises these faculties is subject to a higher ownership than his; to the indefeasible title of the human race, represented to him by the com-

munity in which he lives. Of the material surroundings which he calls 'mine,' he is but a usufructuary, a trustee. The ultimate and inalienable ownership of what Aristotle called 'the bounty of nature,' is in the human race" (p. 197).

And all this discussion means is that without religion there can be no morality, and we believe we have shown that this viewpoint alone can be true. But we must not confuse some form of religion with Religion, for there is "little in Christian morality that is exclusively Christian. And I am not prepared to assert that many of the most precious of the ethical elements of our civilization might not survive a general decay of specifically Christian dogmas. My present contention is more general. It is this: That morality can have root only in the spiritual nature of man. If, from that happy soil, watered by the River of Life, and refreshed by the dews of heaven, you transplant it to the rocks and sands of Materialism, wither and die it must" (p. 244).

"What the Christian religion did for morality was chiefly to touch it with celestial fire, to vivify it by the idea of self-sacrifice, and to point to the Supreme Example of self-sacrifice; to enable man to 'erect himself above himself,' by exhibiting a standard of perfection, and by supplying supernatural motives for the imitation of that standard" (p. 212).

Christianity has "changed men's lives by changing their ideals of life" (p. 213).

Taking all the things into consideration that we have been attempting to make clear in this chapter, it will be seen why one may so easily run adrift in the field of telling others what OUGHT to be done, for, if we wish to be sure we are right in telling others what OUGHT to be done, we must bear in mind all of the following:

We never perform a single act without a motive, by which

is meant, as the Century Dictionary well expresses it, "A mental state or process which induces an act of volition; a determining impulse; specifically, a desire for something; a gratification contemplated as the final cause of action." It is that particular something, be it what it may—instinct, impulse, reason, etc.—which causes the act performed. And "a reason is that which addresses the rational nature by way of argument for either belief or choice; an inducement leads one by his desire for good: as to hold an additional inducement. An incentive urges one on, like martial music. An impulse drives one on, but is transitory."

All the motive means is the reason the act is committed; but we must not forget that it may be a bad reason or a good one. A traveler among the Esquimaux observed that parents did not punish their children, and, asking the reason, was informed that it was because the children's grandmothers' souls were present in the children, and, it was to be implied from this that it would be unfair to punish the grandmother, when it was only the child who committed the fault. It might have been argued from an hereditary viewpoint that that was all the more reason the grandmothers should have been punished for having such grandchildren. But here is a flagrant example of bad reasoning, though this was for the refraining from an act, which, of course, sometimes requires more effort than performing one when the temptation is great.

What we must keep in mind, then, is that we have a motive for everything we do, but we must be able to assign a *VALID reason for the motive*, if we are to be considered worthy the name of a rational being.

Having gotten thus far, we must attempt to find whether the carrying out of our motive is just and right. That is, after finding our motive and the validity for it, we must

know that the act we are going to perform on account of the motive is not unlawful, from a moral standpoint. It will be observed that we have two orders or planes of thought. One regarding the motive, which may be purely emotional or intellectual: the other the moral, which concerns itself solely and only with whether a thing is right or wrong. The intellectual plane or order concerns itself only with *whether the laws of reason have been followed*, either in the moral plane, or in the emotional, or in the purely physical.

Right and wrong are engaged in two different ways by the two great classes into which the thought-world has divided itself. One, the Transcendentalists, who believe in a Supreme Being and obtain all their laws through the intellect, after accepting this premise; and, consequently base all ideas of Right and Wrong on the relationship of the created to the Creator, while the Utilitarians do not accept a Supreme Being, and base their theory of Right and Wrong on the accumulated experience of mankind, finding only that wrong which in the long run resolves itself into pain for either the individual performing the act, or the race.

No matter which one of these two viewpoints we accept, every act, if it is to have any justification must be gauged by one of these theories.

But this only shows whether the act is Right or Wrong. It does not show the degree of guilt of the one who performs it. That is a totally different problem. Let us illustrate. If a man perform an act that is in the sphere of doubtfulness as to whether or not it breaks a man-made law, we have a grand jury appointed to ascertain *whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant bringing the offender to trial*. Remember, there is no question of guilt. It is merely a question of whether the act the accused is supposed to have committed comes under the law. Later, at the trial, all the evidence is

brought in on both sides, and the question of whether the act was actually committed, is adjusted, while still later the third factor enters—namely, *what was the intent* ⁵ *of the accused when he performed the act—not his motive*; the motive is what the detective wants when he is attempting to find why the act was committed; but what we want to know is *what did the accused actually intend doing?* Did he want to perform an unlawful act? Or was it accidental and unintentional? The intent will be taken into consideration as to the punishment he is to receive. But now comes a fourth factor, and that is, even if he intended to do the thing he did, even if there be no question that he did it, or that he did break a law, he may not have known the law, and therefore, though intending the act, did not intend breaking any law, and might conscientiously say that had he known the law he would never have committed the act. Let us examine these things in slightly more detail.

We have already explained motive, and the theories of how we gauge Right and Wrong, that is, why the act is done and whether it be Right or Wrong.

Then comes the question of whether the individual whom we are to judge actually committed the act. Here *all* evidence must be brought in, and upon the evidence alone must this question be adjusted.

Next, comes the question, "What was intended by the person performing the act or teaching a theory?" Here we want to know the good or evil character of the accused. If he is misunderstood in his teaching, or if his act is misinterpreted, he can rightly insist that the Judge and jury have not gotten his intention, that even though evil flow from his act it was unforeseen and could not have been avoided—that is, that it was accidental and not intentional wrongdoing.

But, here, of all places, we say, "Yes, but you broke the law," only to be answered: "True, but I did not know there was such a ruling. I did not KNOW I was breaking a law. Had I known it was forbidden, I should not have performed the act." And all of us who know anything about law at all, know that we have a maxim that reads: "Ignorance of the law excuses no man." Which means simply this: that even if one be perfectly sincere in performing an act or teaching a theory, if one has not taken the precaution to find what the law is, all one's sincerity counts for naught; and, in fact, to be sincere in such a case is really more damaging to humanity than to be insincere, for by virtue of that sincerity, men and women are influenced to do that which in and of itself is unlawful.

All of this will be readily acknowledged by any thinking person, and as we have shown in our first chapter that one's principles—one's method of thought—is made part and parcel of oneself only during the plastic period of life, it follows that unless the proper training is then given, none of these things which we have just said can be understood, and no depth can be attained, no matter how brilliant the individual may be, nor no matter how acute.

It does not mean that in every act of life all of these things must be thought of and worked out, but it does mean that when we attempt to teach others what to do—when we attempt to bring about the making of a new law or the repeal of an old one—unless these things are taken into consideration, those who are advocating such measures show such mental caliber, or lack of it, that none but those who in turn are on their same intellectual level will follow.

This does not mean that each leader, each advocate of a change must know all things philosophical. *It only means that if he cannot understand these simple differences, he need*

not flatter himself on his thinking powers, and those who follow him may flatter themselves still less.

NOTES

1. This excellent summary, which we have changed just enough to present the most important points, we owe to Raymond D. Roehl, Ph.D., late professor of history at the University of Dallas, and now in charge of sanitation at Camp Bowie for his regiment, the 144th.

2. This summary of the Utilitarian viewpoint, as well as all page numbers after the quotations which follow, are from, and refer to, W. S. Lilly's volume *On Right and Wrong* (London, 1892).

3. The dog and horse are usually presented as proof of intelligence in the philosophical sense of the word by those who believe that animals can reason. The dog is punished for doing something and does not do it again, or he is rewarded and constantly responds to a call so that the reward is again forthcoming. No one disputes that all animals have memory, at least all higher forms of them. What is disputed is, that they reason. And so the question resolves itself down to "Did he (the dog) know why he was rewarded or why punished, and act accordingly? If so, the evidence from this and many such experiments fails to indicate the fact; while the following investigation of the association processes in the dog demonstrates the formation of typical associations in the complete absence of rational processes.

"It is well known that under certain circumstances the mouth waters, which is only a familiar way of saying that the flow of saliva into the mouth has increased. The sight of food—even the thought of some appetizing dish—and a number of other causes may produce this result, which is in every case due to the stimulation of the salivary glands. Among the effective stimuli, one of the most convenient for experimental purposes, is hydrochloric acid, a few drops of which, under the tongue, produces a definite increase in the secretion of the parotid gland—which may be remembered as the seat of trouble when one suffers from *mumps*.

"Now it is possible, by a slight operation, to divert the flow of saliva from the parotid gland away from the mouth to the exterior, so that the rate and character of the flow may be accurately observed. A method is thus obtained not only for estimating the effect of various stimulating substances upon the

salivary glands, but, which is far more significant, for measuring in concrete physiological terms the processes that take place in the higher centers of the brain. Suppose, now, that as a few drops of hydrochloric acid are placed under the tongue, a whistle of a given pitch is blown. Suppose, further, that this simultaneous application of acid and sound is repeated as many, let us say, as twenty times. Then suppose that at the next trial, the acid is abandoned, but the whistle is sounded as usual. Repeated experiments have shown that under such favorable conditions the sound of the whistle, which at first produced no appreciable effect upon the salivary glands, now distinctly accelerates the flow of saliva. That this is an example of the establishment of a new association without the aid of reason follows from the fact that the mouth waters without consideration, as a result of reflex stimulation of the salivary glands which the animal concerned may even quite fail to notice.

"The mechanical preciseness of this association is especially emphasized by the fact that it obtains only for whistles of the same pitch. Even the most trifling differences in this respect reflect themselves in the rate of the salivary flow. The association involves a particular tone, not sound in general. It is an association of a very definite, circumscribed type. It exhibits nothing of that adaptability which makes behavior of tool-using animals so noteworthy.

"Yet it is just this type of cerebration that is involved in a vast number of our everyday actions. We even make a boast of it. This man has voted with one political party so long that his dogged loyalty has become his political virtue. That man believes that the duelling code to which he has been brought up is a necessary part of the library of every gentleman. We may have learned to like figs and olives, but we still eschew horse flesh. We are assured that many of the processes by which foods are prepared for the market are irrational, but we continue to demand them. We estimate our guests by their table manners. And we give our favor to a soft falsehood, snubbing a harsh truth. We prescribe not only the canons of dress, but the esthetic taste. We know what we like—alas. We set the limits of polite conversation. We even dictate terms of thought itself. We persecute the genius who would enlighten our ignorance, because his ways are strange. We applaud the demagogue for speaking the fluent language of our own mediocrity. And we marvel at our intelligence.

"We may be rational animals, but a large proportion of our

formal education consists in learning, like the dog, to do new tricks."

(From *Instinct and the Rational Life*, by Professor Harry Beal Torrey, in *The Scientific Monthly*, January, 1917, pp. 64-66.)

The point to be remembered is, that though we are rational, we do probably most of our acts by this associative reflex method and use little reason, but because *we do not do much* reasoning does not follow *that we do none*. And because many of the acts we perform can be performed by irrational animals, it does not follow that they even perform them for the same reasons we do. As Professor Wm. Wundt, has well said, "Animals never reason, humans but seldom."

4. *The Beginnings of Science*, by Edward J. Menge, Richard G. Badger, Chapter IX. *The Ideal*.

5. That the "intent" is of utmost importance in passing judgment on an individual, may be easily shown by calling attention to such an instance as a person's working for the Single Standard of morality. While it is of the utmost importance that there be a single standard, and every intelligent person concedes it, yet there are many who ought to be most seriously condemned for advocating it. For, if one fights for a single standard in order that women may sow their wild oats, instead of that men must cease doing so, it is most readily seen that both parties working for what they consider the same thing, are yet at opposite poles when the moral situation is taken into consideration.

CHAPTER IV

BIRTH CONTROL

SCIENCE means systematized knowledge. It is a *method* of obtaining through the gathering of facts, sufficient materials on which to found theories, which are hammered into shape by mental tools known as the laws of Logic. Its object is to control the forces of nature, and to prophesy what in a given case will result when certain things are done.

The Physical Sciences concern themselves *only with what is true and false*, not *with what is right and wrong*. It is this confusing of our terminology that brings about so many misunderstandings. Whether a thing stated is a physical fact or not, must always rest with the laboratory sciences; that is, we must have the knowledge of several of our senses to satisfy us of its truthfulness. Whether the meanings we then apply to these facts are correct or not, must rest with the Philosophical Science called Logic. But whether a thing be right or wrong can never be obtained from laboratory facts. We can by laboratory evidence only find whether in a particular case certain things work out better than others. It is for this reason that we must have a definition of RIGHT and WRONG. This we have given in our chapter "What Ought We to Do?" *Right and Wrong are in the Moral Order. The truth or falsity of a fact lies largely in the Physical Order, and the truth or falsity of a Theory lies entirely in the Logical Order*, after the facts have been proven.

It will be observed that there is some slight complexity here, and it will consequently be understood that unless all these complex things be taken into consideration there is no obtaining validity for anything we say.

That this complexity of the problem is one of the most important in the field of intellectuality can be demonstrated very easily by any one who will take Mr. W. S. Lilly's volume on *Right and Wrong*,¹ which was written for English College men and women, and hand it to practically any physician, lawyer or engineer he happens to know and see whether such person can read it understandingly. Now let us consider for the moment that only about one person in a hundred in this land of ours receives a college training, and when one further realizes that by far the great majority of these enter law, medicine, or engineering, if these men who have had exceptional opportunities can not understand even a volume that *was not written for technical students* but for professional men like themselves, what hope is there that others who have had less training can understand? The fact is that very few of the one per cent of the American people who have had opportunities have *ever had much philosophical training*, and consequently they can not know when they are being led along erroneous paths in the realm of things outside their own profession that concern the human race vitally. They can not know, when they accept as their purveyor of facts, a man who *is not a scientist*. They can not know, when they are accepting a man who is not logical even when he has his facts correct, or if he be logical whether he has accepted wrong premises on which to begin his reasoning, and they do not know on what basis Right and Wrong rest, and so can not validly decide when a thing ought to be done or not.

Very nearly the entire output of books on education for

years past is entirely worthless simply on account of their authors' having accepted the notion, now disproved, that the child passes through the historical advancement of the race,² and, consequently our educational texts will largely have to be re-written.

An example can be found in medicine. For years iodoform gauze was used as an antiseptic dressing, whereas, now it is being entirely discarded by those who know, because it is a most excellent breeder, if anything, of the very germs it was expected to prevent from breeding. It is still used a great deal, and will be by some of the older men for years, but that does not change the fact of its being very bad for the usage to which it is applied.

Non-valid reasoning comes forth constantly in our magazines and journals. Just now one of the popular subjects that is under discussion happens to be Birth Control. There are any quantity of similar matters discussed in as absurd a manner before the public, but we choose this one to bring home the truth of our statements. It is our object to show how to obtain a validity for one's findings in any discussion of this or similar nature.

When a youth comes to us with a suggestion and plans for a perpetual-motion machine and we inform him that it won't work, he probably asks: "Have you tried it?" To which we of course answer in the negative, and then he wants to know *how we know* it won't work. The answer is given that all any schooling can do is to present fundamental principles on which to build, and with which to work. We learn certain laws that we apply in after life. There is a rule of Physics that says there can be no more work gotten out of a machine than is put into it, and even then one must allow some loss for friction on the part of the machine. Now if one accepts this physical law, and there has never

been an exception to it proven, it is perfectly foolish to attempt a perpetual motion machine. If one does not accept the law, there is only one thing to do and that is to try out the plan.

So it is with everything else we want to reason about. We must take our law if there be one, and ascertain whether it is correct. If it is, and the subject for discussion comes under it, we must judge accordingly. We need not try it out in actual practice. No man could even begin to apply in a dozen lifetimes the laws he obtains in a few pages of a single text-book of High School physics or chemistry.

Remembering this, how absurd are the various discussions we read on both sides of the question we are writing about! One is almost inclined to say "Lord deliver us from our friends," for it almost seems that those who may have the Right mostly on their side, by their poor logic, by their intense emotionalism, by their calling those who disagree with them unpleasant names, and by insinuating all manner of things, are quite likely to drive defenders of the very cause they are defending into the opposite camp.

None of the discussions that the writer has seen go down to fundamentals, that is, to the question of WHAT IS RIGHT and what is WRONG. Many of the writers and speakers tell us that it is right to bring about Birth Control, but how can that be answered until we know what RIGHT and WRONG are? How can one judge whether this or that man is guilty of perjury before one knows what perjury is?

Then they fail to define at the outset of their articles exactly what they mean by Birth Control, and, consequently the reader reads any emotional meaning into the lines he wishes. Practically no one disagrees with the idea of Birth Control, so there is no question on that score at all. The whole argument pertains to the *methods used for that pur-*

pose. The writer knows of no defensible law, physical, natural, or supernatural, that forces one to perform the act by which birth may be produced. The question does not pertain to abstaining from sexual contact. The whole question is whether or not it is *Right* on any basis of right and wrong principles to use artificial means by which to prevent conception from taking place, either by killing the male sperm, or preventing it from reaching the female ovum. *This is the question.*

We have shown what RIGHT and WRONG mean. We have shown that regardless of a slight difference of expression and nomenclature, there are only two possible principles on which RIGHT and WRONG can rest, so that all there is left to do is to show whether from either or both of these principles Birth Control by artificial means is right, and if not, *why not.*

First, we shall take up the Transcendentalist viewpoint and then the Utilitarian. The Transcendentalist insists that if there be a Supreme Being, one has obtained his own reasoning power by virtue of this Supreme Being, and just in so far as one uses it, does one approach that Divine Ideal for which man was put upon this earth, and which it is his end to attain—his final goal. To those who go further and accept a revelation as shown by the Scriptures, the argument is drawn from Genesis Chap. XXXVIII, which apparently shows that it was God's will that the destruction of the male seed should not be.

But it is not necessary to go to the Scriptures for those who accept a Supreme Being and do not accept the Bible as an inspired work. The whole subject can be based on what is called the Natural Law. This means in this case, not that it is an offense to control any natural instinct or subject, as some writers seem to think, such as to cut one's

hair or shave, but, *that one who performs an act must be willing to abide by the laws, which nature shows to be there by having established a penalty as a consequence of the act. This is the point to be remembered. One may control nature all one wishes, but if one notes in nature a penalty when one of her laws is broken, it follows that if he who performs the act is unwilling to pay the penalty nature demands, he by that very shirking of responsibility is breaking that first principle from which we obtain any validity for responsibility, and consequently he is bound, little by little to cast aside other principles as well. For, if one is unwilling to abide by the consequences of his own act, how can he in the name of reason expect others to trust him, for, trust is certainly engendered by our belief in the individual's willingness to be held entirely responsible for his every word and act.*

How can a wife expect anything but lies from a husband, or a husband from a wife, who is willing to enter into an agreement with another and not keep that agreement, even though it be *implied* and not definitely expressed, as this is in marriage, for example. For, isn't that all the whole thing amounts to? If one does not keep the agreement one has made, that is, breaks his solemn promise, on what basis can one accept, or expect truthfulness in anything in life? It is this cowardly shirking of the responsibility that is assumed at the time of the agreement that man and woman make, that they assist each other and adhere to each other, that is brought into question, even on those who adopt the rightfulness of contraceptive devices, for there is no contraceptive device known that is infallible, so, if one or both of the mates accept the principle of the right to limit by artificial means the number of their offspring, and as it can not always be done, it means that human life has not

only a limited value, it means that it has none, for the constant perversion of the natural instinctive processes in the body will psychically throw into the focus of attention only one thing, and that is "Not Wanted." So even after conception has taken place, there being *no principles* to begin with as to what make right and wrong, there is no valid reason why abortion should not be committed. That is, if every individual is the measure of right and wrong, and there is no great fundamental underlying principle, there is no such thing as a standard of OUGHT, and, consequently, whatever one wishes to do, OUGHT to be done. If one desires the death of another, why not kill him?

So much for Transcendental opinion. Now what about the Utilitarian viewpoint? This, as has been explained, when summed up means that *whatever gives pleasure and does not injure the individual nor the race is RIGHT and should be done*.

It is a sort of pleasure-pain theory. It pleases the individual who uses contraceptive devices to prevent conception. This is self-evident or it would not be done, but, as far as the writer knows, there isn't a single writer of repute who accepts the pure pleasure-pain idea of right and wrong, aside from the act's value to the race; and not only that, but, all insist on the greatest quantity of pleasure to the individual or race in the long run—not on the immediate pleasure. Somewhere, if we remember correctly, Spencer himself has said that this Utilitarian idea only holds good for optimists. That is, unless one be sure that the majority of human kind can always be trusted to do what is right, one can not even accept this Utilitarian viewpoint. We recall the answer of an old professor to one of his students asking the meanings of optimism and its opposite in about this manner:

Student: "What is Pessimism?"

Professor: "The faith of cowards."

Student: "And what is Optimism?"

Professor: "The faith of fools."

There is a happy medium in all things, and he who takes either extreme deserves this classification of the professor's.

We shall come back to this matter of being optimistic in regard to humanity at large, shortly. Just now we want to examine whether or not the using of artificial means to prevent conception is injurious to the individual, then we shall see how it affects the race.

In the first place the whole Utilitarian idea of right and wrong *assumes* that people know what is best for themselves regardless of any knowledge on the subject, but any person with the least bit of intelligence knows that this is about the most absurd idea possible. We know that it was an inherent something which has made the child in ages past come through life in fairly good condition regardless of the ignorance of our mothers. We read a great deal about the old-fashioned mother, but throwing all sentiment aside, we know that our mothers certainly were hopelessly ignorant when it came to bringing up children. They mothered their children, they overfed them, and killed them, because they assumed that mother-instinct without knowledge would take care of the baby. They kept them bundled up, they gave them little air, and if nature didn't know so much more than mothers did there would be mighty few of us here to-day even to discuss the matter.

A man is sure he is warmer because in cold weather *he takes* a drink of whiskey and *feels* warmer, but any one who has studied physiology at all, knows that cold contracts the blood vessels on the outside of the body driving the blood inward so it may be farthest removed from the cold

exterior; and an alcoholic stimulant will merely drive the blood back again to the surface *where one feels its warmth*, but, the blood being thus brought nearer the surface cools much more quickly than it would further inward, causing the whole temperature to be lowered. We know that we can not tell by the taste of the food that it has typhoid germs in it; that cool, sparkling drinking water did not spare the lives of those poor prospectors in Death Valley, misled by assuming that what *seemed good must be*.

So, we must not forget that most of the nerves through which we feel sensations of pain, for example, are in the outer regions of the body, where we need them, as no doubt this is nature's way of telling when there is something wrong, in order that we may help to overcome the difficulties which prevent nature from working aright. The interior regions of our body are not so supplied with pain carriers. In fact we know of a case where a pointed piece of wire placed in the uterus for years gave no local pain to the individual at all, though it did cause considerable weakness in the body at large, which later caused the wire's being found and removed.

The point to be borne in mind is this, that the pain carriers in the interior of the body, and the uterus is classified as an interior organ, are not like those in the exterior parts. This means that there may be constant injury accumulated, without the individual knowing anything about it, until such time as the cumulative effects are shown.

A mechanical device is bound to irritate the delicate mucous lining of the orifice, and, as has been well pointed out by acute observers that with married women especially, there is a tendency to cancerous growths towards middle age, which may very easily be ascribed to the accumulated effects of constant mechanical irritation.

It must further be borne in mind that when it comes to sex matters, as some one has said, "nearly all men are liars." That is, there is no one living who knows much about this particular thing because most people shield themselves from what they feel need not be known, though the very thing they fail to mention may be the cause of the difficulties with which they are suffering. This is the reason that medical men can not learn much regarding this particular matter. And it requires hundreds of men, observing hundreds of authenticated cases, before we can build any acceptable theory thereon. All we know now is that thousands of women have cancerous growths and thousands of others have serious difficulties after they have been married for some years. Natural acts do not injure, in so far as we know, if not overdone. The eyelid closes over the eye many times a minute throughout our entire waking life, and yet there is no friction that causes difficulty unless a foreign substance that irritates be injected.

Further, if the sexual act be purely and entirely a matter of calculation, it means that there is no spontaneity, and it becomes only an act to satisfy a passion, which, when satisfied, makes the man of little value as a companion to his wife. Too many wives know that all their husbands find of interest in them now is the sexual part, and they also know what a state of nervousness and dissatisfaction and often desire for death this brings with it, and if it does not lead to actual suicide, it does to separation; but do they attribute this to the proper cause? They do not know that there are certain foods, like rice for example, which must not be polished, or it gives to those that eat it a horrible disease known as beriberi. Why? Because what are called vitamins have been destroyed. What is the relationship between this and what we are discussing? It is so often stated that

only one sperm fertilizes an egg and the rest are destroyed. Is this true? No one knows. It is very possible, as many believe, that these sperm are not destroyed, but just as only one egg in the little fresh water animal *Hydra* grows in the midst of several and then grows large by using the others for nourishment, until they are entirely absorbed, so, too, the female may need these sperm to be absorbed in her body to give her all that is needed when motherhood is to be granted her. We know now that what a few years ago were considered useless organs,—the ductless glands—manufacture a substance that assists other glands in performing their functions. For example, without the thyroid gland no one can live, and yet if a piece of living thyroid be placed somewhere in the body, even though this piece come from another animal, the individual will live. It produces a chemical substance that assists the other life-keeping organs in working order.

In other words it is very possible that a woman may completely wreck her physical existence by shirking motherhood. The fear with which sexual intercourse must needs be indulged—the nervous strain—when both parties are not entirely willing to abide by the consequences is good cause for nervous and mental break-downs. It is well known that among women who go insane the greatest percentage of any single class are farmer's wives.³ These are statistical facts. It doesn't matter in the least whether one believes them or not.

Why do farmers' wives go insane more than other women? It is probable that those who favor Birth Control by artificial means will say on account of bearing children. It may be, but it is more likely that it is simply and solely from the fact that up to this time farmers have not cared much for things intellectual. They have worked out part

of their energy in the fields, and after the woman has likewise exhausted herself in the kitchen, the man's whole remaining desire was sexuality, after which sleep took him until the following morning. In other words, all the wife saw of her husband was while he was eating, sleeping and indulging in sexuality. Is it any wonder that she should think of him as a part of the cattle, and be so disgusted with herself for having married him and seeing no hope for the future—no mutual enjoyment of each other's company—that she should do the only thing a decent woman could do under the circumstances, namely, go insane—where she can live in a world that is her own and not be bothered by the facts in the case?

And here is the crux of this particular question. Would it, if the above be the explanation, make matters better to use contraceptive devices? Would it not mean that, as none of them is infallible, she would have to suffer the same fears, and would it not even mean this, that all restraints being removed from the man, he would indulge in the sexual act even more than he had before? In fact it would make her more of a sexual slave than ever.

The recently issued report of the British National Birth Rate Commission on the declining Birth Rate,⁴ says:

"We regret that we are unable to present a definite pronouncement as to the physical consequences of the use of these devices. The printed evidence which follows does not enable a dogmatic statement to be made as to these, and in view of the fact that medical investigation on this subject is difficult and in large measure has only recently been made, it is not surprising that no definite medical conclusion can be drawn."

Twenty-four of the commissioners signed an addition to the report, acknowledging that there are some questions,

"which deserve more thorough and general consideration than we have been able to give them." Among these is the following: "Is any mode of restriction except voluntary abstinence from marital relations moral and religious?"

Dr. Amand Routh, who testified before the board, said:

"I have no doubt that prevention of maternity by *artificial* methods, invariably produces physical, mental, and I think, moral harm to both, if they both agree to it. The act is incomplete. It is not a spontaneous act, and if the act ceases before the proper crisis, as it were, the nervous system suffers enormously if the habit is continued long. And the result often is that there is a great deal of congestion produced by the woman, at all events. I know nothing about the physical results in the case of the man, but in the woman the result is that the pelvic organs become congested and catarrhal, the womb becomes enlarged, and the result is that later on, when the parents are perhaps better off and want a child they are not able to have one."

And another witness of experience, Dr. Mary Scharlieb, said she did not think there was any physical injury. But to the question, "Having regard to hysteria and allied diseases, would you not agree that although physical injury may not be present, yet nevertheless, serious injury does arise?" the witness replied, "Certainly."

Besides the cumulative physical injuries of which we have spoken; besides the mental injuries mentioned, there is still a third injury that one can not neglect, namely, that whenever an act, such as the sexual one, is not complete on the part of both, it has only partially satisfied, and, consequently *the desire is still there*, causing a far greater repetition of the act than otherwise. In fact it is this which may injure the male as much, if not more, than the female. This, by the way, is one of the principal reasons why the old

moralists objected to self-abuse. Not that the act in and of itself physically was much worse than intercourse, but, not completing the desire which it attempts to complete, it causes a constant repetition of the act, thus weakening by the very abuse of a legitimate instinct, all powers which should be used for a very definite purpose.

So much for what effect artificial means may have upon the individual who practices it.

Now, as to what effect it will have upon the race. Here we may refer to our case of optimism. The whole theory of voluntary birth control by artificial means has for its object the attainment of "Wanted" children, who, it is assumed, because the parents will be able to give more care and funds for their education, will consequently be of better quality than those that come in quantities.

Let us first take up the case of optimism in this regard. We know that if there ever was a time when we hear Democracy deified it is now. The people at large should, by numerical majorities, decide all questions. This idea placed in the minds of men will of course mean that whenever the majority decide on how to run things, they will by sheer power of number be able to enforce it. Now it so happens that the United States Census of 1910 tells us that the number of those who have to be supported by the State in this country due to idiocy, insanity, and criminality, as well as those in the almshouses is summed up as follows:

January 1, 1910, in institutions, feeble-minded. . .	20,731
Admitted during 1910	3,825
January 1, 1910, in insane institutions.	187,791
Admitted during 1910	60,769
January 1, 1910, paupers in almshouses.	84,198
Admitted during 1910	88,313
January 1, 1910, criminals in prison.	111,498

Committed in 1910 ⁵	479,787
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Total of all feeble-minded, insane, paupers and criminals in institutions end of 1910	1,036,912
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In view of the fact that we have a growing population and that those under state care increase in greater proportion than the increase in population, we shall be safe in assuming that at least the same number of state dependents came to the notice of the authorities each year after 1910 as in that year. So that by the end of 1917, we would have a total of 5,465,770, since the account given above is for 1910, and the table below for the seven years since 1910.

3,825 feeble-minded committed in 1910, making in seven years	26,775
60,769 insane committed in 1910; in seven years	425,383
88,313 paupers committed in 1910; in seven years	618,191
479,787 criminals committed in 1910; in seven years	3,358,509

Total of the number of people being unable to care for themselves, or dangerous to society incarcerated in seven years	4,428,858
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If practically four and one half millions of our people have had to be set aside in this way in seven years, it will be observed that in one generation of thirty-three years almost five times this many will be placed under state supervision. That is, twenty millions of men, women and children in less than a hundred million are idiots, insane, paupers and criminals. The reason we have included paupers is that many of the states have not yet made any preparation for the care of the feeble-minded, and most states have prac-

tically not one half sufficient preparation for the insane, so that prisons and almshouses swarm with sub-normal mentalities. It is likewise interesting to note that of all paupers up to 1910 over one third were below fifty-five years of age, showing lack of mentality in being able to make their own way.

An objection may be raised: "You have kept every individual inmate incarcerated during the entire seven years. Surely there are many that die, and more that are discharged. Criminals are sentenced to one, two, three, or more years; about 25 per cent of the insane leave asylum walls each year, and many feeble-minded are dismissed in order that their own families or friends may care for them."

We wish particularly to impress upon the reader that we have taken these into consideration and, therefore, we have not mentioned them, for, paradoxical as it may sound, this has nothing to do with the point we are discussing, which is the bringing of children into the world who, by being brought up by these same people will in all probability follow in the foot-steps of their parents. It is the discharged ones that do the damage. It is during the time the feeble-minded go home on a visit once or twice a year that they breed, and undo all that segregation was intended for.

There are practically no homes for the feeble-minded who have not long waiting lists, so that as soon as there is room others may be placed. This means that none of those who are protected by friends and family and who have never been placed in an institution are counted at all.

Further, when one realizes that only when a person becomes *so insane and so bad criminally that he is a nuisance and a danger to his neighbors*, do they take it upon themselves to have him cared for by the state, we can see that there must be many more who are not quite so bad as these

who are incarcerated, but, who are on the borderland, and who may with any degree of overwrought excitement or undue hardships or suffering become one of these very serious cases at any time. And, as far as criminality is concerned, it is only necessary to note that probably not one of ten wilful murderers is convicted. So that it has been said that for every one person incarcerated, there are ten that ought to be.

It is of course true that many of these commitments will be the same individual, and if we take a period of thirty-three years, probably one half of those in prisons are what are known as repeaters—they have been committed many times for various offenses. But even after taking away one half of the number of criminals incarcerated as “repeaters,” during just eight years (1910 to 1917 inclusive), we still have about three millions, or about five times that many, namely, *fifteen million, in thirty-three years*. No matter how many die—the fact remains that in that space of time they belonged to one of these four classes.

No matter how much we hate this—no matter how untrue we should like to have it, our sentiment is bound to be knocked in the head when we are confronted with definite statements of figures that we can ourselves substantiate.

Now let us go on a little further. We know that everywhere and always those in high places have been the first to limit their offspring. We know that the feeble-minded and the insane, as well as those worst criminals, who neither know what should or should not be done, and who hate society at large to such an extent as not to care, are going to continue propagating their kind.⁶ It does not take any great quantity of foresight to be able to see that if our educated leaders average less than two children to the family, and it is probable that few couples would have more

than two if they could conscientiously obstruct impregnation, and, knowing from experience that all children born do not live to maturity, it means that there will not in the one generation that follows us be as many educated people as there are now. It means that one must have the fullest and most foolish idea of optimism possible if one believes that the defectives, who do not themselves know nor care what they do, are going to limit *their* offspring, and consequently in two or three generations the majority of feeble-minded and insane will control those who are sane. For it so happens, that feeble-mindedness and insanity run in families,⁷ and probably the majority of children born of such parents become sub-normal.

Stop to consider what three million feeble-minded, insane and criminals would do in the realm of begetting mental defectives if they were free, and then remember that these people, especially the criminals and insane *are not incarcerated constantly*; that some of the insane, for example, are allowed leave of absence, and returning home, again breed; that the feeble-minded who are incarcerated visit their homes from time to time again preventing the carrying out of the very reason for their segregation.

But it is said, "what about sterilization?" Well, let us speak of sterilizing; how are we going to prevent our country even in two or three generations from being overrun with those who have only *some traits that are far below normal*, and these apparently innocent, not sufficiently serious to warrant sterilization? Three million men and women of this stripe will breed at least twice their own number every generation.⁸ In two generations we shall have twelve million more beside the parents who may then still be living. What will happen, let us say in two hundred years? Our leaders will continue to grow less by at least one half, on account of

birth control. *This means that in two generations alone*, if we have eighty millions of good sound sensible people now, who are decreasing by one half in each generation, there will be only forty million normal people after the first generation, and one half of these, or twenty million after the second. This means that in two generations alone, with no increase in the "not wanted" type shall the normal and sub-normal be almost equal. Does it take long, under such circumstances, to bring about race destruction?

This is merely thinking of our own people. What about the Asiatic hordes with their more than half the entire population of the globe in their lands? Are they going to simultaneously obstruct *their* birth rate? If not, it will be the same with this land of ours as it was with Rome and Greece. It was in those lands of the past that the birth rate fell until the neighboring tribes were the more powerful. All history, all experience, all reason, displays the absolute hopelessness of the race, if voluntary birth control come into general vogue.

So from either point of view of the only two possible gauges of Right and Wrong, it is morally indefensible.

Any possible defense, as we have clearly shown can only come from an anarchistical viewpoint that no one counts but oneself—from a pure deification of individual desire—which in turn means the doctrine of might—the doctrine of the lowest savage in the scale of intellectual existence.

Aside from the unrighteousness of the entire cause, there are effects that simply can not be gauged, and on which we can only speculate, but on which the speculation is nevertheless rife with what it will mean for our children's children.

We have shown how voluntary birth control would wipe out our families of brains and intellect—our families in whom the strains run that have contributed all there is to

our civilization, and how it will allow the few remaining ones by virtue of their numerical minority to be ruled by a numerical majority of brutes, imbeciles, insane and criminals. We know what effect example has on children. We have shown in our first chapter that unless during the plastic period of life the examples and principles of a virtuous life are instilled they can not come afterwards; but, what are we to say when seeing everywhere about them the great numbers of sub-normals living the most degenerate life—these people, many of them, to borrow a phrase from Dr. David Starr Jordan—have the intellect of a goose and the morals of a hog—what, we ask, is to give the child that backing in his trying to live a moral life when all about him is seen the majority doing just the opposite of what he has been trained to do, and when he likewise has been taught that majorities rule? In other words some of the writers for Birth Control actually sink to this intellectual level when they say that birth control is practiced by multitudes now, and argue from this that because many do a thing it is right to do it. Will not the average child, even when born with average intelligence, seeing the lack of all moral standard about him, not be influenced by such an absurd as well as degenerate viewpoint? It means that it will make of even the intellectual few, except those with an almost superhuman will power, and a genius for clear and accurate thinking, degenerates also, as it will and can lead only to that type of morality, which believes crime consists in being found out, and not in its committal. To this type of person murder will not be wrong.

Further, when no value is placed on human life in its very beginning—mark well, we are not confusing abortion with prevention, by no means; but the human mind is so constituted that the constant and recurring thought brought

up before it that it is right to prevent births, lessens the value of the life that is prevented—it makes one think of the embryo as not a life until it is actually born, but there is absolutely not one iota more of reason for assuming that the killing of the child five minutes before it is born is not just as much murder as five minutes afterward, and if five minutes before, why not an hour, a day, a week, a month or three, six, or nine months? Those who discuss this matter without taking into consideration the many factors that enter into the whole scheme, and who are unable to appreciate the way the human nervous system is constituted, do not deserve very serious consideration.

There still remain several points usually brought up by those who favor the artificial restriction of conception.

First, that it will tend to decrease the death rate. Mr. J. Hudson Mallory ⁹ has well shown the absurdity of this statement in a recent contribution to the subject, when he says:

“Decreased mortality may offset a lowered birth-rate only to a certain point, but not beyond that. Incidentally, don’t overlook the fact that the lowered mortality throughout the world generally is the result of hygiene and not of the bearing of a few children. But when you come right down and analyse the whole problem, what do you find?

“Certainly a decreasing mortality rate goes with a lowered birth-rate because there are not so many to die. And the death-rate will fall to nothing after the birth-rate falls to nothing, for there will be no more people on earth to die. This cheerful little thought never seems to have occurred to our friends who really appear to believe in this pretty theory. Do you still claim that a lowered death-rate offsets a lowered birth-rate?

“A temporarily decreased mortality can only mean that

people are living longer, postponing death. But there will come a limit to this extension of life, and when we get to that place the death-rate will stop falling. There is only one way in which a future population can be supplied, and that is by having babies born. The death-rate has nothing to do with it. Fewer babies mean a smaller population, irrespective of any juggling with mortality statistics, and you know it."

Second, we have the claim constantly made that the birth of fewer babies would tend to make these babies better. That sounds very interesting and there is only one point that we can bring against it, and that is that it isn't true.¹⁰

Those who know anything about biology at all (and those who do not, have no moral right to an opinion on a subject they know nothing about) know very well that the ovary, that little organ in which the eggs of every mammal are contained, has all of the eggs in it at the time of birth of the offspring that it is ever going to have. In other words, every child is born from an egg, just as is the chicken, the difference being that in the human and other mammals the eggs remain in the body of the mother and after being fertilized by the male sperm grow to embryological maturity. While with birds, the eggs, whether fertilized or not, pass out of the body of the mother, and on that account must have enough nourishment within the shell to keep the little chick alive until such time as it can lead its own life. The human egg derives the needed nourishment from the mother during the time of gestation and consequently need not be anywhere nearly as large as the hen's egg. In fact the real egg of the hen is just that little part that usually floats on top of the yolk regardless of the position in which one holds the egg.

There are a good many thousands of eggs in the human

ovary. Probably some twenty to thirty thousand in each of the two, but only between two hundred and four hundred of them ripen during the sexual life, which, by the way lasts about thirty-two years in woman. And it is only one of these ripened eggs that is fertilized by the male sperm when it comes in contact with the egg during the time elapsing between the egg's leaving the ovary and its arrival at the uterus.

There is no possible way of telling which egg will be fertilized at any time. There is no telling whether that particular egg is normal or not. Of the thousands of sperm that enter the orifice at one time there is no telling which one of the thousands will strike the egg. Let us make this clearer: of four hundred possible eggs that may be fertilized during the sexual life, at each conception there is a possibility of one out of, let us say, a million sperm meeting it. Of these sperm there may be half that are abnormal, or, there may not be. The egg to be fertilized was already there, as we have stated, at the time of the birth of the mother, so the egg can not be changed. The sperm, however, keep on multiplying in the father, with a result which may be summed up like this: During the sexual life, with let us say sexual contact twice a month for thirty-two years, means twenty-four times a year, or seven hundred and sixty-eight times during that period. There being probably at least a million sperm emitted each time, this will mean that if two children are to be chosen by the parents each one stands a chance of two in seven hundred and sixty-eight millions of becoming what one hopes for. A rather slim betting chance it will be admitted. In other words, this whole argument that we can get quality by having fewer babies is not only fallacious but absolutely absurd.

And now for the weakest point in the discussion, but prob-

ably one as frequently used as any. It is interesting to note that the editor of the very magazine that contained the excellent article by Mr. Mallory from which we have quoted, should have used this argument in a previous number of his journal, namely, that in view of the fact that two thirds of the medical men at a New York meeting voted against the advisability of giving promiscuous instruction so as to teach people how artificially to restrict their families, and a record of these same physicians showed each had less than two children—that because these men did not practice what they preached, they were wrong in their preaching. How any one with two thirds of the average intelligence, can not see the difference between *a standard of right and wrong*, and what *men do that is wrong*, is beyond understanding. In accordance with a doctrine of this nature, every man, because he himself does not live up to the laws both human and divine, ought to teach that these laws are wrong, or at least suggest they don't exist. This is the same type of mind which, when it notes any one objecting to certain forms of the nude in art, assumes that the one who objects, must have an immoral mind—in other words, this type of individual in scientific parlance is said to be able to see only one cause for every effect, and in any argument his opinion is never admitted as worthy of notice, for any one who can not understand that there may be *many reasons why a certain effect is brought about—that a dozen different men may have performed the very same act, but every one of them with a different motive*,—is not deserving of mental consideration. In fact this type of mind is extremely immoral; for in addition to being very narrow and bigoted, it passes judgment on the basis of what it knows would be the reason *it would object if it did object*, to that type of art. It means only this, that having the “white and black” view of

life, one must either see it "my" way, or be in error—that in this manner we obtain an easy gauge by which to judge right and wrong. Easy it is, but no one need flatter himself on his thinking powers who uses it.

And now for a question that in so far as the author knows no one urging birth control by artificial means, has yet answered. If, as we have shown, each man must accept his own individual standard as the measure of his acts if he favor such methods, and does not take humanity or any member of humanity into consideration who does not fit in with his viewpoint; if, further, consequently there is no Right or Wrong, every *ought* ceases to exist—if, this is the viewpoint taken, as it must be, from this standpoint, since all the writings of these men and women based on sentiment and merely personal prejudices either directly express something of that nature, or imply it, or take it for granted—if, we repeat, this is our background that we are to keep in mind—and, as there is so much more suffering than happiness among people the world over, and there is nothing but a long dreamless sleep when we shuffle off this mortal coil, why in the name of all the angels in heaven above, and the demons down under the sea, or the lack of them, should one not immediately prevent any further suffering, by killing off all the third of humanity which has been shown to belong to the submerged; and why not kill all our cripples, and why not prevent any further births at all—for surely, if there is nothing—absolutely nothing but the happiness of this life—and there is mighty little of it here, even though we be of most fortunate birth—why not see to it that the race ceases to exist at once, and thereby save our children all the troubles and worries, and disease and unhappiness that is mortal's daily share?

NOTES

1. *On Right and Wrong*, by W. S. Lilly, Chapman & Hall, London.

2. "In pedagogy it is also the theory of descent rather than the selection theory which has been drawn on for some rather remarkable developments in child-study and instruction. Unfortunately it is exactly on that weakest of the three foundation pillars of descent, namely, the science of embryology with its Müllerian-Haeckelian recapitulation theory or biogenetic law, that the child-study pedagogues have builded. The species recapitulates in the ontogeny (development) of each of its individuals the course or history of its phylogeny (descent or evolution). Hence the child corresponds in different periods of its development to the phyletic stages in the descent of man. As the child is fortunately well by its fish, dog, and monkey stages before it comes into the care of the pedagogue, he has to concern himself only with its safe progress through the various stages of prehistoric and barbarous man. Detect the precise phyletic stage, cave-man, stone-age man, hunter, roamer, pastoral man, agriculturist, and treat with the little barbarian accordingly! What simplicity. Only one trouble here for the pedagogue; the recapitulation theory is mostly wrong; and what is right in it is mostly covered up by the wrong part, that few biologists longer have any confidence in discovering the right. What then of our generalising friends, the pedagogues?

"Finally in sociology, more particularly biological sociology. Here again, to my eyes, much biological sociology rests on two very insecure bases: (1) a too slight acquaintance with biology on the part of the biological sociologist, and, (2) an acceptance of, and confidence in, certain biological theories which are certainly unwarranted, and are not at all shared by biologists themselves. Biological science contains much that is proved and certain; but also much that is nothing more than a working hypothesis, provisional theory, and anticipatory generalisation. As the proved part is largely of the nature of facts of observation, isolated and unrelated, and the unproved part is composed of the large and sweeping generalisations, the plausible, provisional explanations, such as the various theories of heredity, of the results of struggle, of the development of mutual aid, etc., that is, is exactly the sort of material that the sociologist needs to weave into his biological foundations for the sociologic study of

man, it is exactly this unproved part of biology that the searching sociologist carries home with him from his excursions into the biological field. The recapitulation theory looms up large and familiar in biological sociology; it is mostly discredited in biology. The inheritance of acquired characters serves as a basis for much sociology; most biologists believe it impossible. The selection theories are gospel to some sociologists; they are the principal moot points in present-day sociology. And so on. Biology is not yet come to that stage in its development where it can offer many solidly founded generalisations on which other sciences can build. The theory of descent is one such safe great generalisation; but perhaps Darwinism is not another. At least many scholars do not believe that it is."

(From *Darwinism To-day*, by Vernon L. Kellogg, Henry Holt & Co., 1907, pp. 21-22.)

3. It is difficult to obtain reliable information on this point, as the United States Census does not classify women very well, but what we have found was taken from the statistics gathered in Texas and appearing in the *Dallas News*, February 10 and 13, 1916.

4. As quoted by the Rev. T. Slater, S. J., of St. Bruno's College, St. Asaph, Wales; in the *Ecclesiastical Review*, November, 1916, p. 535.

5. It will be observed that there has been an immense increase in criminals. When it is considered that during 1910 alone, 521.7 persons out of every 100,000 population were committed to the care of a penal institution, whereas January 1, 1910, there were in institutions of this type only 121.2 out of every 100,000, and in 1890, there were 131.5 out of every 100,000, we can readily form one or two conclusions that are startling.

It was during these years that many homes for insane and feeble-minded were erected and so, many that were classified as in penal institutions in 1890 would not now be so classified, which makes the remarkable increase in criminals stand forth all the more in comparison with that time.

What then is the cause of this immense increase? There are various reasons that may be suggested, but absolutely none that can compare with the fact that there is little religious training now given that makes for solid conviction of what is Right and what is Wrong; and, as we have already shown, the child not being taught how to have an absolute standard of Right and Wrong, can only come to the conclusion, if he think at all, that *his* opinion is as good as another's, and—he follows his own in-

clination.

6. "The average number of children born in a family is four, whereas in these degenerates we find 7.3 each, and if the still-born children are included, the disproportion is still more striking, as the average number of children born in each family is brought up to 8.4."

Tredgold: Report of Royal Commission in England, Part 6, page 199, as cited in *Fecble-mindedness and Insanity*. A series of Addresses and Special Studies reported at the National Conference of Charities and Correction.

Issued from Office of Publication, 315 Plymouth Court. Chicago, 25 cents.

7. But because it runs in families does not mean that it is inherited. See Chapter on *Sterilization, Sex-Instruction and Eugenics*.

8. We have already called attention to the fact that this type of individual breeds at the rate of 7.3 children to the family.

9. *The Menace of Birth-Control*, *Physical Culture Magazine*, May, 1917.

10. That fewer children are not by any means better than many, is well illustrated by the fact that clergymen have large families, and though usually very poor, a magazine writer of a short time ago, called attention to the fact that in "Who's Who," there were the names of more clergymen's sons and daughters who had attained eminence in their chosen fields than from any other single class.

CHAPTER V

STERILIZATION, SEX-INSTRUCTION, AND EUGENICS

IN this chapter we shall discuss the subjects mentioned in its title in our usual way. First defining what we mean by the terms, then stating the facts and finally giving the conclusions that flow from the facts.

By sterilization is meant the making of an incision in the lower portion of the abdomen of the female and tying off the uterine tubes, which carry the egg from the ovary to womb, so that no egg can have an outlet as it ripens, and consequently cannot be fertilized; or, if the subject be a male, by tying off the two ducts called the vasa deferentia so that no sperm (the male seed that fertilizes the female egg) can be transmitted by the male to the female, thus successfully blocking any possible impregnation. In either case it is possible to remove partially or entirely either uterine tubes or vasa deferentia respectively.

So much for what sterilization means. Now let us observe the reasons assigned as to why it should be put into practice. It is said this should be brought into effect so that criminals, insane, and feeble-minded may be prevented from breeding their own kind and foisting many more like themselves upon the public at large.

Further, the reason it is believed that sterilization will effect the elimination of these undesirables is because it has been observed that in great numbers of instances, children have in turn become dependents on society and have followed

in the self-same footprints of parents, and that this being the case it must follow that children inherit the insanity, feeble-mindedness, or criminal tendencies of their parents.

"Inheriting" means various things to different people. Biologically it means, not as most people seem to think, that the child is born with something the parents have acquired during their respective lives, but that at the very moment of conception—that is, just at the precise instant the sperm of the father meets the ripened egg of the mother which is descending through the uterine tubes, the supposedly inherited characteristic that is being discussed must then and there be part and parcel of the beginnings of the child. The female egg, we must remember is not the child; neither is the sperm, but as soon as the two meet, the child that is to be has life, and begins its growth. Life is there in all its completeness, but not in the same form that it later assumes; just as the child at the moment of birth is just as much an individual as it ever becomes, though it by no means possesses the same form that it does twenty years hence.

It is not difficult to see that as soon as the sperm has fertilized the egg, the father is a more or less negligible factor, for, notwithstanding the death of the father, the child will go on developing just the same as though that father continued living. There is absolutely nothing further given the child from the moment of conception by the father so far as inheritance is concerned, and it must therefore follow that if all the child is to inherit from the father is not already present in that tiny sperm that fertilized the egg, it cannot be inherited from the paternal side.

On the mother's side it is not easy for most men and women to understand that the self-same rule holds true, and that simply because the child is carried in the mother's



body during the entire period of gestation, does not mean anything except that it receives nourishment from the mother. Whatever the child is to develop into has already been adjusted. There is a continuing of that something that sent the spark of life on its embryological tour. In other words, whatever the child inherits from its mother must be present in the tiny egg that is loosened and thrown out of the ovary when ripe, and which, then meeting the sperm from the father, becomes fertilized. Again let us say, so that it will be clearly understood, that all that is meant by inheritance is that at the very instant conception takes place, all that the child does, and can possibly, inherit is already present in the egg of the mother and the sperm of the father. If anything is added later—if for example any change results from an adverse position of the fertilized egg during the period of gestation, this is not inherited, but is due to some mechanical defect, to malnutrition or to some micro-organism.

Everything given to the embryo after conception is simply nourishment and has nothing to do with inheritance.

All this means is that in order to inherit any parental characteristic, it is necessary that that characteristic be already present in the sperm of the father or the egg of the mother before fertilization takes place.

Now let us state the argument for sterilization which runs something like this: The state, in order to safeguard society and protect itself against criminals, insane and feeble-minded who may later injure society, or be a burden upon them, has the right to use means which (1) are not intrinsically wrong but are (2) morally necessary. And sterilization not being intrinsically wrong and being morally necessary for the protection of society, the state should impose it upon the types of persons mentioned.

Here is what has to be considered when a matter of this kind is being discussed:

(1) We have to take into consideration whether the state has the right to impose sterilization.

(2) We have to ask whether sterilization is intrinsically wrong.

(3) Is it morally necessary?

(4) We are advocating this measure in order that no child shall inherit criminality, insanity or feeble-mindedness.

(5) Have we proven that the child does inherit these things, or does it only *seem* it does?

(6) What if it should be proven beyond doubt that these things, especially feeble-mindedness and insanity are diseases, with which offspring are infected—that is, are actual germ infections—and not inherited?

(7) Would it not mean then that the very end for which we had made these laws would be lost, and consequently we had been doing grave wrong by mutilating men and women and making a huge laboratory of the state in which unfortunates were merely being thrust in order to attempt substantiating very doubtful theories?

(8) Could one in justice speak of Right in any matter where an innocent person were made to suffer, for a doubtful end?

(9) From the moral viewpoint, if we actually believe that a deliberate sin is bad and justly to be condemned, what if it should be proven that sterilization, especially of males, creates a far greater sexual desire than before, and consequently causes more immorality than formerly? Remember that sterilization does not make it impossible to have sexual intercourse. It merely makes impregnation impossible. And if a criminal, after being sterilized was set at liberty, who had seduced any number of young girls before

he was sterilized, a greater desire being now present than formerly, he would seduce still more.

(10) And if we remember this fact we must, if (9) should be proved, accept sterilization with the implication that we do not believe in morality—that we do not believe in any true worth-whileness,—but that as long as impregnation does not take place virtue still remains intact.

(11) Have we a right to impose a greater desire for that which we condemn, upon a person who is already a criminal, or unable to overcome his many temptations in the everyday world without such additional one being added?

If we can find a satisfactory answer to these questions we shall have some solid foundation on which to build.

First, no one disputes the fact that the State has the right to impose upon its members that which in and of itself is not intrinsically wrong, and which will not injure any innocent persons, so that there may be brought about an end which in and of itself is not wrong.

Second, sterilization in and of itself is in all probability not intrinsically wrong.

Third, as to moral necessity, it is first necessary to prove that the thing for which sterilization is applied, can be accomplished. We do not mean that it is necessary to prove that sterilization sterilizes. That would be absurd, being pure tautology. We are here referring to the ultimate end in view—that is, the prevention of criminality, insanity and feeble-mindedness.¹ Again, we must first prove that these things are inherited. Has this been proven? We shall answer shortly, but until this is proven there can be no question of moral necessity, and consequently we cannot discuss the point as to the State's right in the matter. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth questions are embodied in the one just explained.

Ninth and Tenth, does sexual purity count for anything, or if not what does? Do we not believe in *actual morality*? That is, in such a thing as goodness, as purity, as virtue, as worth-whileness? Or do we confuse actualities with simply not being found out?

Eleventh, we must not forget that in no system of Ethics yet accepted by intelligent persons has it been shown to be justifiable that an innocent person could be justly injured so that others might not be, and in no system has it been proven that it is just to instil a greater temptation to do wrong than was formerly present.

We may, and should segregate constantly and permanently those people who are a menace to society and who might breed children like themselves, for that is merely a matter of self-defense on the part of society, and as such is, and must be justifiable. But this is a totally different matter from saying that society has the right to inflict a personal mutilation upon some member in order to prevent something from occurring, which it has not yet been proved would occur. That is, there is no Right, based on any principles of Ethics yet discovered, which would permit cutting off the right hand of one you knew might later use that right hand to injure you. It would be justifiable to bar his way from approaching; it might be right to incarcerate him, but it requires no great intellect to see the difference between this and an actual mutilation, not only to prevent injury, but to mutilate for a purpose that was not yet at all clear as to its occurrence.

The insane and feeble-minded are not responsible for their acts—that is, *cannot justly be punished* for what they do—they may be incarcerated, for that is merely separating them from the rest of society so that no injury will come by them, and if that be considered as a punish-

ment, it is only so incidentally. The imprisonment is not for the purpose of punishment in this case, but merely to keep them from injuring themselves and others. Now as these persons are not responsible, and therefore cannot justly be punished it would be unjustly punishing them were they legally mutilated.

Another factor enters when we discuss the criminal. Here responsibility has been proved and punishment is due. There might be an argument in a case of this kind but there can be nothing said in favor of justice, if those who are irresponsible are to suffer punishment for things they cannot help.

Here Eugenics must be brought in. All this word means is "happily born." If sterilization be practiced, it is an attempt to prevent those from being born who may become a nuisance to society. Eugenics takes just the reverse point of view and attempts to find laws by which healthy and normal children may come into existence. It is therefore seen that both of these viewpoints are intimately interwoven. The one is to prevent not-wanted children, the other is to assist in procuring wanted children.

Knowing what the term "Eugenics" means, we are now prepared to discuss the methods suggested by which these happily-born children are to come into existence. Probably the best statement of the case from the methodical viewpoint is that given by the Eugenics Education Society of England: "the study of agencies under social control that may impair or improve the qualities of future generations either physically or mentally." ²

The scientific foundation for the whole Eugenic idea is based on what is called the Mendelian theory, whose principal laws are those of (1) Dominancy and (2) Recession. "According to the law of dominancy, a pronounced quality

or characteristic in either parent will show itself in all the second generation and in one-fourth of all future generations; whilst, according to the law of recession, there remains latent in the second generation the characteristic or quality opposed to the dominant characteristic or quality in three-fourths of the offspring, in one-fourth of which it will always recur in subsequent offspring and two-fourths of which it will recur in the same proportion as the dominating quality."

Now let us discuss the subject of Mental Diseases, which may be broadly classified into two groups, namely Amentia and Insanity, amentia meaning that he who suffers from it has never had a developed mind, that is, is an idiot or feeble-minded from birth, while by insanity we mean those cases which have been more or less normal, and later lost this mental normality.

As insanity comes after a mind has already had some development, it can come about only through one of two causes; it must be due to either accident or disease, whereas in the case of amentia, that is, where the individual is born without a mind capable of development, it is assumed that neither accident nor disease has anything to do with it. But, as Dr. Flick says:

There is no scientific evidence that imbecility, feeble-mindedness, and idiocy are fundamentally different from insanity. The former are said to be due to an arrested development of the brain, and the latter to disease or injury. That the arrested development of the brain has not been due to disease or injury, or even that imbecility, feeble-mindedness, and idiocy are always the result of arrested development of the brain, has not been proved. In truth, we know very little accurately and definitely yet about abnormalities and their causes.

It is because the heredity of mental diseases has been believed by the world that the eugenist has jumped to the conclusion that he has a cure for them. He is logical enough when he says that if amentia and insanity are hereditary, we can stamp them out by sterilizing the men and women who are suffering from them. As he is not responsible for the premises of the syllogism, we can forgive him for his false conclusions, but we must not permit ourselves to be drawn into a sociological blunder by a division of responsibility for an error. Without conceding that sterilization would be the proper remedy for the prevention of mental disease even if they were hereditary, the point whether they are hereditary should certainly be settled first.

So far as I know there is not a scintilla of scientific evidence to prove that they are hereditary.

And here let us be sure to remember our explanation of what heredity means; namely, only that which is transmitted from either parent to the embryo at the precise moment of conception.

Whatever comes to the offspring extraneous and extrinsic to the primary cell is essentially an acquisition from contact, nutrition, or mechanical interference. It makes no difference whether the acquisition is made during ante-natal or post-natal life, it cannot be set down in the category of inheritances.

It is true that the normality, the vigor, and the healthfulness of the parent influence the normality, the vigor, and the healthfulness of the primary cell (the fertilized egg which is growing into a child), but a defective primary cell, whilst it may lead to inviability (inability to live after leaving the mother's womb) and even to deformity; cannot give rise to the conditions which are known as diseases. Moreover, defectiveness in the primary cell does not arise from an inherent quality of the parent but from malnutrition, from sexual wastefulness, or from a disease which affects either all the cells of the body or the cell-making functions

of the body. None of these fundamental causes of defectiveness can be dealt with in a general way by a general rule of action, since each is individual in some particular person and can only be dealt with in that person. Alteration of form cannot be transmitted except in so far as it is physiological; and physical deformity due to nutritional or organic causes may occur in the offspring of the best-formed parents.

The last word in scientific medicine seems to indicate that the conditions which we call diseases, in whatever part of the body they may occur, are due either to the action of micro-organisms, to malnutrition, or to physical injury. Whatever the cause, they fall outside of the category of inheritances under the laws of biology.

Are amentia and insanity diseases? If they are not diseases, what are they? In the light of present knowledge, it would certainly be difficult to give a rational explanation of them upon any other hypothesis than that they are diseases.

In that most valuable report of Dr. H. J. Sommer, Jr., on 1180 post-mortems of the insane at the State Hospital for the Insane, Norristown, Pa., there are accurately recorded many facts which point unmistakably to the conclusion that amentia and insanity are diseases. The records are not quite complete, as in many of the cases the tissues and membranes of the brain were apparently not studied. In all except seventeen cases, however, an histological study of the important organs of the body was made and in 842 of these cases a thorough study of the membranes of the brain was made. In all of the cases in which there was a record, 1163 in number, a change in one or more of the serous membranes of the body was recorded, and in 842 cases in which the brain had been examined, there was either chronic leptomenigitis (inflammation of the pia and arachnoid coverings of the brain or spinal cord) or pachymenigitis (inflammation of the dura mater) or both. It may be worth while mentioning here for those who are not familiar with technical terms that leptomenigitis and pachymenigitis mean a change in the inner and outer mem-

branes of the brain respectively, due usually to the action of micro-organisms or the toxins of micro-organisms inhabiting the brain or its membranes or important organs of the body. Most of the cases had one serous membrane of the body affected; a great many had tuberculosis; some had cancer; and a great many had nephritis. The serous membrane lining the inside of the heart was quite commonly affected. As the kidneys are chiefly concerned with the elimination of toxins from the body, the frequent breaking-down of these organs in mental diseases is in itself ground for suspicion that toxins in some way are responsible for the conditions.

Dr. D. J. McCarthy's work at the Henry Phipps Institute also throws some light upon the cause of insanity, showing that the toxins which come from tuberculosis, whether from the tubercle bacillus itself or from the micro-organisms which are associated with it, set up changes in the membranes of the brain and in all probability cause insanity. In an histological study of 287 brains of people who had died of tuberculosis, he found acute leptomeningitis 49 times. In his clinical study of the cases he found a change in mentality in a great many patients, which in quite a number amounted to insanity.

In the 1180 cases reported on by Dr. Sommer, 49 were cases of amentia, and of these 44 were cases of imbecility and five of idiocy. The same changes in the serous membranes existed in these cases as in the cases of insanity and they were the same in the youngest as in the oldest. In a female idiot of twenty months, there was leptomeningitis and pachymeningitis and there was a chronic inflammation of the inside lining of the heart. In an imbecile girl twelve years old there were chronic pachymeningitis, chronic changes in the valves of the heart, with chronic changes in the liver, kidneys, and spleen.

Admitting that it has not been proved that the changes in the membranes and tissues of the brain and in other serous membranes are the cause of amentia and insanity or even bear any causative relationship to it, the existence of these changes in all cases of amentia and insanity and

their absence in the majority of people who die from other diseases, give us a working hypothesis and throw serious doubt upon the theory of heredity. To say the least, these findings remove all doubt as to these conditions being diseases.

A micro-organic origin of mental diseases would be more in harmony with what is now definitely and accurately known about disease generally than is heredity, and it would not come in conflict with biology, as heredity does. The theory of the heredity of disease is gradually crumbling away in the light of our knowledge of bacteriology and is daily becoming more evident that even the transmission of such border-land conditions as night-blindness, color-blindness, albinism, etc., will have to be reconsidered. All of these phenomena can be better explained upon the hypothesis of micro-organic action than upon that of heredity. The micro-organic theory would even explain the phenomena of heredity better than heredity can.

With the heredity of mental diseases in doubt, there is no reason for sterilizing people who suffer from these conditions; and it is therefore unnecessary to weigh the prospective good that might come from sterilization against the prospective evil which would come from it. The burden is upon those who advocate extraordinary measures to prove that such measures are justifiable.

Does Eugenics offer us anything for the prevention of mental diseases? Yes, but not by way of sterilization. We can improve future generations by preserving those who now exist as normal human beings and guarding them against degeneracy. For this purpose we must keep in mind the fundamental principles underlying reproduction: (1) that like produces like; (2) that the quality of offspring may be raised or lowered by nutrition; and (3) that the primary cells which unite to form a new being may be influenced by both the physical and moral life of the parents.

In the interest of Eugenics we must improve the conditions of life; we must make it possible for each human being to earn his daily bread without more exertion than is consistent with good health; we must so enlighten the

people that they will live as human beings in harmony with the great God of the universe; and we must seek to meet the difficulties and solve the problems which come with an artificial life. Civilization brings its burdens as well as its pleasures and its enjoyments. Living in houses close together in vast numbers brings us many pleasures, both physical and intellectual, but it also exposes us to diseases and leads us into evil way. Science, art, and organization must protect us against the diseases, and religion must keep us in the right path.

For good progeny we must lead clean, healthy lives under sanitary conditions in a good moral atmosphere. We must have healthy food; we must have light, airy, well-drained houses; we must have broad, clean streets; we must protect our women and children against excessive hours of labor and against labor at improper times and periods. We must get for the working man a living wage; we must discourage the excessive use of alcohol and tobacco; we must protect our young people against the insidious, pernicious influence of open vice; and we must encourage simplicity and discourage ostentation. Let us talk less about the moron and the helpless victim of poverty and more about the Christian hero and the reward of patient struggle against difficulties.

By all odds the most important factor in Eugenics is purity. Sexual dissipation causes degeneracy in the offspring, whereas chastity and continency exercise a building-up influence. Foerster, one of the greatest living sociologists, a Protestant, tells us that the celibacy of the Catholic priests and sisters is one of the greatest influences for good progeny in the world at the present day because it keeps before the world in concrete form the great heroic virtue of chastity. Whatever upholds morality undoubtedly makes for good progeny, and whatever breaks down morality leads to degeneracy.

The influence of Eugenics for the prevention of mental diseases may be exercised through legal enactment in those matters which have to do with better food supply, better housing and better sanitary conditions, but will have to be

reached through religion in those matters which depend upon moral uplift. Sterilization of those suffering from amentia and insanity can lead nowhere because it applies the remedy at the wrong end. It seeks to cure an evil by eliminating the result rather than the cause. Moreover, sterilizing the imbecile and the feeble-minded would undoubtedly throw into society another element of moral degradation, which in the end would lead to more degeneracy.

Segregation of the feeble-minded and of all those who are suffering from amentia of any kind is not only justifiable, but is a duty. Reproduction by these people should be prevented in this way, not because they would transmit their disease to their offspring but because they cannot give a proper environment to their offspring for development into good citizenship. Society has a right to protect itself against pauperism and crime as well as against disease.

In this connection it will not be untimely nor out of place to utter a word of warning to over-zealous workers in the field of prevention of social diseases. Knowledge alone will not protect against these diseases and knowledge without religion may lead to sexual profligacy as well as these diseases. The sane method of preventing these diseases is to register them, open our hospitals to them, and require every one who contracts them to recover completely before exercising the right of manhood and womanhood. Let there be more candor and openness among those who have the diseases and less talk to the innocent who know nothing about them and who are entitled to protection without shock to their sense of modesty and decency.

We have quoted from this article of Dr. Flick's at great length, but he has so well, so succinctly, and so understandingly explained his viewpoint, that we consider every word of it essential.

In regard to teaching the child matters of sex, nearly all are agreed that he should know all that is necessary for correct living, but not many seem able to agree on the

method best to be pursued, or on who the teacher shall be. To tell a child that evil consequences will flow from his act, even though they be painted in the most terrible colors, will not restrain him very often. There must be other factors present, namely, a DESIRE to want to do that which should be done, and a knowledge of what is good and what is bad; but, in order to obtain this knowledge he must have some notion of what Validity means and how it is to be applied to the rules which are laid down for his guidance; for it surely does not bespeak good sense on the part of child or grown-up to accept whatever is told him without question, simply because it is told him. He must be able to authenticate it—to validate it.

And when we think of these things we find we are confronted with the problem "Who shall be the child's instructor?" Shall it be the physician? If so, the boy or girl being instructed feels and knows that his teacher speaks only from a knowledge of consequences. All it can possibly mean to the child is that if he lead an immoral life disease may be his share. There is no validity for the underlying reasons as to why a moral life should be led, given him.

Should the clergyman be the instructor? Here, if the informant have a thorough training and not be a sentimentalist, the child might obtain valid reasons for living a moral life, but as the clergyman is usually quite ignorant of many of the things that the child should know, he does not speak with sufficient understanding, and usually hasn't that hold on the child's imagination that is essential to make what is told him "stick." Then there is the further complication that should the clergyman say anything about consequences that are misunderstood by the child, and, a physician at some future time deny these consequences, if the child be an average one, he will consequently assume that

all the clergyman said was untrue.

Shall the school-teacher instruct? If so, it will in most cases be *en masse*. It is well known by all who have even had the smallest amount of experience in this matter that if this be done, it but opens the way for those conversations between boys and girls which lead to the very opposite consequences of those we are trying to produce.

Shall the parent be the instructor? Probably all will agree that an affirmative answer can be given to this question, but, then the question comes to mind "How many parents know enough to do this intelligently?" For if it is to be done at all it must be done correctly; that is, scientifically, thoroughly and above all honestly. There must be no exaggeration of consequences, or, as soon as the child discovers that what has been told him was exaggerated, he will discount everything the parent has said.

As just stated, probably all will agree that the parent is the proper instructor in so delicate a matter as things pertaining to sex, but, first it is necessary that parents should *know*. And how to teach parents will be the important thing for those who work along these lines. It might be well to have the clergyman, provided always of course, that he be a man of refinement and education, give these instructions to men and women before the marriage ceremony is performed when both bride and groom are together, or if a physician is sought as the instructor, it must be insisted upon that unless he can present a valid reason for what he says it must not be accepted. He must be able to explain fully and completely the *why* of what he says or it must not be followed.

If however the child is ready for instruction we must give it, and in that case if the parent know of any person having the necessary training and the ability to explain

without shock to the child, let him ask that person to impart such knowledge individually. Further, in the study at school of such subjects as physiology and biology, provided that the sexes be kept separate, much information can be imparted by those who are not only able to state the facts, but who can assign a reason for those facts, and for the conclusions that are drawn from them.

But whatever the manner of instruction, the all-important thing to remember is that the child must obtain all of his *methods of thought* before he is fifteen years of age. That is, he must be constantly and always taught that principles count, and only principles. That no theory or idea is to be followed unless its validity can be demonstrated on fundamental principles. And if he is always and ever made to state his *WHY* for everything he says and does, it will be possible for him to understand what is later told him. If he does not have this training one cannot even explain these matters to him when he is about to be married, for he cannot understand. And not being able to understand he brings up his children in the same way that he has been brought up.

Unless morality be instilled before the child is fifteen, that is, unless the child is taught the difference between doing a thing because it is right and should be done, and doing it because evil consequences flow, he will never distinguish between the two—in other words no matter how good a life he may lead it will be an immoral one, for the only reason he lives the life he does is because of his cowardice—his fear of consequences.

But if he is to have any morality he must not only know what is right and wrong, he must know *WHY* it is right and wrong. He must not be taught that a thing is right or wrong because his church teaches it, or because the bible

says so. He must be shown that if it is right or wrong and his church or the bible say so, it is because, in and of itself, aside from all individual sects and books it is still right and wrong and that the church and the bible find their authority for what is right and wrong in and under the same ideas of first principles and logic that every man finds them. That is, that the very basic laws that are part and parcel of every individual are the foundations on which a logical superstructure must be built, or, in other words, the very fact that man can reason forces him to accept the consequences of such reasoning and if he always checks it up with his logic to see that it is correct it will be the guide that keeps him in the path of rightness.

The child must be shown that what he is told to do as being right is not a mass of law and command arbitrarily placed before him, which others have read and are now trying to foist upon him, but that deep down underneath, there are eternal reasons for these commands—that even if all Christianity and the bible be swept away, we should still come to the self-same conclusions we have been discussing, because the human faculty of reasoning would not let us do otherwise. We should still have to decide whether there is sufficient proof of a Supreme Being, and if there be one, that we owe him an obligation on which all ideas of duty—that is of right and wrong—are built, or, if we do not accept this idea of a Creator, we must accept the Utilitarian principle, and we have seen that this doctrine holds good only for optimists, that is, only for those who due to their inherited Transcendental teachings have formed during their plastic period of life the Transcendental morals and continued in accord therewith, even after they have thrown aside the very reason for accepting them.

NOTES

1. "Compulsory surgical sterilization of all defectives is proposed as a radical method for preventing the hereditary transmission of feeble-mindedness. At least six states have passed laws authorizing or requiring this operation. In no state, however, has this remedy been applied on a large scale. There are many objections to this plan. The friends of the patients are not willing to have the operation performed. The normal "carriers" of defect would not be affected. The presence of these sterile people in the community, with unimpaired sexual desire and capacity, *would be a direct encouragement of vice and a prolific source of venereal disease.* Sterilization would not be a safe and effective substitute for permanent segregation and control.

"It is probable that education in the broadest sense will be the most effective method in a rational movement for the diminution of feeble-mindedness. The public generally should be intelligently informed as to the extent, causation and significance by means of suitable literature, popular lectures and other means. There is now great demand for such information from woman's clubs, church societies, charitable organizations, etc. General knowledge of this subject in a community will insure the rational protection and control of the feeble-minded persons in that community."

From *The Burden of Feeble-mindedness*, by Walter E. Fernald, M. D. Publication No. 4, Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene, pp. 12-13. Italics are ours.

2. *Eugenics and Mental Diseases*, by Lawrence F. Flick, M.D., in *The Ecclesiastical Review*, August, 1914.

It is also from this article that the lengthy quotation immediately following is taken.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRIMITIVE FAMILY

HAVING shown when instruction must be given and foundations laid; having shown how to determine what is Right and what Wrong; having shown how to apply this knowledge in the discussion of sociological problems, we come to a consideration of that very important institution known as the Family—the unit on which practically all sociology is built. And, in order that those engaged in social work may know at least a brief history of that institution, scientifically considered, that is, considered from the historical, biological, and psychological as well as economic viewpoints, we shall discuss in this chapter the Primitive, and in the two following the Medieval, and Renaissance and Reformation Families, respectively.

Let us first then define what is meant by science. It means “systematized knowledge,” and the Sciences have come to be used as designating all laboratory branches of knowledge in our various curricula. Philosophy means finding the ultimate reasons for all things; in other words, Philosophy takes all the facts of all the sciences and builds them into one complete whole. To put it in still another way, Science gathers the facts and Philosophy tells what these facts mean, so that we may in all strictness say, that there is no difference whatever between the two terms taken in their fullest and widest significance. They are merely the names given to the two great divisions of studies

pertaining to Life.

Science gathers the facts, to which Logic (borrowed from Philosophy) must be added before we can obtain any meaning at all as to what the facts mean.¹

Let us then for the moment consider WHY we want to gather these facts and weave them together. Professor Carr of the University of Chicago tersely puts it into these words "to control and to prophesy." This seems as short and as easily rememberable as anything we have yet found. We are desirous of gathering all the facts pertaining to the particular subject in question, then finding from Philosophy what they mean, as well as their relation to all other facts of other branches of Science, and the reason we are desirous of doing all this is in order that we may be able to control the particular fields under observation and to prophesy what will occur in that field under any and all circumstances.

It follows that we must find an acceptable starting point and so we have come to consider only those particular acts or things, or processes which can be duplicated in the laboratory as coming under what are called the Natural Sciences but which the man of the street thinks of as the only possible meaning of the word "Science." No matter how true we may believe a thing to be, no matter what evidence we believe we have for such truth, unless that particular thing can be guided, and harnessed, and made to react in the same way each time, under the same laboratory conditions, we throw it out of court. It may be true, in fact far more true than anything we have in the laboratory, but we have agreed as scientists only to discuss those things on which we can definitely experiment with physical methods.

Let us call particular attention to this point, as it is bound to make considerable difference in our reading should

it be neglected. An example comes to mind. Suppose two friends, agreeing quite well on all subjects save politics, find that were this subject discussed, all friendship would cease, agree among themselves that under no circumstances is that subject to enter into any of their conversations. Now such a case is not only conceivable but is quite often found. And this is exactly the situation with scientists. They cannot agree on aught save laboratory evidence.

It must not be forgotten that first they are men with all the frailties and foibles, emotions and prejudices that men have, and secondarily only are they scientists, so that no matter in what field of work men may engage, their prejudices follow them, so that Walter Bagehot has well said that as soon as a man becomes famous he also becomes a nuisance, because he carries so many of his youthful prejudices with him, and, of course, by virtue of his now exalted position in one field of endeavor, his words, even when erroneous, carry great weight to a majority of people.

Scientific men have agreed that they will begin with some theory or hypothesis that fits in with laboratory evidence: this does not mean that there is nothing further back and far more deep than this laboratory evidence; it does not mean that those who oppose this method of taking only laboratory evidence may not be far more correct than those who accept it, but *it is an agreement*, and laboratory men have used this agreement as their beginnings when things scientific are to be discussed.

And, just as it does not follow from the non-discussion of politics that there is no such thing as politics, so also it does not follow that because we do not in laboratory science discuss certain things, that these things are non-existent or as real in their effect on making humanity what it is, as the very experiments we constantly perform in our

laboratories.

Professor William James was referring to this when he very definitely stated in his *Briefer Course in Psychology*² that those who oppose the determinist viewpoint which he uses have the better of the argument, and he for one is willing to accede it, yet, for his laboratory work it is better to adhere to the less probable view. This may cause the asking of a similar question to one the writer heard asked during a graduate course in psychology, when a middle-aged man, after listening to the lecturer for some three or four weeks daily expound various psychological theories and as often show them to be untenable, felt the necessity of something positive, and asked if there were then nothing positive in psychology, receiving the answer, that it all depended on whether the inquirer were doing graduate or undergraduate work. If the latter, then everything the instructor said was true; if, however, graduate work was being done, then nothing the instructor said was so, for, in graduate work each individual was supposed to be sufficiently mature and sufficiently well-grounded in fundamentals to be able to pick the dross from any theory and find the gold that was left, should there be any.

All this foreword bears most vitally on every subject discussed in a scientific spirit, which merely means, in an orderly, step-by-step manner, gathering only accepted facts, weeding out here and there the *so-called* "facts" that are really only clever guesses, and not allowing anything to creep in that is not well authenticated and definitely proven—*unless such matter be admitted as a guess and so stated*.

Under no circumstances must we admit that because the particular guess is plausible is it correct. There may be a dozen other very plausible ways from the true one, which caused a given thing's existence, but there can be only one

true way in which it did come into existence in one particular case, though many factors may have to be taken into account to find that cause.

Here, then, we come to some of the starting-points with which we are likely to meet in studying anything pertaining to the human family. One of these starting-points accepted by many is that humanity as a whole has constantly progressed from much humbler beginnings and has finally attained its present high state, and will continue progressing until an almost ideal humanity will be reached.

Another view held by a still greater number of people throughout the world than the just mentioned one is that man was originally in a very healthy state of all good things, but that he has gone backward through the ages he has spent on this globe of ours.

And still another idea prevalent among a considerable class of men and women is that men sprang from some type of remote ancestor akin to the higher apes, but not an ape, and that by tracing the development of the human race from the lower to the higher forms of animal life, we see and understand how this gradual change took place. And it is from the group who accept this viewpoint we have a sub-grouping of men and women who hold that this general theory of remote lower-type ancestors developing into higher forms is proved by the supposed fact of the child passing through a sort of recapitulation of all past ancestral stages during its pre-birth period, and after birth passing through the stages of the human-family's progress; that is, he is a real savage early in life, later he appears just on the verge of civilization and ultimately he actually becomes a full-fledged member of civilized society.

Then there are the theories as to the cause of the immense difference in children. One school insists that

heredity is the all-important factor, the other that environment counts for most.

And lastly we have the various schools with their many suggestions as to what methods are best in bringing about any desired change.

In the final analysis, Science is really a method. So we have (1) The radicals, who wish to throw aside the entire heritage of the past and start anew with unworked and often unworkable theories; (2) The conservatives, who believe that we may with proper care and caution study profitably what we have had, note the faults of the past and build up slowly but more lastingly a permanent structure that will improve mankind; (3) A sort of progressive, who takes part of the radical and part of the conservative methods; (4) The biologists, who almost lean toward pessimism when it comes to improving mankind; and (5) the psychologists, who believe that though each child is born with certain definite tendencies and instincts (tendencies of nerve-arcs to function) one can, by controlling these nerves—by forcing an activity constantly along the path one wishes it to follow—cause the more frequent activity of the one one wishes developed over the natural tendency, to become the stronger; that is, the natural tendency becomes relatively weakened, though in and of itself it may remain as strong as it originally was. In fact if this psychological viewpoint were untrue, there could be no education possible, and all social workers might as well throw up their hands in despair.

Fortunately, however, it is more true that the biologic idea, though it must be admitted that there can be no progress made with any person if the material to work upon is not there, and that material on which to work is biological.

It is essential that these viewpoints be remembered, for,

in reading the literature of any subject such as the Family, one is bound constantly to meet with references to them, and we must be able to discern not only what is true and what is not, but we must be able to understand what a vast difference in his conclusions will be noticeable, when one or the other of these viewpoints is used on which a writer begins his reasoning, or we cannot have either accuracy or value in our studies.

Again, if all viewpoints and methods are studied, one must be very careful not to choose a single writer and taking his references and following them out, assume that one has a wide range of knowledge, for very often men quote only those who agree with them, and to follow out only such references as agree means that instead of broadening it has narrowed one. Under such circumstances a person reading a hundred volumes may still only have seen one viewpoint.

Bearing these things in mind, we shall call attention first, to the fact that all institutions are the lengthened shadows of one man or one group of men, and second, that notwithstanding the many books and pamphlets written on the subject under discussion taking as their beginnings and their viewpoint that everything, including the family has evolved from a much lower and simpler form than the present, we hold with George Bernard Shaw, that were one to take a man of ten thousand years ago and dress him in our latest fashion, give him our language so he could express himself, one could never know that he was of any generation but our own *in so far as the working of his mind was concerned*. He quite naturally would not be acquainted with our many inventions, but, given the same facts, he would arrive at the same conclusions by the same method we do. That is, no matter how we may apply the term evolution in other fields, in *the method of thought* there has been none, for if there

were,—if men thought differently in the long ages past than now, we could not, simply by virtue of our thinking differently, know anything about their “Whys.” We could not set ourselves up to say that we know why they did as they did, and unless we can do this, all history and all ideas of how the family or any other institution came into existence and progressed are out of the question.

And thirdly, we must hold with Professor Spaulding of Leland Stanford, Jr., University, that the Ideal, that is “Perfection” has not evolved. There has been no change whatever in the Ideal, though our ideals of the Ideal may, and undoubtedly have changed many a time in accordance with our varying capacities for understanding what was meant by the term.

If these very important ideas be kept in mind we have a point with which to start the study of the Primitive Family, or any other primitive institution that will lead us somewhere definitely, and that by virtue of the fact that we know that with the same knowledge and under the same circumstances we should have acted similarly.

Each race or tribe has about the same biological equipment, but we find in one land certain things considered more important than in another, and the less important matters, on account of disuse for many ages, cease to be thought of any value whatever in due time. For example, among certain primitive men, almost the entire tribe is color-blind, being unable to distinguish between red and green. It can readily be imagined that so long as practically all are color-blind, it doesn't matter in the least to that particular tribe whether some one of them should not be. It is unimportant, whereas to a railroad man, such lack of ability at distinguishing two colors of vital importance in railroad work would prove of great consequence.

In each tribe there has been some one man or set of men who have taken leadership upon themselves, and it is to these leaders we owe whatever laws there are. Examples in historic times are Solon, Lycurgus and Moses. These leaders probably felt they were closer to the Ideal than others and it was such leaders who gave emphasis to certain traits of tribal life. This was the beginning of what later became the written law. And it is in this fact of stressing certain points that we shall, in all probability, find the explanation of the many changes that have taken place in our conception of the Family as an institution. That is, in the fact that there is no difference in the methods of thinking of any tribe or nation, any seeming difference is due to some particular point being more stressed than another, making a very great difference ultimately, and making that particular difference which we use as the gauge to assign such tribe or nation its status in the scale of civilization.

Again, all it means is that given a definite premise even a savage by the very fact that he belongs to the human family is more or less logical, and consequently must follow out to the very end, horrible as that end sometimes seems to us, the important ideas that his tribe stresses, and which would lead even ourselves to the same conclusion did we stress the same points. He is not necessarily unreasonable in his conclusions, he is often wrong in the point stressed.

Now we are ready to set forth the various types of families found among primitive peoples, using the term primitive, not in the sense of prehistoric man, for it is reasonable to state that before man began writing about himself, we can know little about him for that very reason; but as referring to those tribes and peoples who are now living in what we term a primitive state, that is without a written law and without a complete social government based on a written law.

The term "Family" we shall use in the sense of a husband with all his wives and children, or a wife with all her husbands and children. There is another sense in which the term is often used, namely, as meaning those particular groups which trace their lineage from a common ancestor. But this will not here enter in the discussion. The word "Marriage" means a union of male and female which "does not cease with the act of procreation."

We obtain our information on these subject mostly from accounts of travelers and the records of missionaries, and in recent years from especially trained investigators' researches. Beside these sources, we often find in the writings of the past, accounts of what ancient authors thought about the then uncivilized tribes with whom they were thrown in contact, and there are some writers who obtain their conclusions by searching for analogies between men and some of the higher animals. And it is because authorities are largely interested in different viewpoints and stress only certain traits in which they are interested, or which they particularly abominate, that gives rise to such varying and often hopeless as well as contradictory conclusions of sociologists.

Of the great general types of marriage we have polygamy, polyandry, and monogamy. The first type existing in the past in regions where wars destroyed the lives of many men, leaving a disproportionate number of women, or where plentiful food caused a disproportionate number of girls being born.

Polyandry, that is, where one wife had several husbands, existed in but few places at any time and to-day exists in still fewer; only in those cold or mountainous regions where the reverse conditions mentioned under polygamy held sway—where it was with difficulty that each man could support

a wife and family.

Monogamy, or one husband having but one wife, is and probably was the prevailing type, and even in those regions where polygamy is still practiced, monogamy is the general rule, only the chief or leading men being able to support so large a family as would necessarily result where one husband took unto himself many wives.

Bachofen in 1861, presented his theory of promiscuous relationship in the distant past, which he called "Mutterrecht," meaning thereby that in prehistoric times men and women lived in general sex relationship and as the father of a child could not at any time be known, the descent had to be reckoned through the mother, who of course always knew her own child. And, this was the cause, as time went on, of mothers waxing strong in the community and taking to themselves great power, developing what is called a Matriarchal system of government.

The evidence for this view as Professor Goodsell ³ has well summed up is: "(1) A few ancient authors and some modern travelers have described savages, low in scale of civilization, who are said to be quite promiscuous in sex relations; (2) certain savage groups at the present day have curious customs which are alleged to be survivals from a period of complete promiscuity."

In contradistinction to this view, Westermarck in his famous work on *The History of Human Marriage* brings forth the following: "(1) that no case of people living in unrestricted sexual communism can be found to-day; (2) that the customs which point to promiscuity admit of different and more satisfactory explanations. For example, 'wife lending,' as found among savage peoples, is probably traceable to their exaggerated ideas of the duty of hospitality; and the deflowering of brides by the priest might

reasonably be regarded as conferring honor upon the marriage. The more the matter is investigated, the more questionable it becomes that primitive groups generally lived in a condition of absolute promiscuity, although a great laxity in marital relations undoubtedly prevailed among them."

Sir Henry Maine developed a theory of what he termed the "Patriarchal Family," and the reasons for his theory are, primarily, that as we find traces among the Ancients of the father having almost absolute power, and the male always being the one who inherited both name and station through his father, it followed that this must have been the original type of family, but Professor Thomas in his article "Relation of Sex to Primitive Social Control" ⁴ conclusively shows that in most regions and among most tribes the reverse of Sir Henry's theory is true in that there is scarcely a case on record where traces of the Matriarchal system are not found.

Professor Westermarck has come to the conclusion that the single pair marriage was the original form and was due to the following reasons: (1) that it is the more common type of marriage among the higher animals and birds;—a union entered into and continued for life; (2) there are the inherent jealousies of men and brutes which would insist on single ownership; and (3) that the various cases of polygamy and polyandry are really offshoots from the single pair, and not the reverse, in so far as they already denote a higher conception of "classes" among the people, as only those who were "above" their fellow tribesmen in point of social station indulged in this form of marriage.

Grosse, in his *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft*, seems to think, and develops an interesting theory upon his thought, that food supply was the dominat-

ing factor in what method of family life any particular group or locality would develop. That is, during the pastoral stage men took whatever they could and the difficulties of finding sufficient food for more than himself and one wife caused man to have only one—resulted in the monogamous marriage; but during the agricultural stage, when women did most of the work, each man tried to obtain as many workers as possible and so he who had most wives became the wealthiest. It might however be said that the reverse conclusion might also be valid in this case, that the wealthier a man was the more wives he could afford to keep. And it is well to bear in mind that in nearly all cases it was the man wealthier in this world's goods who did practice polygamy; the poor man was always monogamous.

Another thing to remember is that all races and tribes have not passed through the self-same stages as have their contemporaries, and some of them may have even gone backwards to former conditions of living. And we must also remember that we shall not arrive at a just and true conclusion if we take only the industrial viewpoint, as does Grosse, or the sociological viewpoint as do many others, to the exclusion of the most important factor of all, namely the Psychological. That is, the *desires*, the *emotions*, and the *mental values* placed on the many and various forms of social intercourse and ideas by the different peoples; in short the important point to be kept in memory is that among men at large it is in the intellectual plane rather than the purely sensist that the greatest differences arise, and it is in this field that we must seek our reasons for differences, for man is immeasurably removed from the very highest types of animal forms by his faculty of speech and his ability at forming concepts and having general ideals.

Continuing, we shall discuss the Matriarchal form of

family life. It is in this system that kinship is traced through the mother, though some tribes practicing this method have all property descend from father to sons, as, for example, among the Fijians and many other groups of the Pacific Islanders, as well as among the West Australians. We see that here is a combination of Patriarchal and Matriarchal forms, and it may be that we are meeting with a transitional period in these cases.

Among the Malays where the maternal system holds sway the husband only visits "his wife's abode occasionally," she still retaining her old rights among her own people, and he among his.

Professor Goodsell sums up woman's position at this time in these words: "Concerning the whole vexed question of woman's status under the metronymic system the following conclusions seem fairly well established:

(1) In those instances where the husband lived and served among his wife's kindred the position of the woman was relatively high. She was protected by her male relatives from unjust divorce, from abuse and from gross overwork.

(2) On the other hand, it should be remembered that the maternal kinship system does not imply that women were in supreme control of the household, nor even that they held a determining voice in the management of the affairs of the kinship group or clan. This view of female supremacy or of a matriarchate has been maintained by Bachofen and other writers, but has not been satisfactorily established. On the contrary the evidence goes to show that, even when name, rank and property descended through the mother, she was not always the controlling force in the household. Rather it was a woman's older brother, her father, or even her husband who had the deciding voice in all important

matters and who determined the training and arranged the marriages of the children."

Most authorities seem to hold that the paternal system followed the maternal, though, as Professor Goodsell says, some of our very lowest tribes, such as the Fuegians of South America, the Todas of India and some Australian tribes, have this system, without any evidence remaining of there ever having been a maternal system preceding it.

The paternal type seems to have developed, according to those who hold to a well regulated and systematic series of steps by which men rise from one social level to another, by a sort of division of labor, a better understanding of the part the father played in generation, and the consequent feeling of assistance that was essential to the welfare of the mother and child. It is under the paternal system that the idea prevailed, wherever polygamy existed, that there was little or no kinship between children of the same father, though uterine brothers and sisters were supposed to be of the closest possible relationship. Such views would readily suggest customs then beginning, whereby certain individuals were not permitted to mate with certain others, as in this case, between uterine brother and sister, producing ultimately the tribal rules of exogamy, meaning simply that one's mate must be sought outside the members of one's immediate tribe.

It is further supposed that because it devolved upon woman to bear children, which bound her to the home more closely than man, it fell to her lot to care for all things in and about the home, including the tilling of the fields. Men, in the meantime, hunted, fished and made war. In fact it is during this period that some writers hold we may seek for the beginnings of modern inventions; that it is here that the first farming implements had their birth in woman's fertile

mind. Working hard and long in the fields there first came to her mind the thought of the assistance a crooked stick might give, then a stone was attached forming a hoe; later the discovery that certain kinds of stone would not crack when heated—the direct forerunner of our cooking utensils.

The making of all these things slightly changed and improved, later developed into regular trades taken over by men, and claimed credit for by them as proof of masculine ingenuity.

Under this system, too, a certain number of cattle or an amount of money was exchanged for the bride, probably in many cases tending to the conception on the part of the husband of an actual slavish ownership in the wife, though there is in all probability evidence enough to show that in any quantity of cases, the matter was not looked upon as a selling of the bride at all, but that inasmuch as parents were to be deprived of a valued possession in the loss of their daughter, they were entitled to some recompense, the whole process being considered a necessary evil of which parents had to make the most of; in fact it might be considered somewhat analogous to a case in which a railroad, being the cause of an injury or death, renders an amount of money to the injured, or his heirs in case of death, not in payment for the injury or the death, for that of course could never be paid for in terms of money, but, inasmuch as the injury or death is a fact, one simply has to make the most of it and accept whatever recompense seems somewhat compatible with such death or injury. It seems reasonable to accept this view, for there are tribes among the Indians who gave a certain amount of blankets and other valuables, only to receive gifts in turn of equal value.

Westermarck, Darwin and Grosse, all seem agreed that in the very primitive stages woman really had considerable

choice in her acceptance of a husband and that the male appeared as an ardent wooer, just as he does in our own time. And any reason why most savage tribes of the present day do not permit this free choice is said to be that they are not by any means living under primitive conditions now and have not been for great lengths of time.

Divorce is very frequent among some tribes, such as the Kurnai of Australia, and some of our own Dacotah Indians. Freedom of choice is common among the Maoris of New Zealand, the Creeks and the Pueblos.

"Indeed there is some reason to believe, as Howard has suggested, that marriage began in free choice, passed through the stage of contract and purchase arranged by family or clan, and with the decay of the kinship group and paternal power, became very slowly, once more an individual matter as in modern times."

With some forms of polygamy we are all familiar from biblical accounts, as well as that still practiced under the Mohammedan and Chinese régimes, though even here it seems to be dwindling constantly. But with polyandry we are not so familiar. This practice is "confined at the present time to a very few groups, notably to the Todas of India and the inhabitants of portions of Ceylon and Thibet." As we have already suggested, this is in all probability due to a disproportion of the sexes. It is interesting to note that these tribes marry endogamously, that is, they intermarry within their own tribes. This endogamy apparently increases "the proportion of male births, and thus may well be a factor in the development of polyandrous marriages."

In many tribes all over the world divorce is free and easy; in others it is not. Dr. Ruskin, the Arctic explorer, tells the writer that among the Esquimaux there is no divorce of which he has ever heard, except with the single exception

where at the expiration of the first year of married life, should the bride not have given birth to a child. Under such circumstances the husband returns her to her mother, all the men of the tribe contributing to her support while the young husband seeks another spouse.

It is a curious fact that some of the rudest people of whom we have any knowledge do not permit divorce under any circumstances. Such are the Veddahs of Ceylon and the Papuans of the Island of New Guinea, among whom death alone may serve to unloose the bond of marriage.

As to the men, their greater powers of organization and co-operation in a common pursuit, especially such as war, developed a larger social and political vision than in woman, whose "feminine virtues and accomplishments most emphasized in all ages have been precisely those relatively individualistic ones developed by the domestic wife and mother. Therefore it is not strange that women as a whole have a more restricted social interest and vision than men."

Now, as to why in certain cases the mother's name was used and men traced their ancestry through the maternal side: Devas thinks it due to the fact that there was easy divorce, making the mother the only permanent member of a family, for she might have from ten to twenty husbands. Consequently, if the children were to have any ancestry at all, it would have to be traced through the mother. Other factors entering were: making the eldest daughter mistress of the household or heiress and thereby, by some years sooner bring a male worker into the home of the parents; or, kings may have wanted to give their daughters in marriage to one of lower rank and then raise the husband's social status. In fact in Spain at present a man is ennobled by marrying one of noble birth.

As all marriages and families are but variations of the

different types we have presented, whether they be developed later into Egyptian, Chinese, Grecian, Roman or more modern types, it is fitting that some conclusions be drawn from the facts so far presented.

In ancient times, for example, in Egypt, women had occupied the very highest places, but it is easily seen that men had ruled before women had, and that the women even while actually ruling considered it an anomaly for them to do so, for we find them wearing artificial beards to make them appear the more masculine.

Of masculine anomalies we find regions, again, where the father being considered the all-important member of the household and the child taking all that was good that he possessed from the father, this idea was carried out to such an extent that at the birth of a child the father had to take to bed and spend some days with the infant while the mother was forced to continue her usual work.

Not only these anomalies but all the many changes that make family life different in different regions and among different peoples have come about, in the opinion of the author, through neither social nor economic reasons but almost entirely through psychological; for, just as in our own country some historian of the future ages while exploring in the regions of Utah may uncover corner stones of great buildings containing records of polygamy and conclude from these that in the year of grace, 1918, the people who occupied this region were just passing through the very infant stages of civilization, so we have been judging the past, instead of realizing that it was but the mental make-up of the individuals who lived in a given region that caused them to follow some leader; in this case, Joseph Smith.

There is no proof that any race or tribe of people passed through certain stages, definite and always akin, until they

came to a higher vision; but it is more than likely that, cast off from the mother-land on account of rebelling against certain ideas there held, these groups followed some leader, who set up a new order of things; and, as we have no record of any nation whatever that has become civilized, except in so far as it has come in contact with another more civilized than itself, if science teaches anything at all it teaches that natural laws always hold good, and that we must believe in the continuity of the underlying and inherent causes in things—then, we must as readily believe that there was somewhere a group of people who had come into existence with a very advanced stage of thought, and who has left its mark on civilization; and it follows that those races which are on much lower levels than their neighbors are not those who did not reach the heights, but those who have fallen from them, their ancestors once having stood much above their descendants.

An interesting side-light is had in the case of the Fuegians of South America whom Darwin considered the lowest of races, but who Professor Max Müller found had a vocabulary of over thirty-thousand words, showing that even here amongst the lowest was proof positive of a decided descent.⁵

After only a few generations in our own mountains of Kentucky we find a people still continuing family feuds and whose standards of living are far from what we should wish them, yet whose ancestors came there but a very short while back—short in so far as history is concerned—but being isolated from the people of the surrounding country, due to mountain barriers, they came to fall far below their relatives in other regions where social intercourse is far more easy. If such cases are found directly, we might almost say, in our line of vision, and resulting from only three or four generations' removal from the parent stock, what will

not people sink to when that removal is placed at ten or twenty generations or more?

Professor John Watson of Johns Hopkins University,⁶ a recognized psychologist and ardent disciple of that branch of modern psychology called behaviorism, who of all people certainly believes in a decided advance among men, says, that in so far as language is concerned, man is immeasurably separated from the rest of the animal kingdom, and adds in a deprecatory manner, and "yet we find scientifically-minded men still searching for the missing link."

Summing up then, we find that man came into existence some time in the past, the exact age of which we do not know, in a very complete form and with a very complete idea of many things and above all with a language and an intellect, so that even where man does the same things that do the animals, he may and can do them for totally different reasons; namely, he follows a leader because he (the individual) thinks, and through thinking decides to a certain extent for himself that that particular individual is to be followed.

And it is this following a leader in the realms of ideas—of thought—that is the main reason for the great divergencies at present existing in marriage, as well as in the many theories held by various men to explain these divergencies.

And these theories took different bents by being held by different tribes or races who separated from the parent stem and then dispersed to all parts of the world. Those of like temperament or mentality, drawn by a common bond became separate tribes and nations in turn, or sometimes, forced by lack of food and severe climatic conditions to leave the place of their fathers, left under the guidance of some leader who had sprung up amongst them, and whose

peculiarity of mind or temperament became then embodied in the customs of such tribe, when that leader had become a sacred memory.

These leaders were called by various names among different people and at different times. Sometimes he was poet, then priest, again medicine-man, and often a great warrior or strong man, but always the ideas of this individual added to that of preceding leaders influenced the people and became part of the tradition which later was embodied into actual laws, punishment being meted out to all who would not obey the venerated customs.

And, if we will only think of this common origin of our laws and customs we can readily and easily understand why, among different peoples, separated from each other and following different leaders who stressed different points, there should be a seeming gulf of great breadth holding them apart, which, nevertheless, is only due to the fact that all men are alike in their method of thought, even though they are not in the choice of subjects they think about; and we should then realize also that we, too, should come to the self-same conclusions as many a savage did, were we to start with the same premises.

If then, by morals we mean the idea of Right and Wrong "written upon the human heart"—that is, *conscience*, and by Ethics we mean the interpretation of morals, we must admit that in all ages and times men have followed their conscience, and as Dr. Alfred Russel Wallace well says in the last volume ⁷ that issued from his pen, there has been not one particle of moral progress among men since the beginnings of history.

NOTES.

1. *The Beginnings of Science*, by Edward J. Menge. Richard G. Badger. Chapters IV and V.

2. *Psychology, Briefer Course*, by Wm. James, in the *American Science Series*, Henry Holt & Co. 1892, p. 461.

3. *The Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, by Willystine Goodsell. The Macmillan Co., 1915.

All quotations from Professor Goodsell, in any of the following chapters, are to be found in this volume.

4. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III. 1897-98, p. 754.

5. See Article "The Savage," in *The Nineteenth Century*, January, 1885, p. 120.

6. *Behavior, an Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, p. 320, by John Watson. Henry Holt & Co.

7. *Social Environment and Moral Progress*, by Alfred Russel Wallace. London, 1913.

CHAPTER VII

THE MEDIEVAL FAMILY

JUST as with the Primitive Family, so in studying the Medieval, we must define our terms and show what points are to be stressed in order that our explanation of changes and divergencies taking place between different peoples may be understood. We must, consequently, constantly keep in mind the four salient points of our immediately preceding chapter, namely: (1) that every institution is the lengthened shadow of a man or group of men; (2) that all divergencies are due to the stressing by a people of some one point in preference to another, which later on, by constantly following out logically to where the stressed point leads, causes an immense difference in their lives; (3) that science means only proven knowledge, and natural science means only the gathering of facts that can be proven in the laboratory; while (4) philosophy, the queen of sciences, weaves these facts into a meaningful whole and interprets our facts for us.

With these important points in memory we may continue. Harding, in his *Essentials of Medieval and Modern History*, well says, that the Middle Ages should be used in the plural, for there were really three of them; the first from the year 375 to about 800, an epoch of transition, the "time of invading Germans and the subjects of the Roman Empire were being fused into one people, and where the remains of classical civilization, the institutions of the Ger-

manic barbarians, and Christianity were combining to form the culture of medieval Europe.

“(2) The typical Middle Ages begin with the renewal of the Western Empire of Charlemagne (800) and lasts till about 1300. It is the age of feudalism, of the might of a church organization ruling every form of human activity, of great struggles between Popes and Emperors.

“(3) The third division is an epoch of transition, from about 1300 to about 1500. It is the time of the Renaissance or ‘re-birth,’ when men’s minds were made free and when state, church, art, literature, industry and society took on new forms.”

Our discussion of the Primitive Family covered the different types of marriage and family organizations up to and through the first period of the Middle Ages, for, while the barbarian tribes were still overrunning Europe, the same types of marriage prevailed that had obtained just prior thereto; and, while in Greece and Rome separate forms of marriage arose and slight differences were evident, still the same theories were yet held that had been held before; the differences in the working out of these theories, however, were due to the difference of stressing one of the following: the individual, the family, or the state. In Greece during that period where the state was considered supreme, we find under Solon the laws by which boys were taken at a very early period and brought up by the state and not in the family. In later Grecian times, and in Rome as well, these laws were not accepted, and consequently the boy could again be trained by his own immediate family.

An ancient practice which comes to mind here as an excellent illustration of what following out an erroneously stressed point may lead to is that of phallic worship, where fecundity being considered the all-important factor—the

stressed point—the organs of generation became the object of worship on the part of those who held this theory, and with it came naturally a consequent lewdness and a licentious ritual.

Then, where slavery existed and women were not free, there could be little question of sexual morality, for being owned, completely and fully by a master, the female slave needs must do what that master commanded. It has been said in conjunction with this, that when conditions of this nature prevailed, every opening of new baths in ancient cities was really the opening of a new place of lewdness, while women at large, caring for naught but luxurious living and feeling that bearing children would detract from such living, yet unable to still the instinctive promptings of their nature, suckled young animals, not even excluding serpents.

Into a world of this kind came Christianity. Starting from lowly beginnings it fought long and hard against one of the most corrupt civilizations of which history has left any record; and how hard it fought we can imagine, when, to-day after almost two thousand years, though winning those in high places to its altar, it has not yet been able to cast out from even those nations who publicly profess it, the same instinctive tendencies that had made the past so corrupt; tendencies which because they are instinctive, are considered right.

We have already shown that Right and Wrong have nothing whatever to do with instinct as here considered, and that any answer to problems of this kind can only be solved by accepting one of the two viewpoints under which all ethics fall, namely the Transcendental or the Utilitarian.

Christianity was persecuted, but during the period of persecution waxed strong; for, men and women seeing these humblest of persons—these who had no social standing

whatever, and who on that account were considered devoid of all those things that made pagan life worth while (that is, were devoid of all individual as well as collective bravery), who always bowed down in humble acceptance of whatever burdens were placed upon them—stand forth under all manner of punishment and calmly pray in their hour of trial to be permitted to suffer still more, must have, and did have a marvelous effect upon the oppressors, attracting many of these self-same persecutors to the Christian ranks. It was the beginning of the idea in that sodden civilization that there must be some truth in the theory that only the Soul matters.

This again illustrates the suggestions previously made that an institution was but the lengthened shadow of a man or group of men. Christianity was the lengthened shadow of Him who founded it. And as Christ had stressed the Soul in all things, so as this new religion gained ground, men and women felt that all things except the soul were but as dross. For if there were a soul, and man is only on earth an infinitesimal period when looked at with the idea of eternity in mind, it was surely the better part of wisdom to care little for anything except those things which would make for a better and more lasting gain to that soul, and give it an everlasting place of contentment and happiness in the eternal world to come.

Unless this point is looked at with sympathy there is no understanding, nor can one even obtain a remote idea of what the Middle Ages stood for. And there can be no background for the study of how we have attained many of our present theories and ideas which are the direct outcome of these ages—which mean so much to us now, yet had their very birth in that past time of which we are writing.

The Middle Ages were an age of Faith in God. We had

almost said: "Were an age of Faith." Of course they were an age of Faith. Every age is. But the Middle Ages were an age of Faith in God. This is what sets aside this particular period from our own times. They had Faith in God, we have Faith in Science.

There would be considerable difficulty for the average man to tell what was meant by science, and those whom he would classify as scientists would in nearly every case be stricken from such list by scientists themselves, for there is an immense difference between the real scientist, who is usually entirely unknown except to his colleagues in the same fields of work, and the man who, with a smattering of scientific terms and a desire to make converts to some doctrine of his own, keeps his name and work before the public so continually that from sheer force of seeing his name in print so often, men begin to believe he must be one of the greatest, if not the greatest, scientist living.

To repeat then, the Middle Ages were ages of Faith in God. Our own age is just as blind in its Faith as was that, *only* we have placed it in Natural Science.

In discussing this very suggestion as to whether there is more or less superstition in the world now than formerly, with one of the great scientists of America, the writer upheld the thesis that there is just as much of it prevalent to-day as there ever was, his opponent contending that this was often supposed because men forgot that when the same act was done for a different purpose it was not the same act; for example, if men of two hundred years ago didn't want flies on their food because they were afraid the devil was in them, that was a clear case of superstition; whereas men of to-day didn't want flies on their food because they carried various germs to that food, and this, though it resulted in the same act of exterminating the flies, was thor-

oughly correct, thoroughly scientific and not superstitious at all. To which we were forced to reply, that in view of the fact that most men knew no more about germs than they did about the devil, it still remained a case of blind faith and rank superstition, man only having transferred his allegiance from God to Science.

The next point to understand is that when we discuss the Middle Ages we mean not only a point or period of time, but a geographical region as well. We mean Europe during the years mentioned. It is from Europeans that we spring—it is the European ideas that have influenced us in all we have done and in all we have accomplished, and had they not been, we should, of course, not be; and had they had other ideas, and, had they stressed other points than those they did, we should now likewise have entirely different viewpoints than we have.

Europe became in 800 the Holy Roman Empire—that is, it became Germany, which embraced nearly all continental Europe. The names that lands have taken unto themselves are often confusing to minds whose training has not made them familiar with the reasons for such names' adoption. So let us not confuse this term "Roman" with the old city-state of Rome which had long ceased to be an empire; the city alone retained the name of "Rome."

The Holy Roman Empire, or Germany, came into existence in the year 800 under Charlemagne and consisted of practically all Europe that made any claims to civilization at all; and it was Charlemagne who wove together this great unwieldy mass of one empire under one Emperor and the spiritual control of the Pope.

Those who are unfamiliar with Church history, which, of course, means those unfamiliar with the history of the Middle Ages especially, must first realize that it is most essen-

tial that they understand the dual viewpoint in the philosophy of life that men of that age held. All men and women who considered themselves Christians with the one exception of the Eastern Church (that is, those under the Grecian Bishops) likewise considered themselves under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome, the Pope. There was no such thing conceivable to men of that time as even a branch of the Christian Church if it did not accept the same dogmas as the mother church. Even the Eastern Church, the one exception of which we have just spoken which did not acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, still held to all the dogmas that the Western Church (that is, all who acknowledged papal supremacy) held, and the very supremacy of which we have just spoken was only cast aside by the Eastern Church at this very period of which we are speaking.¹

But the point to bear in mind is this, that every belief held by any geographical division of the Church was held by all. *A National Church* did not mean then what it does now, when we speak of the National Church of England or of Russia, meaning approximately that the head of the state is also head of the church. What was meant then by an English Church or an Irish Church or any church with a national prefix added, was simply that as to matters of local import, the bishops and clergy of that particular country spoke of themselves as distinct from others. It was merely a convenient form of geographical location and had absolutely nothing whatever to do with any differences of dogma. Among Catholics we find this in very common usage to-day where the Irish Church, the Spanish Church and the Italian Church designate only those Catholics in Ireland, in Spain or in Italy, though all acknowledge allegiance to the Roman See. We must never lose sight of this fact, or

we are bound to make considerable error in our interpretation of any history we may read that pertains to times Medieval. The word Church, then, as used during the entire period we are discussing in this chapter means solely and only the Roman Catholic Church under jurisdiction of the Pope, who held sway in the ancient city of Rome.

As to the dual point of view to which we have called attention, this means, that in matters spiritual the Church was supreme, and that in matters temporal the Emperor was supreme. But, if, as we can readily see, even in our own day we have but to read the great mass of literature daily pouring forth from the press, to find that men cannot yet separate these two things in what we term the most enlightened age that has ever existed, the one side accusing the other of being unable to be good citizens because they owe spiritual allegiance to a foreign pontiff, how much more must this have been misunderstood in days so long ago? All that can be said in such cases is that a mind incapable of separating the spiritual from the temporal, never can grasp the historical aspect at all, and, consequently, all argument is lost. Further, if we of this age can find so many who can not understand this dual viewpoint, we are bound to conclude that there were indeed few who could make this distinction a thousand years ago; but *it was to the minds that could* that this separation appealed, and it was because often in the highest places came unworthy and incapable men who could not make the distinction,—or, if they could, felt that desire for all-embracing power so keenly that nothing was permitted to stand in their way, and who tried to usurp both authorities,—that caused such constant friction between the two orders. It is fortunate that no one holding such a view ultimately succeeded, but the many attempts made to embody both temporal and spir-

itual leadership in one person was the cause of most of the long and bloody wars fought during these periods.

Again, it was the great stress laid upon the spiritual side of life that held men's minds in sway, and which led to their so valiantly fighting for the non-union of these two great ideas in one individual or in one set of men, and which permits us our spiritual freedom to-day.

"It should be remembered that the struggling company of early Christians, striving as they were to realize on earth the pure ethical teachings of their Master, found themselves in the midst of a corrupt and degenerate society, the leaders of which were in many instances shamelessly licentious," says Professor Goodsell,² and while this is perfectly true, the conclusions he reaches from this fact, that it was due to the early Church Fathers placing the stress on the spiritual side, that men and women came to look upon marriage as purely sexual and only *permitted*, though by no means to be praised, are not true, and shows all-too-plainly that he has not caught the spirit of these same Church Fathers.

This is easily understood when it is realized that there were seven Sacraments³ the Church taught and held, and one of these was marriage. As a Sacrament means a sacred sign definitely instituted by Christ which the Church is bound to uphold, and which she has ever considered her choicest possession, it can be seen that marriage was looked upon in a very different light from what we should be led to believe from following the writings of the author quoted.

Holy Orders (ordination to the Priesthood) is also a Sacrament, and as it was known to require a much severer battle with one's lower and baser nature to worthily fulfill the exalted station to which a priest was ordained, it was then, as it is now, considered the more worthy spiritual

life—that is, the life which, due to its hardships, its restrictions, its intense internal struggles which must be fought so often, bespeak a soul that must be more chastened than one who permits his passions greater play. And simply because the fathers spoke in spiritual language, and now there are so few who do not translate everything into physical terms, it is almost hopeless to show that because one upholds a very high standard in one field of ideas, it does not follow that because another field is different, it must therefore be worse, simply because it is different.

Marriage, too, had its devotees in the ancient days, but let us not forget, as Ripley in his *European Races* well says, that every one of us is the descendant of men and women who cared nothing whatever about things intellectual or things religious; and, being descendants of such parents how can we understand many of the viewpoints of the past—those viewpoints having been given us by the intellectuals of the past?

There were really only two careers open to men, one that of the army, the other that of the Church. The soldier cared not for intellectual pursuits; he was anxious to *control*, to wield earthly power. And so every man as well as woman who cared anything for intellectual pursuits, who cared anything for study, for anything that did not savor of mere controlling other human beings for the satisfaction of possessing power, entered the religious life, and as such became celibates. That is, in EVERY GENERATION, *every intellectual individual died without leaving any descendants*. This was very bad from a worldly viewpoint, but it meant something very important to one who does not care for the worldly viewpoint. It meant that through many generations we have seen men and women leave everything they had to follow their Ideal, and it means much

more than the average writer dreams it does; for it means that on the ONLY EVIDENCE THAT MODERN MEN ACCEPT—LABORATORY EVIDENCE—has it been proven that men and women could live a clean and chaste life. This is the crowning achievement of the celibate religious view. It has been proved a success and it has further been proved that the loftiest ideals we have and the most wonderful institutions that have descended to us and of which we are justly proud, came from these men and women. It has shown that clean living and high thinking and beneficent results are not strangers to each other. To these men and women we owe our hospitals, the most beautiful masterpieces of sculpture, of art, of architecture, of education, of philosophy, and we even owe them the beginnings of the Natural Sciences, for these same Natural Sciences of which modern man is so proud, must be traced back to the monk Roger Bacon, so often confused with his namesake, Sir Francis, who lived in Queen Elizabeth's era.

And while Professor Goodsell truly says: "From the beginning of its history the early Church clearly recognized the *spiritual* equality of women and men," for as Clement of Alexandria wrote: "The virtue of both men and women is the same," he thinks that the Church was too far in advance of its time and that it took over a thousand years to make men realize this even partially. We might add that most men have not yet realized it.

But here we must obtain another very essential point, namely, the Validity that these men had for the laws they followed. It is one thing to be a king, a totally different thing to play the part of one on the stage. And so, whatever law was made in the spiritual world, due to the Pope being considered the supreme pastor and representative of Christ on earth, that law having papal sanction meant that

that was proof positive that it was valid. No man questioned such a law's validity, the only thing ever questioned was whether it was expedient.

We have shown already that only in so far as a Creator is accepted can there be absolute validity to any law; and if the Creator in and of Himself is the cause of all law to which men owe obedience, his personal representative upon this earth meant something that most of us of this age can hardly appreciate. But without constantly remembering this point, our study of the family during, preceding, and immediately following the Reformation will prove most farcical. In the pre-reformation days men and women accepted the Pope as the legitimate successor of St. Peter and the personal representative of Christ, and as such his words had the utmost validity. That is, he was the supreme court in matters spiritual and moral, while those who set up laws that did not have his sanction, were only playing the game, and did not even have authority for the game.

The Church, then, by virtue of its supremacy in spiritual matters, laid down the laws as to who might marry and who might not. That is, it was very definitely stated that no one within the seventh degree of blood-relationship should be allowed to mate, this, however, in due time came to be changed to the third degree; that is, within as close a relationship as cousins.

But as soon as laws of this nature were promulgated, as well as those relating to divorce, we meet with the dual viewpoint again. The difference between the rulings of the Church and the laws of Christian Emperors often came into direct conflict, which, of course, was the ripest cause of trouble between the followers of these two great powers. The Church always contending that as the Emperor or Prince was a follower of Christ he had no right to make

any law that was contrary to what Christ taught, and what Christ taught being treasured and kept by the Church and the Church having been instituted for just this purpose, it logically followed that only the Church had the right to pronounce on the validity of any law from the Christian constitutional viewpoint. That is, as we have already said, the Church was considered by herself as well as by all followers of Christ as the Supreme Court of moral values; the teachings of Christ as embodied in the Scriptures and in tradition being the Constitution by which she was alone bound, she having no right whatever to make any additions to or subtractions from the said Constitution.

But it must not be forgotten that this Constitution dealt only with things moral and things spiritual. In the matter of Church government—that is, in the discipline the Church lay down for its own clergy and its members, merely as discipline and not as dogma—the Church had a perfect right at any and all times to make any changes she saw fit. This is another point often misunderstood—the difference between the Church's two-fold work, one her own constitution governing what should and must be done to remain or to become a member of the Church as a society, and the other, her position as the Supreme Court of Moral Values, governed, in turn, by the Christian Constitution, namely, the Scriptures and tradition.

So the Church had not only to fight those Emperors and Princes who opposed her, but there were many customs which on account of their long usage had become so part and parcel of the people that it was with the greatest difficulty they could be thrown aside, and where a particular ruler felt the need of assistance in times of war of another powerful leader, it was but natural that he should not be particularly anxious to antagonize his much-needed ally,

should that ally be fighting the Church. Human nature was the same then as now, and as all those particularly interested in matters spiritual had already entered the Church the rulers and warriors were largely men of great strength of will, with little thought and still less care for those moral values which we now prize so highly.

Such conditions, for example, as abortion, infanticide and child exposure were by no means uncommon, and all this the Church had to oppose against the most severe inherent prejudices. Professor Goodsell thinks that the "doctrine of the Church concerning the damnation of the unbaptized, constituted an important motive for its condemnation of child murder in all forms." It is interesting to note that no such doctrine existed, however, until the time of the Reformation, the Church merely holding then as it does now that the unbaptized do not see God. There was no question of damnation.

In regard to divorce. The Church has never granted her members the right to divorce each other and remarry during the life of either spouse with the single exception of what is called the Pauline privilege, which will be explained shortly. And so-called facts purporting to gainsay this, are taken from the laws of some so-called Christian ruler, but never from the Church.

The Church, as the Church, has never sanctioned divorce, though here and there before the Church definitely defined what she meant by the term, there may have been individual churchmen who did sanction it. The one possible exception mentioned and known as the Pauline Privilege⁴ means that in accordance with what St. Paul taught, there might be—when one is married to an unbeliever and cannot, due to that unbeliever's insistence on his spouse giving up the Christian life, or his not permitting the practice of the Christian

faith—an annulment of the marriage.

There was and is a separation allowed where the grounds are sufficient, so that husband and wife may live apart, but under no circumstances may a remarriage be indulged in, except in the single instance mentioned above.

Lastly, that which is often called a “divorce” by writers unfamiliar with the Church’s teachings is, where a so-called marriage has taken place in opposition to well defined laws against such contract. In such case, as no marriage has taken place, there can be no divorce; it is merely a question of whether or not the individuals were really married to begin with. Surely it is a considerable misnomer to call a thing a divorce when no marriage has taken place!

But with all this continual opposition between Church and Rulers, here are a few things the Church was able to accomplish in spite of that opposition, by sufficiently influencing Christian Emperors to place on their statute books as laws:

“Husband and wife were made equal before the law.

Children were not permitted to be exposed, to be killed or to be taken by panderers and brought up as prostitutes and criminals.

Permission of father to kill his grown-up child was abolished.

Children could not be sold into slavery except in cases of extreme destitution.

The father was no longer permitted to act as judge over the life and limb of his family.

A father could no longer surrender his son to the injured party in a law suit, and so rid himself of all responsibility for his son’s acts and fines.”

The writer from whom we quote, seems to think that all these things were but a continuation of tendencies that the older Romans had already begun, and that the only thing Christianity did was to instill a few new ideas as to prohibited degrees of marriage, celibacy, and those things that followed from the introduction of these two ideas. We believe, however, that we have already shown the inability to accept this view, if we are to throw ourselves into the spirit of the time and understand what these men and women were actually trying to do, and why they were doing what they did.

Monogamy was, of course, the Christian rule, and at first the customs attending marriage were of more or less similar type, there being what we might term the general continental plan, and that evolved in England, which, cut off as it was from the continent, became more and more insulated and its customs developed along somewhat different paths from those of the continent, but always based on the self-same religious belief, for, being in communion with the Roman See, there was no change in any marriage laws that all Christendom had; the changes were merely in customs attending the ceremony which had nothing whatever to do with religious beliefs.

The people on the continent traced their relationship through both father and mother, so that all those having the same grand-parents and even going three generations beyond, were considered as belonging to the same family. The Continentals called this group the *sippe*, while the Anglo-Saxons spoke of it as the *moegth*.

This family group punished its own members and others who injured any member of their group, just as do those who practice feudalism to-day.

The father probably lost considerable of his power over

his family about the beginning of Charlemagne's era, for we have a statute of the "Danish King Cnut, whose oft-quoted law runs as follows: 'And let no one compel either woman or maiden to him whom she herself dislikes, nor for money sell her——' "

Boys were considered of age, at this time, when they were twelve. So, too, were the girls, but the father still had charge of handling the girl's property, and still, probably, represented her in all legal dealings.

Then came the type of marriage called *Bewedding* and *Gifta*. The first meant that there was an agreement between the father of the girl and the prospective husband as to what presents he should make the parents of the bride. The latter meant the actual giving of the bride to the groom, a survival of which is still seen in the Anglican Ritual.

Then came what was called the "morning gift," and first, probably but a trifle, later becoming, however, of vast importance. This was the gift given the bride on the first succeeding morning after the marriage, by the groom, and signified that he accepted her for all time as his wife. Ultimately the morning gift became more valuable than anything else about marriage and came to be a sort of "provision for the wife to be handed over to her at the death of her husband."

Second marriages were, to a large extent, discouraged, and at certain periods many widows and, no doubt, widowers also, sought the monastery immediately after the death of their spouse, probably regretting it later when the first days of grief had passed away and they found their old life again appealing to them. It may be, and undoubtedly was, largely due to these people that abuses crept into some of the monasteries, for, not having the spiritual vocation,

these people chafed under the strict rule they had accepted and caused untold difficulties for which those innocent had to suffer.

Women, both on the Continent and in England, owned their morning-gift as well as all things actually given them, this being called the *gerade*. Such things as "house, linen, furniture, ornaments, money, sometimes even the poultry tended by the bride before her marriage and the sheep her hands had shorn. This personal property of the wife descended strictly to the female heirs." In England women held joint possession of the land with their husbands, while on the Continent they did not hold real property, though probably even in England the husband had control of it during his lifetime.

The home was the center of industry. The men fought and jousted, hunted and fished as always. The women of the higher classes especially did embroidery work which is still famous where any remnants of it can be found. And that one characteristic of women is not a modern development may be understood from an account of Bishop Aldheim "in a quaint eighth-century work in praise of virginity where he complains of the vanity of Anglo-Saxon women who sought to arrange delicately their waving locks, curled artificially by the curling-iron, with their cheeks dyed red with stibium."

Women were sometimes admitted as members of the guilds, even being given their husband's place when the master-workman died.

And then came the second period of the Middle Ages with what is called the Feudal system. During this period everything was judged by men at large in accordance with what service a man could render his lord and master in times of war. Petty rulers and Barons sprang up everywhere,

each with his own fortified castle and his own retainers. The Castle was in reality an entire village, and with the great isolation in which the family had to live, the father was bound to be thrown in very direct companionship with his family more than ever before, and it may be that it was only when this period was reached that by daily contact with wife and children the tenderer emotions that unite husband and wife were aroused, and the beginnings of the first real home-life as we now understand it were brought about.

That there was a charm of companionship, dignified, yet simple, we learn from the following letter, written by Stephen of Blois, quoted by Harding,⁵ "a powerful French noble, brother-in-law of the English king, wrote from before Antioch in March, 1098," while on one of the Crusades:

"Count Stephen to Adele, his sweetest and most amiable wife, to his children, and to all his vassals of all ranks, his greetings and blessing:

"You may be very sure, dearest, that the messenger whom I sent left me before Antioch safe and unharmed and through God's grace in the greatest prosperity. Already at that time we had been continuously advancing for twenty-three weeks, toward the home of our Lord Jesus. You may know for certain, my beloved, that of gold, silver and many other kinds of riches I now have twice as much as your love has assigned to me when I left you."

Then after telling her the news, he ends with these words: "These which I write you are only a few of the things, dearest, of the many which we have done. And because I am not able to tell you, dearest, what is in my mind, I charge you to do right, to carefully watch over your land, to do your duty as you ought to your children and your vassals. You will certainly see me just as soon as I can possibly

return to you. Farewell."

As time went by, and we reach the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the wife could not only inherit, but often assumed her position in the knightly régime and controlled her vassals and assisted her overlord in procuring the proper number of men for his armies.

The position of women had gone down somewhat at the beginning of feudal times, to later develop into the most intense admiration possible to all women, even those far from comely, by all men. It was at this time that men considered it an honor to be deemed worthy of even being permitted to fight with a woman's name upon their lips or some token of hers on helmet or covering the heart.

Later, children of nobles were exchanged and Pages and Damoiselles came into existence, the former to serve their master and mistress by doing humble service, by being taught loyalty and obedience. At fourteen the boy became a squire with ideals of loyalty to Church, lord and lady, and if he showed himself especially able, would have knighthood conferred upon him when he was twenty-one.

The girls learned to weave and embroider, while later in the afternoon they would step into the "quaint gardens" and be joined by the pages and squires. "It is highly probable that most of these young women received some education in reading, writing and in the French language." But the troubadours kept them informed of the deeds of valor, of the history, of the love-songs, romances and epics of their day and time, and above all, the girls were taught not to shrink from the sight of blood, and to be ever helpful in nursing and bandaging when required.

The working classes were divided into three different grades; there were the tradesmen or merchants, the free farmers, and the serfs. The latter "were bound to the soil

and owed clearly defined services in labor to their overlord." Among the merchant class or Burghers, as they were called, there was for some time a coarseness, but as time went by and they were able to procure the benefits of refinements, they naturally copied their lords, for "like master, like man" almost always holds true, and if we can procure a good and true account of those who walked in the higher regions of life, we can always be sure, that sooner or later, those in the lower walks will follow them.

All the Middle Ages stood for, all that they meant, all that they wrought, is too vast a subject for so short a sketch as here given, but we have attempted to present the spirit of the times, at least, so that those who desire to read deeply may the better understand.

It is essential that the intense spiritual attitude of these times be grasped, otherwise we cannot even understand the marvelous perfection men of that day wrought in even their material productions, much less in their ideas that have so profoundly influenced us of later times. Just as an example, let us consider their architecture. We do not find, that in places unseen, the workmanship is any less perfect than in places where minutest detail is caught by every passing eye; in fact, far up on the summits of their steeples, hundreds of feet above the pavement "where only God and the Angels can see" is the delicate handling of the idea to be expressed in stone—as worthy of praise and as admirable in every way as is that which comes directly and constantly before the gaze of an admiring public.

And it was this spirit of perfection—this striving toward a definite Ideal as held up to that age by the Church, that made for the attempt at an ideal marriage state as well as an Ideal in every other field of endeavor.

But then came the revival of Pagan literature—the en-

trance of the "New Learning" as it was called—the study of old Grecian and Roman writings, and the content of these writings holding up the old Pagan Ideals as contradistinguished from the Christian, influenced men and women tremendously. The people at large, finding the multitude reading and speaking of these ideals, assumed as the majority usually does, that because a thing is constantly met with, it must be right. They did not have the ability to understand the beauties of style and form of the literature, thinking only of its content, of its looseness in all things moral, of its total depravity in things spiritual, and began again to follow these centuries-before-discarded theories. These theories, being made a part of their every-day life, caused the undermining of the family, which up until that time had been considered of greatest sacramental character, and these theories also laid the foundations on which the so-called reformers of the time of the Reformation builded.

Let us then remember that during the Middle Ages men attained the very highest conceptions of woman-kind; attained an openness and a frankness by which every man might fight for every woman, and all considered marriage a Sacrament that made the love of man and woman rise from mere sexual union to the most sacred heights.

As always, when any new idea is promulgated, many who accept it go to extremes. So, too, in the Middle Ages there were many extremes, many absurdities, but the beauty of the age taken as a whole; the intensity of making all things romantic; the bringing of those in the immediate family very close to each other on account of all living in the same great castle; the firm knowledge possessed by each that on the spiritual side of things they *KNEW* what was Right and what Wrong, because no difference of opinion entered into the matter, for God had arranged a living head

for His Church as a preserver of the law who could make no errors in matters of Faith, but who could and did interpret what all words meant when any dispute arose. All this made for a family life and a National life of wondrous beauty and positiveness. It led into no vagaries of thought by one man or woman saying: "I think this should be done or that," for when it came to Right and Wrong in the Moral order, there was a Validity to every law that none could question.

This, then, is to be remembered, that due to this validity there was no mental struggle within oneself when an act was to be performed as to its Rightness or Wrongness—there was not the misunderstanding that is now so current because people are brought up under such different conditions and with such varying educations.

NOTES.

1. See following articles: "Orthodox Church," "Eastern Churches," "Greek Church," "Heresy and Schism," sub-title, "Russia," in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

"Orthodox Eastern Church," Vol. 20, p. 334, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, where it is stated that "the final break came in 1054."

2. *The Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, by Willystine Goodsell. (Macmillan.)

3. See any account on "Sacraments" whether it be in any of the small Catholic Catechisms, or under that title in any good encyclopedia.

4. See Article "Divorce" Sub-title "The Pauline Privilege." Vol. V, pp. 60-61, *The Catholic Encyclopedia*.

5. *Essentials of Medieval and Modern History*, by S. B. Harding, 1905.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION FAMILY

IN our chapter on the Primitive Family we called attention to four stressed points, namely, (1) That every institution is the lengthened shadow of a man or set of men; (2) that the only difference there existed between nations and races was that of stressing some one or more points in preference to others; (3) that Science means gathering facts and proving them by laboratory evidence; and (4) that Philosophy means weaving these facts into a complete whole in order to give meaning to the facts gathered.

In our chapter on the Medieval Family we stressed one particular point and that was that after all the four factors above mentioned had been considered, there was still one great outstanding thing to be kept in mind, namely, that the people in Medieval times believed they had a *Validity* for all things they did regarding Right and Wrong, that could never be brought into question.

In this chapter we wish to call attention to three additional things that must ever be kept in mind if a discussion is to have scientific value. (1) We must have *all the facts* in any given case before we can pass a judgment of value; (2) we must have only such a one pass judgment as is capable of doing so; that is, only one who knows his Logic and knows it well is at all competent to read meanings into the facts after we have gathered them, and even if he knows his Logic he must have that range of vision

and breadth of knowledge as well as depth which makes him capable of ascertaining whether the premise itself is correct; and (3) the one passing such judgment must not be dishonest. For, surely it is not only possible, but pre-eminently probable that a man may stand very high in any walk of life, and as such he would possibly fulfill the first two qualifications, yet, having a theory of his own to bolster up, he might, though possibly unconsciously, see only the favorable side. We have an excellent example of this very thing in one of our well-known scientists, namely, Professor Ernst Haeckel of Jena, whose deliberate falsifications of photographs in order to make his own favorite theory of Recapitulation the more probable,¹ has called down upon his shoulders the hearty condemnation of other scientists; but, we find that thousands of people drink in his every word as absolutely proven knowledge.

In history we have a very similar case. We must not forget that immediately after the Reformation began in England, laws were placed upon the statute books prohibiting everything Catholic. Remember, however, that the doctrines of the English and the Roman Church did not change immediately, but as England developed a State Religion, and men of that time were unable to grasp the possibility of a separation of state and Church, it was treason to teach anything pertaining to religion that did not meet with the entire approval of the then existing government, for it was assumed that anything that did not bolster up and defend the state religion was undermining the very foundations on which the government itself rested. England's punishment for treason consisted of hanging, drawing, and quartering—a punishment so exceedingly unpleasant even to contemplate, that it would take a mighty brave man to either write or teach history impartially under such condi-

tions, and even if it were written or taught, the writings would be destroyed as the writer and teacher likewise would be.

Under the circumstances it was not very natural that many men should risk their lives,—though some did. The result of such conditions being that the children brought up under a limited and one-sided instruction, and having it constantly drilled into them that all that did not make for the greater glory of Anglicanism was erroneous, by very force of repetition began to believe it, and the second generation then following, very honestly taught its offspring in turn what they themselves had been taught, still making matters a little worse, for, when things go on from one generation to another, there is always a little touch here and there added to round out the ignominy of those one considers enemies, and likewise a little touch to round out and make more acceptable the things one wishes to make a part of a people's daily belief.

But here is the gist of the matter. From the time of the Reformation until about 1829, no man *dared* to write history of any kind in England that spoke the truth. Do not imagine that the men and women had suddenly turned dishonest. They did not. They simply dared not speak of anything except the English Church when historic subjects were discussed, except to give rather unpleasant comparisons. The children being brought up under such a régime, quite naturally accepted what was given them, for men at large believe that if all the schools teach a thing it must be true. Before Columbus' time, the dominant schools taught the earth was flat. It is easy to draw one's own comparisons.

As England is cut off from the mainland, the English people, except for those few who traveled, were unable to

obtain any true accounts of general history, except what their own government allowed them to obtain. It may be objected that the English were always great travelers. True, but the men who did the traveling were not scholars as a whole, often, in fact, they were not even able to read and write, and it is only those who can give their ideas to a much larger world than mere personal contact affords whose influence is far-reaching. We wish, therefore, to impress most thoroughly upon the reader this fact, that any book written in English and published in England for nearly three hundred years, except as to matters purely English happening on English soil and having no relationship whatever to history or the Church, must be accepted with the utmost caution, and all its statements checked up as to accuracy before being in turn quoted.

As every historian takes the works of his predecessors for his guides and profits by their work, we find untold numbers of writers of to-day, boldly and freely copying every detail of these writers of warped history, and palming it off as historical and factual.²

It was not until the early part of the nineteenth century that some of our American men went to Germany to study, and from that time on we in this country got a broader basis of information in our American schools; not because they studied in Germany rather than in any other foreign land, for had they gone to France or Italy or any other region where scholars were to be found, and where English was not the mother-tongue, they would, in all probability, have obtained approximately the same viewpoint.

We can readily understand, however, why it is so easy to present false history to those whose mother-tongue is English, for, of all people on the face of the globe, probably the Americans and the English, as a people, are the

poorest linguists, and consequently, reading only their own language, the world might be full of truth, but because it does not appear in our native tongue we know nothing of it.

This lack of any language outside our own is no doubt one great factor in foreigners' thinking us extremely boorish and uneducated. But as *we* speak English, we are on that account in extremely close relationship with the Motherland, and we have consequently read only these unreliable English volumes, and drawn all our conclusions therefrom. How can we, under such conditions and circumstances, have a valid and correct view of life?

So much for our evidence of why we have accepted the many things that are not true. Let us give an example of what we mean and show how what we have said is working out *now—to-day—in* the very schools which teach our teachers to again instruct the youth of the land.

Here is a quotation from Compayré's *History of Pedagogy*, used as a text-book in many of our normal schools throughout the country. Under the title of "The Intellectual Feebleness of the Middle Age," we find this stated:

"In 1291, of all monks in the convent of St. Gall, there was not one who could read or write. It was so difficult to find notaries public, that acts had to be passed verbally. The barons took pride in their ignorance. Even after the efforts of the Twelfth Century, instruction remained a luxury for the common people; it was the privilege of the ecclesiastics and even they did not carry it very far. The Benedictines confess that mathematics were studied *only* for the purpose of calculating the date of Easter."

This book of Compayré's which has been translated by the president of one of our State Normal Schools is meant to show by inference that from this example quoted we can

correctly conclude that all the monks of the Middle Ages were an ignorant, worthless lot. In the original French edition, however, the statement is made that there was but one monk who could read and write. The learned translator has improved somewhat upon this, by adding the touch here and there, we spoke of above, and making it read that there was none who could read or write. In fact, in the year 1291 of which Compayré is writing, "there were over twenty thousand students at the University of Paris, almost as many at the University of Bologna, and over five thousand . . . at the University of Oxford, though all Europe at this time did not have a population of more than fifteen million people." So much for showing that in proportion to population the universities were better attended then than now. As to the monastery of St. Gall in Switzerland; this famous establishment was directly in the path of every warring band that came to conquer; it suffered until from one of the most exalted types of what a monastery should be, it became a home for aged warriors, until by the time of which Compayré speaks, this is practically all that it was. In order to live there, these old soldiers had to wear the monkish gown, but, to take this as a fact from which to draw the conclusions that have been drawn, is rather far-fetched to say the least, and—we must not forget that this example is taken from a book which is now in use and one which has been put on the list of REQUIRED volumes to be read in many Normal Schools.³

This presents an excellent example of using but one or two facts from which to draw a conclusion, neglecting all the others. It presents further an excellent example of how minds are poisoned at the very fountain-head of learning—at those schools which instruct our teachers how to teach, and it makes clear our three factors regarding which we

are here writing: that is, the necessity of knowing all the facts; of having only those pass judgment who are capable; and of not permitting one who has a theory to bolster up to write our text-books.

The periods we have so far covered in our short sketch of the Family has brought us up to about the year 1300. We shall now discuss the years 1300 to 1500 which may conveniently be called the period of the Renaissance, or Re-birth. It was during this interval of two hundred years that many things were crystallizing into that which was suddenly to burst asunder the ties that had held men to a moral code for the ages past. The very name of Renaissance—Re-birth—has been criticised time and again on account of its leading those unfamiliar with conditions immediately preceding this time, to assume that a great change took place all at once, instead of carrying with it the idea that whatever change there was, was a growing one, taking two hundred years to accomplish.

As stated in the Medieval Family, the Greek and Roman literatures were again being read, and as Greeks and Romans could only have written about Greek and Roman Ideals—about Greek and Roman life—and as these ideals were all based on Pagan concepts with no understanding of the underlying basis for moral laws as we understand them, the reading of that literature brought into existence various groups and cliques who made a study of particular authors and subjects, just as do Browning Clubs and Shakespeare Clubs in our own day. The ladies of Italy and France kept a salon where men and women gathered. Loose sexual relationship being a very prominent subject of the ancient authors read, it followed that discussions upon this subject were very common at any of these salons.

Now, if every one speaks of and reads this type of litera-

ture, it is but natural that many of the ideals expressed by the authors read should come into common practice, and consequently we find that it is at this age that licentiousness flourished.

Harding says that the Renaissance made "men's minds free," and if we mean that it removed all moral restraint, this is true; if, however, we mean something different by the use of "free" than to cut down every law of decency, it would be well not to accept Harding's statement. A new Hedonism—that is, a philosophy that considers pleasure the only important aim in life—came into existence, and as we have shown, it is the philosophy of life that a man has, that makes for all the difference in the world in his thought and his action.

It was at this time also that men and women took that part of these ancient authors which appealed to them most, as we do in every age, and made it a part of everyday life. In this case it was the doctrine of Platonic love that appealed. And it is this same idea of Platonic love that was one of the very greatest factors in tearing down the sacredness of marriage.

It was quite natural among the many, married only because it was the proper thing to do, that they should then choose some other person than their spouse to whom to give this idyllic love. It was a dangerous practice, for, while there is no doubt of its possibility, there are very few who can love platonically. But once this idea of an idyllic love was stressed and constantly discussed, and then practiced, it made great inroads among all classes of people. It meant, however, that unable to grasp the pure ideal of Plato's thoughts, these people remotely felt they believed in a thing that men at large can never understand, and, finding it led into a physical and forbidden love, used this theory of an

Ideal to cover up and excuse their sins. But, this Platonic love, so-called, loosened the hold that the laws of the Church had upon the people, and the common man and woman, seeing those in the higher walks of life act so constantly and so openly in purely licentious ways, soon came to feel, that if those who were more learned and had greater responsibilities toward their inferiors, considered this action right, they, too, were justified in following.

The next step in tearing down the laws that made marriage sacred came with the advent of Luther after 1517. We do not know how his opposition to authority would have resulted at any other time; we do know how it resulted coming just when it did—just when people's minds were poisoned with this Renaissance doctrine of Pagan Ideals; coming, as it did, when due to a laxness in morals, with which the Church had absolutely nothing whatever to do as we have sufficiently shown, men and women were seeking for an excuse for rendering INVALID those laws which must still have given their consciences a pang real often, even amidst their revels.

So in 1517 the fight began and some three years later Pope Leo X excommunicated Luther. This was the beginning of the more intensive tearing down of all that made any moral law valid. Remember that up to this time no one disputed *the validity of the laws made by the Church in the spiritual order of things*. Men objected to some of the laws, but never for a moment did they object to their validity when passed on as constitutional by the Church. Luther, being backed by German Princes, was able to take a stand directly opposite to this ancient viewpoint, and with the soil so well prepared by the Renaissance, with the people seeking an excuse for loose living, it did not take long before the various duchies and principalities took sides in the

matter.

When the prince of the land has as much sway over his people as he then had, the people being obliged to depend almost wholly on that prince for a livelihood and knowing he had the power of life and death over them, quite naturally, unless they were of the very bravest, acknowledged their prince's religion. Those who didn't were either beheaded or banished, so, after all, whatever religion the prince claimed was bound to be the religion of his people, and when we remember that it was usually those in the highest places, such as princes, who wanted an excuse for their riotous living, the conclusion is obvious.

Further, as soon as Luther's doctrine came into existence that marriage was not a matter for the Church to discuss, it being a purely secular affair to be adjusted by each community for itself,⁴ it does not take any considerable quantity of intellect to understand that men at large, seeing varying and often absolutely opposite laws in contiguous cities, came to consider the matter of stating definitely What is Right and What is Wrong as hopeless, and gave themselves up to not accepting any ruling at all in the matter.

It is easy to understand and imagine what state morals were in; why it was that great civil wars tore the nation, and even when peace was finally brought about, that those who had had one or two generations' training of no principles, should cause untold suffering of all kinds, for these men recognized no valid law of morals whatever. Wives, mothers, and children were abandoned. Luther himself allowed Phillip, Landgrave of Hesse, to live in a bigamous state,⁵ and suggested that as long as it did not give scandal and become known, it did not matter. The only definite conclusion we can come to in a case of this nature is that

wrong does not exist as a wrong, it is only *being found out that it is to be condemned*.

The doctrine that Faith and Faith alone was what counted, became another factor in tearing down the idea of responsibility for one's acts, Luther himself acknowledging that he put the word "alone" into his translation of the Bible after the word "Faith." This placed the idea in men's minds that acts were of no value—the exact thing these men of loose living had been looking for to justify their evil deeds. Likewise, if acts do not count, men and women could not possibly have any very exalted idea of marriage, where the acts of constancy, of protection and of love are all important.

It was now that Germany was becoming infected with the Pagan ideals which had been ripening in Italy and France for over two centuries, but which never obtained any spiritual validity there, such as they were to find in Germany, by having rulers follow Luther's doctrines and making these ideals, or rather the lack of them, a part of the Christian Religion. It was here, also, we find that coarseness sprung forth in the daily literature of the continent, such coarseness, that we of this day, with all our intense love of freedom of expression, would never tolerate. Even such language as Luther himself used in his Table Talks, dare not be printed in English lest the books come under the law against obscene literature.

Most of us are hero-worshippers. We consider some man a decidedly great individual, and then, of course, we very foolishly want to believe only what is good of him. This is an absurdity. One who wants to know the truth; one who has any desire whatever for a scientific discussion of any subject, must have no wants or desires in his findings; he must take whatever is proved. Emotionalism is not for

him.

Another thing that makes for a difficult separation of matters into separate compartments of the mind is this: that during and immediately succeeding the period of which we are speaking there came into existence a great many of our physical comforts and scientific inventions that an older generation had never known. Wealth was being accumulated. Great and luxurious palaces were erected and a sort of etiquette was being born; that is, an etiquette as we now understand it. These people of the past had cared little for sanitation, for evil-smells arising from an unwashed body; for the higher classes used perfumes to overcome all this, while the lower lived so much of their time in the open that they did not mind it. It was the beginning of stressing another point, that of sanitation and that of etiquette. First it was how a person was to act while eating; even Erasmus, that greatest of scholars of the Renaissance, wrote on this subject, and said that no gentleman would lick his plate at table. Another writer announces it is bad form to pick one's teeth with a knife, and there is a great painting which, if we remember correctly, is placed in the National Gallery in London, showing various royal personages at table, in which Mary, Queen of Scots, is shown in the process of picking her teeth, though in this case, she is actually using a tooth-pick.

Queen Elizabeth was also the first queen, if we remember rightly, who wore stockings.

We mention these things, because so many people assume that because it was an age of great activity, that all these comforts which we certainly do not wish to do away with, were caused by the Renaissance and the Reformation, instead of realizing that they were but a product of the time and merely contemporaneous with the moral changes,

neither one being the cause of the other.

We have stated the doctrines of the Church on the Family in our immediately preceding chapter, and called attention to the laws that kept the Family on the exalted plane it occupied during the Middle Ages.

Let us quote Professor Goodsell, whose order of arrangement we have followed. He looks with a very favorable eye upon Luther and the reformers, so his testimony is of more value in this matter than were it written by one who is not in sympathy with that period. He says that Luther made the whole marriage matter a "temporal business" with which the Church should not interfere, but should rather "leave to each city and state its own usages and customs in this regard." (Luther's Preface to the *Short Catechism*, 1529.)

Now, remembering what has just been said about the conclusions that the ordinary man and woman will draw, and are bound to draw, when each community has different and often contradictory laws, we can easily understand how and why and when much of the validity for right living was destroyed, and how and why and when the institution of marriage lost its hold on modern man.

Dr. Kish⁶ quotes Luther as saying that should there be no children born in a family, the wife should, in such case, suggest illicit relationship with some friend of the family or with the husband's brother.

Goodsell says that "the student of the period (under discussion) is particularly impressed by four current ideas and customs with respect to betrothal and marriage: (1) The popular sentiment concerning the nature of marriage; (2) the predominant part played by parents in arranging the marriage; (3) the early age at which betrothal and marriage ceremonies were performed; (4) the view that be-

trothal was a binding contract second only to marriage in its dissolubility.

Marriages came to be looked at from no other viewpoint than as a mere breeding arrangement, by which one might legally procure a maiden from some family of good standing thus assuring healthy children. A sort of Eugenic idea, except that it was rather one-sided, people seeming to forget, or not taking into account, at least, the fact that diseases of the father as just as likely to affect children as are those of the mother.

Remembering also that there was great docility among women at the time of which we are writing, we are not sure but that the words "love, honor and obey" came only after the Reformation, and that not by the Mother Church, but by those who separated from her; remembering also Luther's doctrines as to marriage being of value only in so far as children were born; remembering King Cnute's ruling that no woman was to be forced to mate with any she "misliked," we get a slightly different angle of vision when looking over what the Reformation did in so far as women and marriage is concerned, from what we have usually been taught to believe.

We forget that there were women professors in some of the great universities before the Reformation, but that there were none since then until very recently.

We forget that in all the homes of the well-to-do there were private tutors for the children, both boys and girls receiving the same instruction, which made possible so many brilliant women.

Read the accounts of child-marriages, especially in England, in the Sixteenth Century that Professor Goodsell cites. Such cases as "Roland Dutton, married to Margaret Stanley when he was nine years of age and she but five." They

living apart then until the age of puberty. In this particular case the young groom absolutely refused to accept his wife, and probably the courts dissolved the partnership. The records are filled with child marriages.

During these latter times the husband became supreme; and, may we not validly draw the conclusion, that it was also due to the loosening of the bonds of validity by the Reformers, that removed the binding force of all law, and the husband being in control, it was his desire that something be done to hold at least his women-folk in check which caused the passage "to love, honor and obey" being put in the marriage ritual?

"A French writer of the Sixteenth Century thus describes what should be the attitude of a woman to her husband: 'To pay honor, reverence and respect to her husband, as to her master and sovereign lord . . . obedience in all things just and lawful, adapting herself and bending to the habits and disposition of her husband, like the useful mirror which faithfully reflects the face, having no private purpose, love or thought; . . . she must be in all and through all with the husband . . . wash his feet, keep his house.'"
(Charron, *la Sagesse*.)

No doubt women often did not receive just treatment, but there is also no doubt that there were many men and women who did really grow to love each other after being married, and there is likewise no doubt of those who were not swayed by the Reformation doctrines still believing in moral equality; for we find at this period such a law, as Northern Italy had, that a man was punished for adultery by the loss of an eye.

All living conditions were far from pleasant at this period. Erasmus has said that he thought the plague in England was "partly due to the incommodius form and bad exposi-

tion of the houses, to the filthiness of the streets and to the sluttishness within doors. The floors are commonly of clay, strewed with rushes, under which lies, unmolested, an ancient collection of beer, grease, fragments, excrements . . . everything that is nasty."

In the homes the housewife spent her time in waiting on her husband and doing everything that could there be done, from curing meats, dipping candles, making soap, making bread, doing the family cooking, to brewing the drinks, of which latter alone Markham in *The English Housewife* (1683) mentions twenty-two different beverages.

A factor that often lent itself to misunderstanding was that during the period of which we are writing a marriage made in the present tense was final and valid. That is, any one saying to one of the opposite sex before witnesses: "I do take thee for my lawfully wedded wife" or "husband" as the case may be, became by virtue of that statement legally married. The Reformers, seemingly being unable to understand the difference between this and the idea of telling another that one would marry them at some time in the future, confused the two things; that is, the statement made in the present tense and that made to be consummated at some future time, and great disputes arose.

Professor Goodsell finds fault with the Church for allowing a divorce, as he calls it, in a case where a lady brought proof before the ecclesiastical court that her first husband had not died when she thought he did, and was actually alive three years after the second marriage ceremony was performed. But surely if she brought this proof, even if it came from perjured witnesses, as far as the court was concerned, if it did not know of the perjury, how could it have rendered any other decision than to declare the second marriage invalid? For, there being a husband already,

the lady in question could not, in accordance with the existing law, take unto herself another during his lifetime. But we are constantly finding just this type of reasoning among writers otherwise exceptionally able.

Let us review, then, what has been said. We find that it was the casting aside of all that made for validity that brought about the downfall of the Family, and it was this casting aside of validity plus the re-entry of a literature that again introduced Pagan Ideals in men's lives with all its looseness of morals that weakened the sacredness of the tie that is called marriage.

The Puritans tried to overcome this looseness by extremely rigid laws, but they were unsuccessful with their methods, though their aim was commendable. They did not succeed because they did not have the proper perspective—they did not have a historic background, that is, they did not understand the real and deep causes, and so, erroneously assumed that a mere civil enactment could and would make men good. And lastly, they failed because they lacked the validity, and the ability of establishing that validity which the old Church ever claimed as its own.

Dr. Foerster, professor of Education in the University of Vienna, in his *Marriage and the Sex Problem* (1912), covers the ground for the older Ethics with its doctrine of validity that gave men and women something definite to lean upon. He well says in regard to voluntary restriction of the number of children born into one family, for example, that the "most excessive production of children could not endanger women so greatly or so deeply undermine the true necessities of their existence as will the artificial restriction of the family. For such methods unleash the male sex passion by relieving it of all sense of responsibility for the results of its indulgence. The true cure for the evils of excessive

childbirth is to be found in man's mastery of his sexual nature which shall ensure the liberation of the woman from every species of sexual slavery," and Professor Goodsell sums up what many sociologists hold in criticism of this and similar passages, in these words: "But when full recognition of the sanity of many of Dr. Foerster's positions has been accorded, it is probable that the reader will feel dissatisfied with his solution of the problems of sex and marriage. In the first place, few educated men and women of the present day will be willing to surrender their individual judgment, trained more or less, to unbiased conclusions, into the keeping of the Church, and to return to the religious idea of marriage as a sacrament whose form is a sacred symbol."

We have sufficiently shown, we believe, that it is a man's philosophy of life that counts, and this philosophy is a psychological and spiritual matter. Now what Professor Foerster is trying to convey is not as Professor Goodsell seems to think, an attempt to give up passing judgments, and assigning our intellectual practices into the keeping of some institution, simply as an institution, and simply because it is considered best that such should be done. It means this, and this only, that if we go deep enough in our thinking and if we think clearly enough, and follow out our thoughts to their logical conclusion, we come to exactly the same viewpoint that does the Church. It means, we shall be in accord with the Church's ancient teachings if we define our terms clearly, and then work out logically what we are bound to accept if logic and thought mean anything; it means that if we are thoroughly scientific, which means that we accept all the facts in the case as presented through our senses, and then use our philosophy to tell what all the facts mean, we shall find we come to exactly the point the

Church has come to. But we must be very careful not to begin with any preconceived notions and inherited prejudices, or we shall arrive at truth only by accident, and an accident of this nature is not at all likely to occur.

That the idea here presented, and ably defended by Dr. Foerster, *does* appeal to educated men is shown by the very fact that men such as Professor Foerster defend it, and there are few men who rank higher in their respective fields of work than does this same writer. That *it does* appeal to educated men is shown by Professor William James's statement in his *Pluralistic Universe*, where he admits that unless he accepts the Scholastic Philosophy, life must be conceded illogical. That *it does* appeal to educated men is shown by the fact that Professor de Wulf has been brought from the University of Louvain to Harvard to instruct students in this philosophy. That *it does* appeal to educated men is shown by the fact that Johns Hopkins University offered a professorship to the Jesuits in Scholastic Philosophy which however they declined. That *it does* appeal to educated men is shown by the fact that Columbia University has been listening to lectures on Scholastic Philosophy recently, and that in England great crowds attend lectures on this self-same subject whenever given. That *it does* appeal to educated men is shown most conclusively by the great number of volumes coming from the press on Scholastic Philosophy each year.

We do see, then, that in all the walks of education—in our most renowned institutions of higher learning—that that philosophy based on common-sense—the only philosophy which takes into consideration the entire field of human life, but does not permit the extremes and the vagaries of either idealism or materialism to hold the mind in thrall—has made its impress, and is rapidly coming back

into its own by those who are willing to start at the very simplest beginnings and take, regardless of whether it be pleasant or not, all the facts into consideration and follow wherever logic leads.

Daily men are coming back to that philosophy which takes things physical and things spiritual into consideration, granting each its proper sphere, but which attempts to find and understand the relationship between these spheres; not denying either's existence simply because one may not be able to understand more than one point of view.

When this philosophy is taught our boys and girls again, when Social Workers understand it, their words will ring with truth, and they will not only know whereof they speak, *but they will know that they know*, and be able to give an account for the faith that is in them; they will be able unhesitatingly, to give an intelligent reason for their acts based on firm intellectual and historical evidences.

They will not then take to themselves with such avidity every new theory, simply because it is plausible. It is of plausible things we must usually beware, for it requires trained minds to catch the underlying falsity, should there be falsity there, and there are but few such minds abroad.

So with all we have said held in mind, let us summarize:

(1) It is essential that we remember the past history of the Family.

(2) It is essential that we have Validity for every act and theory by which we wish to influence others.

(3) We must have *all* the facts in a given case before being able to pass judgment.

(4) We must know the relationship between the facts gathered as well as the relationship between the branches of science in which the facts have been found.

(5) We must accept no man as an authority until it has

first been shown that he is honest; that he knows this philosophy of the entirety of which we have just spoken, lest he, by only seeing one side of a discussion, lose that relationship on which we have laid so much stress.

If all this be kept in mind and lived up to, one not only understands that the Church holds only what any man would hold, did he start with the same premises and draw his conclusions logically, but one is able to understand even the sacredness of marriage without accepting any religious faith of any kind, for one would understand that in the act of procreation God has made man and woman partners with himself, in that He has made it possible for them to assist in the act of creating a new human being—to bring forth another living image of God. And any union based upon such an exalted plane, if entered into with that idea in view and dominated with that spirit, must be sacred if the word means anything at all.

To attempt to put all we have said on the Family in one or two lines we may say that with the history of the Family at our command, with the philosophy of common sense as our guide, we can again make the Family that Sacred Institution which it once was and which most of us regret it is, all too-often, not at the present time.

That is, without the proper backgrounds and without the proper philosophy of life we make people only a little better physically, a little better from a sanitary viewpoint; but, spiritually and morally, where all progress comes from, we leave them exactly where they were, or even worse than they were, for any faculty of the human being not constantly used is bound to atrophy, and this is as true of morals and spirituality as of an arm or a hand.

NOTES

1. See Note 3, Chapter V, in *The Beginnings of Science*, by Edward J. Menge.

2. It is well to refer to an Englishman in regard to this. Dr. James Gairdner, of which the London *Athenæum* says: "There is no living writer more thoroughly equipped for producing a trust-worthy work on the English Reformation than Dr. Gairdner (non-catholic). Now that the one man in England who has the whole of the facts at his fingers' ends, has spoken with such deliberation, no decent writer, however staunchly anti-papist in his convictions, ought to cite Legh or Layton to substantiate tales of the vicious lives of the monks. 'It was only after an able and despotic king,' says Gairdner, 'had proved himself stronger than the spiritual power of Rome that the people of England were divorced from their Roman allegiance; and there is abundant evidence that they were divorced from it against their will.'"

See also, Article on Dr. Gairdner, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

3. *The Thirteenth the Greatest of Centuries*, by James J. Walsh, pp. 67-70.

4. See *Luther*, by Hartmann Grisar, S. J. Translated by E. M. Lamond. Published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., London, 1913. (6 volumes.)

The value of this biography consists in actual quotations from Luther's own works as well as from the works of his disciples, and not in a mass of opinions collected by those who are antagonistic to the German Reformer. These quotations are definitely cited, word for word, with page and volume from which they are taken, so that any disputed or doubtful quotation may be substantiated.

5. See any account of Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, in any good encyclopedia.

6. *The Sexual Life of Woman*, by Dr. E. H. Kish. Rebmanns.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY

THE object of all training is to obtain those particularly valid principles upon which all our evidence must rest for anything we wish to prove.

It is therefore essential that we know what science and philosophy mean, for science is our method, and proof is accepted only in so far as we have followed the rules laid down by it, plus our logical interpretation of the facts thus found.

In the study of anything in the nature of social problems it is essential that we stand off far enough to obtain perspective—and this perspective can be obtained only by knowing the history of the institutions we wish to study.

Those then who write on any social subject without regard for this history of the past must not be taken seriously.

We are seeking some kind of gauge by which to measure the worth of a writer on social subjects.

We are trying to show the difference between acuteness and depth.

Our terms must be defined. For example, we must think of progress as something that starts very definitely somewhere and carries us forward from that point. We must distinguish between individual progress and race progress. The latter alone counting if we mean any actual getting forward, for we have shown that individual progress must necessarily end at practically the same point for each per-

son, thus making no true progress at all.

The value of a knowledge of the past is twofold, *i. e.*, to avoid the errors into which others have fallen, and prevent the waste of our efforts on dreams and theories that cannot succeed.

We must be able to distinguish between those things which occur in the lives of a people due to the mere occasion of living at the particular time they did, and the results that flowed from a philosophy of life they held.

We must be able to understand the terms men and women used as referring to things and conditions of their particular time, and not read into them what these terms may mean to us now.

We must understand what was meant by such a term as the Church, namely, a Supreme Court of Moral Values that merely stated whether a law made by Christian princes was constitutional or not, and, that this Constitution was a logical development of what Christ taught.

Every one accepted the Church as such Supreme Court, and consequently laws had a validity when sanctioned by the Church they do not now have.

The Divine Constitution was not arbitrary as so many believe, but was the working out of those logical laws which every normal man uses constantly; and the findings of this Court were the same that any man by mere virtue of the fact that he was a man would have to come to were he passing judgment on similar cases with the same knowledge of the past that these men possessed.

In fact all the laws of this constitution were based on exactly the same principles that make any of our thinking logical and valid to-day.

But there were those who fought the Church for selfish ends, and these being very powerful at times, and having

many vassals, laws were set up and enforced by these men in direct opposition to the Church who had the authority but not the power to enforce her findings.

It is to these opponents of the Church that the enemies of the Church point when finding fault with her.

It does not matter whether we like these things or not. Any one who defends or rejects a fact because of personal like or dislike must never be considered worthy of discussing anything intelligently.

It is a custom now-a-days not to discuss universal principles, for the minute a man begins to think deeply, and finds principles, he has a religion, and religion with many is taboo.

President Hibben well says that the doctrines of the schools at last become the maxims of the crowd; it is therefore of the utmost importance that we pay the strictest attention to what is being taught in our schools to-day.

We laugh at the men of the past, but those who come after us will have more occasion to laugh at us; for, those of the past persecuted a man for his principles, while we praise and fête him for what he teaches and then most inconsistently throw him into prison for following out the principles he taught.

Our ability to "perceive what are the wrong things increase in an uncanny and devouring clarity," while "the eye that sees clearly what things are right is growing mistier and mistier every moment, till it almost goes blind with doubt."

What is the good of discussing what should be done to bring better and better men into the world until we have first settled what is the good of being a man?

On what basis can we discuss what is Right and what is Wrong?

And let us not, due to our association of physical com-

forts originating at a certain period of history with the ideas then held, assume that if we see past ideas of more value than those of the present again being suggested, it means the coming back of the days when physical comforts are to be thrown aside.

We must know what *training* means, and that the brain must have its regular exercise constantly during the growing period so that it will continue developing, just as muscular exercise is necessary to arm development.

Let us not forget that the brain reaches its maximum size close on to when the child is fifteen years of age, and that what he has been taught during these years remains with him longest.

Further, that likewise, what has been left untaught, will be very likely to remain untaught.

That, consequently not knowing the principles underlying great events, and likewise not knowing his own ignorance, the individual without proper training becomes the worst enemy society has to cope with; for, imagining he knows when he is ignorant, he carries conviction with him by the mere fierceness of his onslaught alone, and not by his reasoning.

Often, too, this type of person is a good neighbor and a genial companion, and works havoc in his community by being placed in positions of power on account of these traits, when he possesses no knowledge of the department over which he presides.

In other words, there is an immense difference between a good, honest, and firm man, and a man who KNOWS.

We must obtain all of our principles during our early years. Later we only apply what we have learned in youth.

Intellectual training alone without philosophical and religious convictions can make a man hygienic but never moral.

It is this lack of a complete training, always excepting feeble-mindedness, that is the principal cause of both boys and girls going wrong, as is sufficiently evidenced by the facts quoted.

Very few persons continue studying after leaving school; in other words, by mere non-usage of their brain power, the older these people become the more atrophied and worthless their opinions.

But to pass an opinion of whether a certain thing ought to be taught or not, requires a knowledge of the principles on which Right and Wrong rest.

These are two only: either one must accept the Transcendental viewpoint which accepts a Creator and takes the ultimate end for which man was created into consideration, or one must accept the Utilitarian standard which has for its primal fact the doctrine of delectation,—that is, pleasure.

But pleasure and duty are not by any means synonymous, and the Utilitarian doctrine holds good only for optimists.

All are agreed that a second factor likewise enters, namely, that only what is pleasurable in the long run is important.

Having our theories of Right and Wrong we apply them to one or two prominent social problems.

Birth control is one of these problems. By it is meant that by ARTIFICIAL MEANS the sperm of the father is to be killed or prevented from reaching the egg of the mother of the not-wanted babe.

This is not to be confused with abortion. It is not killing an infant—it is preventing such infant from coming into being.

But the very agreement entered into by the contracting parties in marriage implies that they mean what they say—that they are responsible for the act of marriage, just as

all our daily acts in any civilized state are dependent upon our assuming responsibility for our own acts and allowing a like responsibility to others with whom we have to come in contact.

Without responsibility for his every act and deed, no man is worthy of notice in any civilized society.

By Natural Law we mean only that a man must be willing to assume responsibility for his every act and deed, or he cannot be trusted in anything, as no one will know where to draw the line.

If, further, nature shows there is a penalty for breaking any natural law, we have a double assurance that we are correct in respecting it.

In the practice of birth control by artificial means, we find penalties attached, such as dissatisfaction on the part of the parties affected, and cumulative physical and psychological effects that are entirely too serious to be neglected.

Further, the practice of such method takes away all restraint from the male, producing a more frequent sexual desire than otherwise, and thus again injures the woman.

Still further, keeping the idea of "not-wanted" in the foreground it works upon the mind of the couple constantly, lessening the value of human life, until little by little it seems to possess no value at all; and, thus also breaks down the very first barrier that makes a man responsible for his every act and deed. For, having thrown aside responsibility for his act in this instance, little by little he throws it aside in other instances.

Because a practice of this kind may be indulged in by many has absolutely nothing whatever to do with whether it is right or not.

It is necessary to take one or both of our Principles on which Right and Wrong rest, or we cannot validly pass an

opinion in a case of this nature.

We have shown how birth control by artificial means breaks a natural law and undermines the very principle on which responsibility for one's acts and deeds rest, thus showing it to be wrong from the Transcendental viewpoint.

We have shown that it is physically hurtful, and even aside from such physical injury, injures in the long run both the parties practicing it and the race, by tearing down the barriers of responsibility for one's acts, increasing the feeble-minded, insane and criminal types, while it decreases the number of sound and healthy children.

Consequently it is opposed to the Utilitarian principles of Right.

We have called attention further to the fact that with a training such as the average individual receives, which teaches him that majorities settle the matter of Right and Wrong, when the increase in feeble-minded, insane and criminals shall have taken place, it will be by criminals, insane, and ignorance that even the children of the sound parents will be controlled.

Still further, Asia with its more than half the population of the entire globe will then be in a position to seek an outlet for its overflowing peoples, who, by sheer force of numbers will crowd our children from their native soil.

So that from every conceivable angle, birth control by artificial means must be considered thoroughly indefensible.

With Sterilization, we must first settle our principles of Right and Wrong as we did in discussing birth control. Are we ever permitted to mete out punishment for the acts of any person who is not responsible for his actions? If so, it would be permissible for every warring nation to cut off the hands of all male children lest at some future time they bear arms against their conquerors.

Insane and feeble-minded are not responsible for their acts, therefore it is morally unlawful to punish them. They may be segregated so as to prevent injury to themselves and others, and, if this be considered a punishment, it is only so incidentally. They were not segregated for the purpose of punishment.

As to the insane and feeble-minded a further reason may also be assigned as to their not being sterilized, though the one stated is amply sufficient. It has not yet been proved that these things are inherited, though most texts seem to consider that it has been. The authors of these volumes assume this primarily on account of having observed that children from subnormal parents often follow in their parents' footsteps. But this can be laid to training in any number of cases, and not to heredity. It seems from all the evidence so far gathered that feeble-mindedness and insanity are due to a micro-organism.

This leaves only the criminals to consider when discussing sterilization. But, it has been shown, that sterilization may create a greater sexual desire in the sterilized male than was formerly there. If we stop to consider what this means, we find we are really injuring ourselves more than we are benefited by this operation.

Sterilization does not prevent the individual from having sexual intercourse; and, all checks being removed, and a greater desire being instilled, at least in the male, if he had criminal tendencies before, and had seduced any girls prior to his sterilization, he will quite naturally be inclined to seduce many more afterward.

And, on moral grounds, it is causing him to, due to his lack of will power, commit more sin than formerly, by producing greater desires without any corresponding increase in will power.

As to Eugenics, which means to be "happily-born" we have the interesting biological fact to contend with that the vast number of eggs and sperm from which a possible fertilization may spring, make the chance so slight of ever getting the ones we want to meet each other, that we cannot even dream of such chance being fulfilled.

In regard to Sex-hygiene, all are agreed that the child should be taught, but the problem is, who is to be the teacher?

Very few men or women are capable of doing this. Parents are the logical ones to give such information, but to do this, parents themselves must be trained. This information should come from one who has a thorough knowledge of both the moral and the natural law. A comprehensive volume that will do this is needed, and this instruction to parents should come at the time of marriage.

The child must be made to feel and to know that, as has already been said, morals are not mere matters of arbitrary law; that they do not obtain their validity because Church or Bible says so, but that underlying both Church and Bible are these selfsame verities and principles to which the Church and Bible but give expression, and parents must be able to see that without Religion there can be no morality, but they must not confuse Religion with *some form of Religion*.

The child must not be told a lot of things that are not so. In classes of biology there is much opportunity to teach some of these things, provided the sexes are kept separate, or, it may produce but an opening for salacious conversations.

The child must be shown the difference between being moral and being hygienic. That no matter how good a life he lead, if he does not do this intelligently and intentionally

because it is good and moral, he is very immoral. *It is the intention that counts.*

Having shown *how to apply*, as well as *how to find* the necessary principles with which to begin any study of social problems, we then consider the most important institution with which things social deal,—the family.

Here we take up the history and state of the primitive family, showing what is meant by primitive, and how the evidence for our conclusions is obtained.

Then we consider the principal theories which various writers assume as true before starting their discussion.

The child being born with certain nerv-arcs having a tendency to function in certain definite paths, all teaching is but changing these pathways; that is, teaching means forming associative habits. But if a prejudice of any kind has been associated with anything taught, it will always come forth at any future time whenever any idea is presented that is even remotely connected with the original thing taught.

This is as true of what one's notions of evolutionary theories happen to be as it is of what one reads into history.

It is therefore important in all study not to choose a single writer or a single group of writers to follow, for most men are inclined to quote only those who favor their own viewpoints.

There has been no evolution in either perfection itself or in *man's method of thought*. *That is, he is a logical animal*, whether he will it or not.

The stressing of one or more points is all that makes any psychological difference³ that exists between nations and peoples.

By the term Family is meant a husband with all his wives and children, or a wife with all her husbands and children,

though it is often used in another sense, meaning those particular groups which trace their lineage from a common ancestor.

There are three types of marriage, namely, polygamy, polyandry, and monogamy; meaning respectively, having several wives, having several husbands, and having either only one wife or one husband.

The various theories advanced to explain the history of the family are principally the Matriarchal, the Patriarchal, and the Economic.

Not enough attention is given to the psychological aspect of the case; that is, to the desires, emotions, and the mental and spiritual values that people have placed on certain theories of men.

Evidence seems to point to the woman having had considerable choice in earliest times in choosing her mate.

Some tribes and nations standing on equal planes in the intellectual scale, allow divorce and some do not.

Darwin considered the Fuegians lowest in the scale of intelligence, while Professor Max Müller in investigating these people found they had a language of such wealth of expression that it was conclusively proven that they must have occupied a much higher state of existence at some time in the remote past, showing that there are ups and downs in the lives of nations as there are in the lives of individuals, and, leading us to accept the dictum of Alfred Russel Wallace, who says in his last book, that so far as evidence is concerned, man has not made one particle of moral progress since the beginnings of history.

In discussing the family during the middle ages, we must remember that there are really three divisions to this period: 375 to 800, 800 to 1300 and 1300 to 1500.

But the entire middle ages were ages of Faith in God, at

contradistinguished from the present age, which is an age of Faith in Science.

The Church during this period began its distinct sway over the greater part of Europe which brought civilization out of chaos.

Up to about 800 (the era of Charlemagne) the entire Christian world was of one faith. It was shortly after this time that the Eastern Church separated from the Western, both however to this day holding nearly all doctrines in common, showing that what is held to-day by these two great divisions of Christianity must have been held by the Church universal during the time preceding such separation.

We must not confuse the temporal power of an individual with the spiritual. We must not confuse laws made and enforced by so-called Christian princes with those laws which the Church made on distinctly church matters for her own members.

Marriage was always a sacrament to the ancient Church. So was ordination to the priesthood. And as it required greater strength of character and will power to live truly as a celibate, it was considered of greater dignity to receive the sacrament of orders than of marriage, but marriage being a sacrament, it was a divine sign instituted by Christ, and consequently, held in great honor.

The men of the past stressed the spiritual side of all things and as we of the present day interpret everything in physical terms, most of us fail to catch their vision or their viewpoint.

We must not forget that there were only two careers open to men. The army and the Church. Every one who cared for anything intellectual at all took orders, while those who did not entered the army; so, the intellectuals of all these cen-

turies being celibates, all of us are the descendants of men who cared nothing for anything but power. In fact under such a régime, all the intellectuals died out in each generation, and a new group of men handled the reins in each succeeding generation.

The Church always taught the equality of man and woman in her province—that of morals.

The Church considers marriage a mere natural contract before the dawn of the Christian era; a sacrament after that time, and as such, marriage must be amenable to her jurisdiction.

A few of the things the Church was able to do during these great days were, abolition of abortion, infanticide, and child exposure, as well as preventing the father from selling any member of his family into slavery, or from having the power of life and death over them.

No divorce with privilege of remarriage during the lifetime of one's spouse was permitted. And any statements made to the contrary are based on the inability of the writer to understand the difference between a divorce proper and a court's finding a marriage illegal; that is, that it did not exist at all—that the parties in question had never been married.

The single exception to this is known as the Pauline Privilege which means only, that when one is married to an unbeliever and such unbeliever will not consent to the Christian living according to his faith, the believer need not live alone thereafter.

The second period of the Middle Ages saw the birth of the Feudal System. Entire villages were encased in great walls, making almost one castle, where the lord and his family lived with his retainers. This bringing the family in extreme close relationship, probably brought forth a greater

appreciation of the opposite sex by men and women, and led to a noble family life, but also to a great exaggeration of womankind in many ways.

The lower classes always copy those in higher places and if we can obtain a good knowledge of the upper and ruling classes, we may always be sure that sooner or later those in the lower walks of life will follow.

The aim of the period was to obtain perfection, as exemplified by the wonderful achievements in every field of endeavor.

The last portion of the Middle Ages, 1300 to 1500, is known as the Renaissance, or Re-birth, lasting, as it will be observed, for two hundred years, during which time the old pagan literature was again brought forward, instilling into the minds of men and women Pagan ideals, loose sexual relationships, and Platonic love, opening the way for the Lutheran Reformation and all that went with it.

We speak the English language, and most of us are not linguists, so, all our information has been garnered by reading what was written in English. But England from the time of the Reformation up to well into the last century did not permit any one to write the truth when it reacted unfavorably toward the government or the English people. In fact English history has been deliberately falsified.

Historians are unable to check up every statement of their predecessors, and so copy what those who have gone before have written, thus perpetuating an error.

We have an example in our own land of such misstatements in Compayré's *History of Education*, which leads to an entirely erroneous opinion regarding the time of which he writes, by withholding certain very important knowledge.

We must therefore seek in other languages for reliable information, and we must be able to see the difference be-

tween an opinion expressed by the historian, and an actual quotation from some writer of the past showing what he himself taught or believed.

As has been said, the Renaissance brought forth sensual ideals, which, having nothing higher than the gratification of the mere senses as an ideal, sank to pure sexuality.

With men and women thinking only of things sexual and sensual, any training there was left of the past must have caused a pang of conscience every once in a while, and produced a desire for some justification for throwing aside all those moral ideals of a bygone time.

Luther appeared at the psychological moment. His doctrine that marriage was not a sacrament and was a matter for each state and city to adjust for itself, as well as his teaching that Faith alone justified, caused all men and women who sought an excuse for immoral acts to find it here. No matter what Luther may have meant by this doctrine, no matter how much his followers may try to explain it away, the fact remains that men and women of his day found his doctrines very pleasing to their comfort of mind.

His further doctrine that any woman not a mother after due time had elapsed should call on friend or brother of the husband, to father a prospective child, did not add anything to the dignity of marriage.

Conditions became worse until the Puritans tried to overcome them by legislation. They were correct in their desire but erroneous in their method.

Dr. Foerster's book is full of excellent suggestions of great importance in social work, and should be in every one's library.

We must not make the mistake of Professor Goodsell, in assuming that Professor Foerster is trying to make individuals give their intelligence into the keeping of the Church



or any other institution; but, we must realize that he is seeking to have men and women go down to the very roots of the matter under discussion, or, as we should put it,—to take up the study of Scholastic Philosophy again—which cannot but help to clear up so many superficial and absurd theories that are cast afloat every so often.

It is as erroneous to take this view of Professor Goodsell's as it is to assume that because we insist upon the study of grammar we are trying to prevent speech. We are but trying to make speech correct, and so by the study of Scholastic Philosophy we are but trying to put our reasonings into such form that they will have that same validity for men and women at large now, that the approval of the Church in the past had for the people of that day and time.

Apparently this is realized and appreciated by several of our largest universities, where lectures in Scholastic Philosophy are now conducted.

And finally, we must always remember, that until we have all the facts in a given case, a man with sufficient intelligence to understand and interpret them, and a lack of prejudice in searching for results, we may not validly say that we are sure we are right in anything.

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See also all articles on such subjects as Family, Divorce, Sociology, Right, Wrong, Morality, Ethics, Science, Philosophy, etc., in the following Encyclopedias: *The Encyclopedia Britannica*, *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, *The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Consult the *Periodical Index* in any Public Library to find dates, and Journals in which articles written on any of the subjects mentioned in this book are discussed pro and con.

Chapter XII, in *The Beginnings of Science* above mentioned, gives a very comprehensive list of volumes to be read which bear a vital relationship to the chapters in this book, while at the end of each chapter in Professor Goodsell's volume on the Family an excellent bibliography is given for those who wish to go deeply into the study of that subject.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF SCIENCE

Biologically and Psychologically Considered

BY EDWARD J. MENGE, M.A., PH.D., M.Sc.

Professor of Biology, Dallas University

Author of "Backgrounds for Social Workers"


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